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1.1 MIND THE GAP
Over the past few decades, until the onset of the Great Recession, real dis-
posable per capita incomes have grown steadily in OECD countries. The benefits
of this income growth, however, were not equally shared amongst households.
On the contrary, most OECD countries witnessed a widening of the income
distribution. Earnings grew more dispersed in particular (Morelli et al., forth-
coming). This was for a significant part due to increases in wage differentials
between low- and high-skilled employees (OECD, 2008a; 2011a).
Only fairly recently, rising income inequality has returned to the political
agenda as a major concern for policy makers and society at large. Piketty’s
thought-provoking premises of an increased concentration at the very top of
the income and wealth ladder in his magnum opus ‘Capital in the Twenty-First
Century’ (2014) has gained wide attention in academic and political discourse.
The Great Recession has further fuelled the imperativeness to cope with policy
issues stemming from rising levels of earnings dispersion and stagnating
earnings at the bottom and middle of the distribution (Jenkins et al., 2012;
Salverda et al., 2014).
Inequality is inextricably linked with ideological issues of fairness and
equity. Inequality is a potential source of injustice when the income distribution
is a result of rent-seeking behaviour, or when a lack of financial means inhibits
people to pursue personal goals and realise their potential (Cingano, 2014).
In the same vein, inequality can be deemed unfair from a perspective of
equality of human beings and humanitarianism (Rawls, 1971). On the other
hand, earnings differentials can be justified when they simply reflect personal
choices in amount of effort, or productivity differences from which society
at large can benefit (Mankiw, 2013).
I will refrain from taking ideological positions in this doctoral thesis. What
should be core societal objectives and what level of inequality is defensible
are normative questions. Conversely, what has caused such inequality, what
effects it may have on economic and social wellbeing, and what policy strat-
egies could be implemented in the case of public interference are more factual
questions. The importance of analysing these issues looms large with a wide-
spread widening of the income distribution. This doctoral thesis aims to
contribute to such an inquiry. At the same time I emphasise the imperfections
and limitations of the analysis presented here.
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1.2 UNTYING A KNOT
The widespread trend of rising income inequality evokes a number of ques-
tions. To begin with, how can we explain this pervasive pattern of growing
income disparities? Three explanations are regularly put forward, namely
labour market institutions, international trade, and technological change
(Atkinson, 2003; Brandolini and Smeeding, 2009; Oesch, 2013).
A first line of explanations for employment and wage variations are
changes in labour market institutions (e.g., Rueda and Pontusson, 2000; Mahler,
2004; Martin and Swank, 2012; ILO, 2015). Labour relations and the bargaining
power of employers and employees can have an impact on the distribution
of wages and other working conditions (Martin and Swank, 2012; Huber and
Stephens, 2014). In particular the share of employees covered by wage bargain-
ing agreements and the level of coordination of wage bargaining are often
mentioned as important factors in shaping the wage distribution (Wren, 2013).
Employment protection legislation might be another factor by protecting
employees from being laid off, whilst it can also create a gap between insiders
with a permanent contract and outsiders without one (Koeniger et al., 2007;
Rueda, 2007).
A second culprit often mentioned in comparative political economy and
labour economics is international trade. The degree of international integration,
in particular between developed countries and developing countries such as
China, has increased substantially in the last decades. When imports substitute
for the domestic production of goods, local labour demand will go down.
Increased competition from for instance China could also reduce possibilities
to export to foreign countries. The resulting employment and wage effects
might not be equally shared across all skill groups. Given the relative abund-
ance of low-skilled labour in developing countries, mainly low-skilled
employees in exposed sectors in developed countries will be affected by
increased levels of imports (Autor et al., forthcoming).
A third prominent hypothesis is that current advances in information
technology lead to substitution of routine work by capital, whilst occupations
with abstract or interpersonal manual task structures are complemented or
unaffected (Autor et al., 2003; Goos et al., 2014). Technological change will cause
an increase in the demand for high-skilled labour to perform non-routine
abstract work, which in turn leads to higher wages and better employment
opportunities for highly educated workers. On the other hand, routine work
that tends to lie in the middle and parts of the bottom of the wage distribution
will be substituted by capital (Oesch, 2013). This will trigger polarisation of
the wage structure and an increase in inequality.
Which of these three factors can be seen as the most important driver?
Surprisingly perhaps, this question has not received much attention yet in the
empirical literature. Studies in comparative political economy have mainly
focused on changes in labour market institutions, whilst effects of technological
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change are not taken into consideration (e.g., Pontusson et al., 2002; Rueda and
Pontusson, 2000; Oliver, 2008; Huber and Stephens, 2014). The opposite holds
for studies in labour economics (Autor et al., 2013; Balsvik et al., forthcoming).
Effects of international trade are addressed in both strands of literature. Yet,
in particular in comparative political economy the analyses tend to be based
on a country level approach, ignoring variation in exposure to international
trade at a more detailed sectoral level.
Having introduced possible explanations for rising levels of income inequal-
ity, a second main issue addressed extensively in public policy debates is
whether this rising dispersion has had economic and political consequences
(IMF, 2007; OECD, 2011a; Stiglitz, 2012). Inequality can hamper growth by
leading to more social unrest or by causing lower overall levels of human
capital accumulation, as people who lack financial means are inhibited to invest
in themselves (Cingano, 2014). Conversely, income differences could incite
people to exert additional efforts as the relative benefits are greater. If the
earnings distribution is deemed undesirable, welfare states can mitigate earn-
ings by redistributive policies (Boadway and Keen, 2000). Yet, alleviating
inequality by redistributing income might have effects on growth as well. The
trade-off hypothesis that redistribution based on economic outcomes reduces
marginal benefits to gain income figures prominently in economics (Okun,
1975; Aghion et al., 1999).
In addition to effects on economic output, rising earnings dispersion might
induce a change in attitude. In particular, it might incite people to increase
their redistributive claims. Based on a median voter model where redistribution
preferences of individuals are a function of material self-interest, we would
expect greater market earnings inequality to produce greater political demand
for redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Individuals might also favour
social protection as insurance when they are exposed to an increased risk of
job or wage loss. Since these forms of social security are redistributive (e.g.,
Nelson, 2011), individuals exposed to occupational risks of technological
change or international trade might show an increased preference for re-
distribution (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Rehm, 2009).
Political and economic consequences of income inequality have been subject
of much inquiry, but there are still a number of caveats. First, in an ideal
world, when analysing the effects of inequality on growth we would take into
account the effects of policies that were put in place to cushion dispersion as
well, as these might have distinctive effects on growth. Moreover, the type
of inequality might matter too. For instance, inequality across the population
might impact human capital accumulation, whilst a rise in top incomes could
be more important for levels of savings and investment. Regarding political
consequences, international trade and labour market institutions have received
wide attention as possible factor in explaining redistribution preferences (e.g.,
Rehm, 2009; Walter, 2010; Gingrich and Ansell, 2012), but the same cannot
be said for technological change. Whether individuals in occupations exposed
4 Chapter 1
to risks of job loss due to automation increase their redistribution preferences
has not been analysed so far.
A third main element of rising earnings dispersion pertains to possible
policy responses that countries can use to mitigate inequality. In most OECD
countries, transfers account for a larger part of the absolute income redistribu-
tion than taxes (OECD, 2008a; Immervoll and Richardson, 2011; Wang et al.,
2014b). Insight into what type of social policies governments choose to adopt
contributes to our understanding of the bandwidth for possible policy strategies
of affluent countries. There is a large body of literature looking into structural
processes of welfare state development (Pierson, 2000). The two most
prominent hypotheses are that countries converge to a common model by
opting for more similar policy solutions or, on the contrary, that welfare states
only adopt incremental changes and largely follow their institutional legacies
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). Not much attention has been given to whether these
two theories can explain how welfare states respond to urgent social matters.
1.3 AIMS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This dissertation is a collection of five chapters aiming to provide insight into
determinants and political and economic consequences of income inequality
and social policy development in affluent countries. As this dissertation is
based on papers, the chapters are loosely related and can be read independent-
ly of each other. Four of the chapters are written together with other scholars.
Chapters 2 and 3 look into determinants of earnings inequality, employ-
ment, and wages across sectors in developed countries over time. Two ques-
tions guide this first part of the analysis. The chapters aim to contribute to
the comparative political economy literature on inequality by analysing simul-
taneously the effects of labour market institutions, international trade, and
technological change. Moreover, they adopt a sectoral approach to account
for the substantial variation across sectors in inequality patterns and their
exposure to international trade and technological change.
Q1: What sectoral trends in levels of earnings inequality and employment can
be delineated and can these trends be explained by differences in sectoral exposure
to international trade, technological progress, or changes in labour market institu-
tions?
Specific attention is devoted to trade competition with China. The rapid rise
of China on the global economic stage might have employment and wage
effects that differ across skill groups given China’s large volume of low-wage
labour. China’s surge has not received much attention in the comparative
political economy literature on wage inequality. The analysis also looks at
direct effects of Chinese imports and effects of Chinese competition on foreign
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export markets, a route neglected thus far in the comparative political economy
literature.
Q2: What are the employment and wage effects of China’s rapid rise as a trading
partner for low and high-skilled groups in advanced industrialised democracies?
Chapters 4 and 5 address the possible economic and political impact of rising
levels of inequality and its determinants in developed countries. Chapter 4
aims to provide some clarification on theoretical and empirical relations
between inequality, redistribution, and economic growth at the country level
over time. Essentially, this chapter consists of a discussion on how the socio-
economic objectives of attaining economic growth and restricting income
inequality are related to each other. This is a primary problem for the con-
temporary welfare state and a question in which political science and eco-
nomics collide (Pierson and Castles, 2006). Data that consistently distinguish
between the income distribution before and after taxes and transfers are used,
which is a precondition to discern between inequality as such and redistribu-
tion. Moreover, generic measures of inequality across the population are used
where top and bottom coding is applied, as well as enrichment at the top,
captured by top shares (Atkinson et al., 2011).
Q3: How can we theoretically and empirically understand the linkages between
inequality and economic growth on the one hand, and redistribution and economic
growth on the other?
Having introduced redistribution as a key element of this doctoral study, the
next question is whether preferences for redistribution are affected by inequal-
ity or its drivers. Even though it is often mentioned as a key cause of rising
earnings dispersion in the labour economics literature, technological change
has not received attention in comparative political economy accounts of deter-
minants of redistribution preferences. Current advancements in technological
change are said to be capable of substituting routine work by capital (Goos
et al., 2014). Chapter 5 examines whether individuals in routine task intensive
occupations favour higher levels of redistribution as a means of public insur-
ance. Reintroducing the sectoral approach, the chapter also analyses whether
this relationship becomes stronger for individuals working in sectors that are
more exposed to technological change. By doing so, the analysis aims to bridge
the gap between studies emphasising occupational risk exposure influencing
redistribution preferences, and studies that underline differences in risk ex-
posure across sectors. Moreover, the role of personal income in shaping re-
distribution claims is revisited. Personal income is allowed to have a direct
negative effect on the level of preferred redistribution in the spirit of Meltzer
and Richard (1981), whilst it can accentuate the effects of risks resulting from
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technological change on redistribution preferences as individuals have relative-
ly more to lose from automation.
Q4: Do individuals in routine task intensive occupations prefer higher levels of
redistribution as insurance against the increased risk of future income loss due
to automation? Is this relation stronger for persons employed in sectors that are
particularly exposed to technological change and for richer individuals who have
more to lose from automation?
Chapter 6 deviates from the earlier chapters in that it addresses actual social
policy development in welfare states rather than inequality per se. Moreover,
it is more conceptual in nature and based on a qualitative empirical approach.
Although structural processes of welfare state development have been ex-
amined frequently, there is a caveat in knowledge on reactive policy strategies.
The chapter aims to fill this gap by examining the reactive policy strategies
of three countries representing the main welfare state regime types, namely
Germany, the UK, and Sweden. By doing so, it provides a test whether
structural policy development theories, namely the convergence and path
dependence theories, can explain the policy strategies followed by these
countries in response to the Great Recession.
Q5: Do the social and unemployment reactive policies adopted in Germany, the
UK and Sweden in response to the Great Recession in 2008 and 2009 differ
systematically and if so, can we use long-term policy development theories to
explain these differences?
1.4 CONCEPTUAL CHOICES
In my dissertation I aim to provide insight into income inequality and social
policy development. I confine myself to income when discussing inequality,
rather than for instance wealth, consumption, or income accounted for in-kind
benefits. Income is widely considered to be a measure of utility or welfare
(Sen, 1992). Having income is a precondition for consumption in a capitalist
system, though it clearly does not paint a full picture of social welfare.
Income is a flow variable; I will not devote any attention to its stock
counterpart, wealth. While acknowledging the existence of wealth inequality
– one only needs to consult Piketty (2014) to gain insight into highly skewed
wealth concentration at the top – earnings and wealth inequality do not
necessarily share the same trends, causes, or have a similar impact on growth
or redistribution preferences (e.g., Alvaredo et al., 2013; Ansell, 2014). I will
also not look into the distribution of consumption expenditures. The actual
consumption of goods is arguably more directly linked with utility than
income, or the means available for consumption. Yet, consumption contains
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a stronger personal element – an individual voluntarily fasting would be
considered poor (Sen, 1992; Morelli et al., forthcoming). Furthermore, I will
ignore in-kind benefits, such as publicly available services, even though in-kind
benefits have redistributive effects as well (OECD, 2008a; Paulus et al., 2010).
The main reason for excluding the distribution of wealth, consumption, and
in-kind benefits in this thesis is the availability of comparable data across
countries and time.
In Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis I will focus on earnings inequality and
wage differences across sectors and skill groups. Rising income inequality is
mainly a consequence of growing disparities in earnings. This also explains
why factors that likely affect earnings patterns are addressed, namely labour
market institutions, international trade, and technological change. I broaden
the income definition in my analysis on associations between inequality,
redistribution, and economic growth. I apply both disposable and market
income as well as their difference as a proxy for the absolute level of redistribu-
tion, since we might theoretically expect distinctive effects of these different
income definitions and redistribution on economic growth (Kenworthy and
Pontusson, 2005). For instance, the distribution of disposable income might
negatively affect growth by leading to more social unrest. A more unequal
distribution of market income could hamper growth when this leads to more
demand and actual levels of redistribution, and when redistribution negatively
affects growth (Perotti, 1996).
Having selected income as the locus of distribution, the next step is the
selection of units holding a certain level of income. I will delve in particular
into the distribution of earnings among individuals and households within
sectors and within countries. I use individual earnings and wage shares across
skill groups in the sectoral studies on determinants of inequality, since indi-
vidual earnings can more accurately be attributed to sectors than household
earnings. Moreover, sectoral relative employment sizes and shares of hours
worked across skill groups are used as additional dependent variables. I correct
for differences in household composition using equivalence scales when
looking at household income.
I restrict my analysis to OECD countries between 1970 and 2012. Which
countries and years are covered exactly differs per analysis and depends on
data limitations. The analyses encompass a broad set of OECD countries with
diverse political-economic institutions. In emerging countries other factors such
as malnutrition or democratic stability might play a crucial role, and data
availability and quality are of much greater concern. Moreover, the chosen
time span covers the widespread increase in earnings inequality in the devel-
oped world, the gradual trend towards international integration especially
with developing countries, and the revolution in information technology.
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1.5 EMPIRICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Chapters 2-5 address determinants and consequences of income inequality
that are all based on a quantitative design. Most fundamentally, I seek to move
beyond generic country-level measures of the variables of interest by using
a variety of approaches and data sources. First, sectoral data built from a micro
time-series database are used. Moreover, sectoral data that differentiate
between employment and wage shares across skill groups are employed. I
also apply country-level information, for instance on top income shares,
redistribution, and labour market institutions. I will use multiple inequality
measures for the country-level inequality indicators to test for robustness, since
each measure by mathematical definition is particularly sensitive to shifts at
certain parts of the income distribution – or equivalently, since each inequality
measure has implicit social welfare judgments. When addressing redistributive
claims, occupational and sectoral information on risk exposure are combined.
A few words on the quality of the data seem warranted. Crucial to my
comparative design is that the income definitions are standardised across
countries and time. I use secondary cross-national datasets from the OECD,
LIS, EU-KLEMS, and the Standardised World Income Inequality Database in
which the income definition is made consistent as adequately as possible.
Moreover, the LIS and EU-KLEMS data I use allow for a consistent identification
of sectors. Nevertheless, their comparability has its limits. The aforementioned
datasets try to cope with consistency, but are still constructed on the basis
of country-specific surveys (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001; Atkinson, 2008;
OECD, 2012a). I try to minimise these issues by testing whether my results are
sensitive to the choice of dataset, if possible. LIS data play the most prominent
role, since in this dataset the country surveys are harmonised using consistent
definitions and concepts (Morelli et al., forthcoming).
I base my regressions on a pooled time-series cross-section design exploiting
variation across countries and time. Such a design permits correction of un-
observed heterogeneity. I employ multiple estimation techniques, depending
on the nature of the dependent variable, the data, and the question at hand.
In an ideal world, I would analyse effects and consequences of income inequal-
ity and social policy development in a randomised and controlled setting across
sectors, occupations, and countries over time. Since this is not feasible, possibil-
ities of reverse causality hamper a causal interpretation of the found asso-
ciations. This specifically holds true for the analysis of ‘grand’ associations
between income inequality, redistribution, and economic growth. I will further
reflect on these issues in the specific chapters.
Chapter 6, in which I examine social and unemployment crisis response
policies, makes use of a comparative country case selection. As my objective
is explicitly country-specific – I examine whether the crisis responsive policies
fit with the historical-institutional tradition of three archetypal country cases
– a qualitative approach seems most appropriate. The three selected European
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countries, Germany, Sweden, and the UK, differ maximally in their institutional
legacies, but all experienced a sudden shock to their GDP and employment
levels in 2008 and 2009. Obviously, the fact that I examine the policy strategies
of three non-representative countries to one crisis decreases the generalisability
of the findings.
1.6 A READER’S GUIDE
The following two chapters focus on determinants of rising earnings dispersion
in developed countries. Chapter 2, Taking the sector seriously: Data, developments,
and determinants of sectoral earnings inequality and employment, co-authored by
Chen Wang and Olaf van Vliet, maps trends in intrasectoral inequality across
8 OECD countries based on micro data, and relates these trends to differences
in exposure to international trade, technological change, and labour market
institutions. Chapter 3, Competing with the dragon: Employment and wage effects
of Chinese trade competition in 17 sectors across 18 OECD countries, co-written by
Olaf van Vliet, zooms in on trade competition with China, which might have
distributive effects across skill groups given the country’s large share of low-
wage labour.
Chapters 4 and 5 move from determinants to possible economic and
political consequences of rising levels of income inequality. Chapter 4, Is it
the income distribution or redistribution that affects growth?, addresses linkages
between income inequality, redistribution, and economic growth at the macro
level. Chapter 5, Technological change as a determinant of redistribution preferences,
co-authored by David Rueda, analyses whether individuals whose occupations
are more exposed to risks resulting from technological innovations demand
additional redistribution as a means of public insurance.
Chapter 6, Falling back on old habits? A comparison of the social and unemploy-
ment crisis reactive policy strategies in Germany, the UK, and Sweden, written with
Heejung Chung, looks at the development of social and unemployment policies
adopted by three countries in response to the Great Recession.
I end this doctoral thesis with a summary of the main results in Chapter 7,
Conclusions. In this chapter I reflect on how these findings contribute to the
academic literature and on their societal relevance in more general terms.
Finally, I indicate a number of directions for future inquiries into inequality
and social policy.

2 Taking the sector seriously
Data, developments, and determinants of sectoral
earnings inequality and employment1
ABSTRACT
Studies using a country-level approach to examine developments and deter-
minants of earnings inequality neglect the substantial variation in inequality
patterns across sectors. A sectoral approach can also shed light on possible
determinants of rising inequality, as sectors differ widely in their exposure
to trade and technological change, whereas changes in labour market institu-
tions would predict a more uniform rise in levels of intrasectoral inequality.
This chapter delineates trends in sectoral earnings inequality and employment
for eight OECD countries between 1985-2005 using a new database. Decom-
positions show that country-level earnings inequality and its rise are mainly
consequences of inequality within rather than between sectors. Cross-sectional
pooled time-series analyses indicate lower employment shares in sectors more
exposed to import. No evidence is found for relations between intrasectoral
inequality and international trade or skill-biased technological change. Waning
trade union power at the country level is associated with higher levels of
sectoral earnings inequality.
1 Earlier versions of this chapter appeared as (in Dutch) Thewissen, S., Van Vliet, O., Wang,
C. (2013a), Sectorale loonongelijkheid en werkgelegenheid in internationaal perspectief
tussen 1985-2005, TPEdigitaal 7(3): 139-160, and as Thewissen, S., Wang, C. Van Vliet, O.
(2013b) Sectoral trends in earnings inequality and employment: International trade, skill-
biased technological change, or labour market institutions? LIS Working Paper Series no.
595. This working paper won the LIS Aldi Hagenaars Memorial Award for best LIS working
paper written by a researcher under age 40. Earlier versions of this chapter were presented
at the 2012 Dutch Economists day in Amsterdam, the 2012 UM/ICIS Measuring Globalisa-
tion workshop in Maastricht, the 2012 NIG conference in Leuven, the 2013 ILERA Amster-
dam conference, the 2013 ESPAnet Mannheim doctoral workshop, the 2013 ECSR –
EQUALSOC – University of Trento summer school on rising inequalities, and the 2014
LIS Summer Workshop in Luxembourg. We would like to thank all participants, in par-
ticular Paolo Barbieri, Michael Braun, Michael Gebel, Dirk Hofäcker, and Wiemer Salverda,
for their helpful comments. In addition, we are grateful to Jason Beckfield, Koen Caminada,
Wen-Hao Chen, Julian Garritzmann, Kees Goudswaard, Torben Iversen, Marike Knoef,
and Vera Troeger for their useful suggestions.
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2.1 INTRODUCTION
A widely observed phenomenon in social sciences is the gradual and wide-
spread increase in earnings inequality within developed countries (Atkinson,
2003; Alderson et al., 2005; Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005; Brandolini and
Smeeding, 2009; Immervoll and Richardson, 2011; Iversen and Soskice, 2013).
In the political economy literature three explanations are generally put forward
for this upsurge in inequality at the country level: increased international trade,
technological change, both arguably disadvantageous to the low-skilled, and
changes in labour market institutions, in particular weakening employment
protection legislation and union power (e.g., Alderson and Nielsen, 2002;
Mahler, 2004; Koeniger et al., 2007; Oliver, 2008; OECD, 2011a; Alderson and
Doran, 2013; Oesch, 2013; Wren, 2013).
Even though substantial attention has been given to inequality trends at
the country level, there is a knowledge gap on developments within countries
across different sectors. It would help our understanding of the manifestation
of inequality if we would know whether earnings dispersion at the country
level is a consequence of earnings differences between industries, or intra-
sectoral earnings dispersion. Second, a sectoral design provides insight into
possible drivers of inequality, as it allows us to differentiate between the three
aforementioned explanations. If international trade or technological change
indeed are explanations for rising inequality, then sectors more exposed to
these trends should have higher levels of inequality, unless workers are perfect-
ly mobile across sectors, an unrealistic assumption given persistent wage
differences between sectors and the existence of labour market frictions
(Krueger and Summers, 1988; Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Mares, 2005). When
sectors follow comparable inequality trends over time, this would correspond
more to the theory that changing labour market institutions, set at the national
level, are the main driver of inequality.
This study describes trends in labour earnings inequality and employment
at the sectoral level in eight OECD countries between 1985 and 2005 based on
a new database (Wang et al., 2014a). The level of intrasectoral inequality differs
substantially across sectors, which indicates that a substantial part of the
manifestation of inequality is overlooked or ignored when studies are confined
to country-level inequality trends only. Using cross-sectional pooled time-series
analyses we test whether international trade, technological change, or develop-
ments in labour market institutions can explain variations in inequality and
employment across sectors in countries over time. For the first two factors
sectoral data are available, allowing us to differentiate between the three
theoretical explanations.
Our contributions to the political economy literature on inequality are
threefold. First, our sectoral design is relatively new, allowing us to locate
inequality at a more detailed level across sectors, countries, and time. Second,
compared to studies examining possible determinants of rising inequality by
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means of a sectoral design in multiple countries at two moments (Mahler et
al. 1999; OECD, 2011a, Oesch, 2013; Michaels et al., 2014), we seek to contribute
by building a new sectoral database with more detailed information over time.
Third, as opposed to the sectoral studies examining skill wage gaps rather
than inequality per se (OECD, 2011a; Michaels et al., 2014), we take into account
sectoral earnings and employment developments separately. Compared to
Mahler et al. (1999), who also construct sectoral inequality measures, we base
our findings on individual rather than household earnings, so that we can
more accurately attribute earnings and employment information to sectors.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 discusses
the three main explanations of rising country-level inequality. In Section 2.3
we apply these theories to the sectoral level and we motivate our shift towards
the sector in tracing inequality. Next, in Section 2.4, we describe our dataset
and show trends across countries, sectors, and time. We decompose the level
and growth of country-level inequality into inequalities within and between
sectors. In Section 2.5 we conduct cross-sectional pooled time-series regressions
to empirically test the three theoretical explanations. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 CURRENT EXPLANATIONS FOR RISING EARNINGS INEQUALITY
Three explanations for the widespread trend of widening earnings at the
country-level are regularly put forward, namely, increasing international trade,
skill-biased technological change, and weaker labour market institutions
(Atkinson, 2003; Oliver, 2008; Brandolini and Smeeding, 2009; Oesch, 2013).
The amount of international trade increased substantially during the last
decades, in particular between developed and developing countries (Harrison
et al., 2011). The Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that when countries
engage into trade, the production factors that are relatively abundant gain.
In developed countries, where high-skilled workers are relatively more
abundant, engaging into trade will lead to a higher skill demand, whilst the
low-skilled will suffer from the increased competition with developing coun-
tries with a relative abundance of low-skilled labour (Van Reenen, 2011; Hellier
and Chusseau, 2013). Mahler (2004) and Mahler et al. (1999) differentiate
between effects of import and export on the earnings distribution. Import might
impair the wages or employment possibilities of domestic workers by putting
them into direct competition with foreign workers. When mainly the low-
skilled jobs are prone to outsourcing to low-wage countries, import has a direct
effect on the earnings distribution. For export, the opposite might hold as it
could give room for higher earnings or job creation.
Country-level studies generally report insignificant associations between
trade integration and inequality (Mahler, 2004; Harrison et al., 2011; OECD,
2011a). Also sectoral studies report insignificant associations between their
sectoral indicators of trade integration and earnings inequality (Mahler et al.,
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1999), the skill wage gap (OECD, 2011a; Michaels et al., 2014), or employment
differences for high versus low-skilled employees (Oesch, 2013). Yet, sectors
more exposed to import saw a relative decrease in the number of total and
low-skilled jobs. A number of studies also incorporate financial flows (FDI)
and outsourcing or trade in intermediates (see for an overview Hellier and
Chusseau, 2013), for which some evidence of inequality-enhancing effects is
presented (Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Dreher and Gaston, 2008).
A second prevalent theory is that current technological innovation comple-
ments the high-skilled, whilst it substitutes routine labour by capital (Goldin
and Katz, 2008; Van Reenen, 2011). The theory plays a central role in the wage
literature, using skill demand or the skill wage gap as dependent variable.
The wage literature reports evidence for skill-biased technological change
leading to polarisation in the labour market, though the analyses are mainly
limited to the US (Autor et al., 2003; see for an overview e.g., Hellier and
Chusseau, 2013; Oesch, 2013). Also in sectoral studies positive correlations
between the skill wage gap and technological change, measured by the infor-
mation and communications technology (ICT) propensity from EU-KLEMS, are
reported (OECD, 2011a). Michaels et al. (2014) find that industries with the
greatest growth in ICT propensity were also the ones with the strongest growth
in wages for the highly educated workers. The lowly educated were largely
unaffected by this rise in ICT, whilst demand for middle educated workers
fell in industries with the greatest growth in ICT intensity.
A third branch of the literature addresses changes in labour market institu-
tions as the main cause of growing earnings dispersion in the developed world.
In particular the weaker influence of trade unions and changes in employment
protection legislation are put forward in the empirical literature (Mahler, 2004;
Koeniger et al., 2007; Oliver, 2008; OECD, 2011a; Wren, 2013). From these studies
it can be hypothesised that more centralised and coordinated wage bargaining
processes lead to more compressed wages. Furthermore, the literature generally
provides two effects of employment protection legislation on earnings inequal-
ity. On the one hand, strict legislation brings employees in a strong bargaining
position for employees and therefore results in low wage dispersion. However,
this will mainly apply to employees with a permanent contract. Therefore,
stricter legislation can lead to a dual labour market with relatively high degrees
of wage earnings inequality between the segments.
2.3 A SECTORAL APPROACH TO STUDYING INEQUALITY
Compared to a country-level study, in a sectoral research design the number
of observations increases and industry-specific differences can be taken into
account. In case there are differences in the degree to which sectors are exposed
to factors that potentially drive inequality – which is indeed the case as shown
later – these differences in exposure will cause variations in effects on earnings
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or employment per sector, unless there is perfect labour mobility between
sectors. Only in the situation of perfect labour mobility between sectors are
production factors rewarded identically which would spread out across the
economy.2
Evidence for imperfect labour mobility comes from persistent wage differ-
ences between sectors that cannot be explained by (observable) composition
effects (Krueger and Summers, 1988; Dickens and Katz, 1987). These persistent
differences may be a result of labour market frictions, such as search costs
in looking for jobs (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999), job and industry specific
human capital (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001), or institutions such as employment
protection legislation that depress labour mobility (Hellier and Chusseau, 2013).
Artuc et al. (2008) and Artuc and McLaren (2010) report heterogeneous distribu-
tional effects of trade resulting from limited factor mobility. They find that
it takes around eight years before a wage effect of a trade shock in a liberal-
ising sector spreads out across the economy.
To our knowledge only a few studies examine possible determinants of
rising inequality by means of a sectoral design in multiple countries over time.
Mahler et al. (1999) analyse earnings inequality within sectors using LIS house-
hold data, whereas OECD (2011a) and Michaels et al. (2014) calculate skill wage
gaps from EU-KLEMS data.3 Oesch (2013) studies total and low-skilled employ-
ment sizes, and upskilling measured as the change in share of high-skilled
minus low-skilled workers at the sectoral level within Germany and the UK
for 33 sectors based on LFS and SOEP data. All these studies analyse sectoral
exposure to trade, whereas only OECD (2011a) and Michaels et al. (2014) take
possible effects of technological change into consideration.
As far as we know there are no studies examining effects of labour market
institutions on sectoral inequality, although there is a branch of literature
examining differences in redistributive preferences across sectors (Scheve and
Slaughter, 2004; Mares, 2005; Rehm, 2009). The aforementioned sectoral studies
(Mahler et al., 1999; OECD, 2011a; Oesch, 2013; Michaels et al., 2014) also do
not take labour market institutions at the country level into account in their
regressions. A number of institutions are set at the national level, such as
strictness of employment protection legislation. Yet, the impacts of others, such
as unions, might well differ per sector, but unfortunately, no sectoral informa-
2 Our study should be seen as complementary to the branch of literature using heterogeneity
in occupations and tasks rather than sectors to examine consequences of technological
change and trade (e.g., Autor et al., 2003; Goos et al., 2009; Rehm, 2009; Oesch, 2013). These
studies are of particular interest when examining which types of jobs are prone to out-
sourcing or computerisation and what consequences this might have on for instance demand
for redistribution, but occupations are arguably a less relevant categorisation for calculating
inequality, our point of departure.
3 We were able to replicate the findings from Mahler et al. (1999), who also employ LIS data,
with our own data using their sample of countries and periods and inequality indicators
(available upon request).
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tion is available with sufficient detail in a comparative setting over time. Pinto
and Beckfield (2011) show that union membership differs between individuals
working in services versus those working in industry between 2002-2008 using
European Social Survey data, and that this gap in membership differs per
country. For the US more detailed information on union membership for a
longer period is available. Kristal (2013) reports a negative association between
union membership and labour’s share of national income for two-digit and
four-digit industries. Nevertheless, these studies use union membership which
seems a rough proxy for union influence in a European context, where laws
or other practices extend coverage to non-union members.
In our approach we take the widely observed rise in earnings inequality
at the country level as our point of departure. Hence, we calculate inequality
indicators rather than wage bill shares. Yet, we base our main calculations
on individual rather than household information, to avoid the problem of
attributing earnings or employment information from the spouse or other
relatives to the sector in which the household head is working, since the other
household members might work in a different sector.
We elaborate on existing sectoral studies in two ways. First, we contribute
by creating a new database on inequality and employment at the sectoral level
that contains sectoral data over a longer period rather than for only two
moments in time. This allows us to examine variations over time while taking
into account industry-specific and country-specific developments. As a second
contribution to existing sectoral studies, we explicitly explore both sectoral
earnings and employment developments. For a sectoral design this is of
particular importance. For example, when all low-skilled move to sectors less
exposed to trade or technological change with lower earnings whilst all high-
skilled congregate in exposed sectors characterised by higher earnings, then
earnings inequality at the country level will increase whereas the levels of
intrasectoral earnings inequality will decrease. Third, we take into account
developments in labour market institutions at the country level.
Our sectoral design also has limitations. First, there might be dependencies
between industries. In addition, certain confounding factors that might have
an effect on both trade, technology, or institutions, and on sectoral earnings
and employment, such as product market developments, are not included in
the model, even though we control for unobserved sectoral trends. Therefore,
the empirical results should be interpreted as associations rather than causal
evidence.
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2.4 DATA
2.4.1 Income definition, sector standardisation, and sample
For our sectoral approach we calculate indicators for earnings inequality and
employment, standardised across countries, periods, and sectors. This dataset
is available online (Wang et al., 2014a), as is a more detailed description of
the data (Thewissen et al., 2013b). It is constructed on the basis of the Luxem-
bourg Income Study (LIS) micro data, elaborating on Mahler et al. (1999). We
restrict the sample to individuals aged between 25 and 54, which are those
people most dependent on earnings as source of income. Since we are
interested in labour earnings inequality, we only include income from wages
and salaries or self-employment, omitting income from other sources such
as interest and rent, and we do not adjust the wages for taxes or social contri-
butions.4 We follow standard LIS top- and bottom coding conventions. As
explained above, we base our calculations on individual data and we apply
individual weights to the earnings and employment indicators.
Sectors are standardised based on the ISIC 3.0 classification. We distinguish
between nine sectors at the two-digit level, and we further break down the
manufacturing and transport and telecommunication sector into twelve sub-
sectors using the three-digit level, as in Mahler et al. (1999), OECD (2011a), and
Michaels et al. (2014), see Table 2.1.5
4 We refer to our income definition as ‘earnings’, which corresponds to ‘labour income’ in
the LIS template. Earnings of both part-time and full-time workers are included, see also
our sensitivity tests.
5 No further breakdown in the community services sector is possible with LIS micro data
for a sufficient number of country-period observations. The community sector consists of
people working in public administration, education, health and social work, and other
community and personal service activities.
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Sectoral information is available for eight OECD countries, allowing us to
compose an unbalanced panel of five periods of five years between around
1985 and around 2005.6 We have 31 waves containing a total of 651 observa-
tions at the sectoral level. The correlation between the relative employment
size of sectors from our calculations based on LIS data and the sectoral indica-
tors from OECD STAN (2011b) is 0.97, providing a reliability estimate of our
dataset.
2.4.2 Trends at the country level
We begin by showing the trends in inequality at the country level for our
sample and earnings definition, see Figure 2.1. We make use of two indicators;
the mean log deviation is more sensitive to fluctuations at the bottom end of
the distribution, whereas the Gini coefficient is more sensitive to changes across
the mean of the distribution (Atkinson, 1970).
6 We exclude Spain, Belgium, and Poland, as not enough detailed information on earnings
or technological change is available.
Table 2.1 Country, period, and sector sample 
Country Period Sectors (ISIC) 









1987, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2004 
1987, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2004 
1984, 1989, 1994, 2000, 2004 
1994-1996, 2004 
1987, 1992, 2000, 2005 
1986, 1999, 2004 
1986, 1991, 1994, 2000, 2004 
AtB Agriculture and fishing 
C Mining and quarrying 
D Manufacturing 
15t16 Man. food 
17t19 Man. textile 
20 Man. wood 
21t22 Man. paper 
23t25 Man. chemicals 
26 Man. minerals 
27 Man. metals 
29t33 Man. machinery 
34t35 Man. transport 
36t37 Man. other 
E Utilities 
F Construction 
GtH Wholesale and hotels 
I Transport and telecommunications  
60t63 Transport 
64 Telecommunications 
JtK Finance, real estate, business 
LtQ Community services 
Note We combine the 1994-1996 waves for Ireland where we recalculate the earnings information to 1995 levels using 
information on inflation from the World Bank (2012) 
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Consistent with the existing country-level literature, inequality is higher in
the Anglo-Saxon countries than in the Northern countries. Earnings are grow-
ing further apart within countries over time (Alderson et al., 2005; Brandolini
and Smeeding, 2009; Immervoll and Richardson, 2011; OECD, 2011a; Alderson
and Doran, 2013; Wang et al., 2014a). We see a particularly strong upsurge
in earnings inequality in Germany, also documented elsewhere (Fuchs-
Schündeln et al., 2010). Part of this might be due to the unification as the LIS
waves of 1984 and 1989 are based on West Germany only.7
By and large the Gini coefficient and the mean log deviation show compar-
able trends over time. A noticeable exception to this is Finland, where the Gini
index shows a gradual descent whilst the mean log deviation drops rather
abruptly from 1995 to 2000. During this period the earnings inequality at the
bottom end of the distribution decreased rapidly, whilst inequality at the top
half of the distribution actually rose (see also Cowell and Fiorio, 2011).8 Due
to these opposite dynamics the Gini index decreased less rapidly than the mean
log deviation.
7 The waves 1984 and 1989 for Germany are not included in the regressions as no sectoral
information on import or export is available.
8 Inequality shifts at the top end of the distribution are captured by the GE(2) index which
rises for Finland from 1995 (0.145) to 2000 (0.167).
Figure 2.1 Earnings inequality at the country level 1985-2005 
 




Note  Mean: unweighted arithmetic average for the available observations of that period 
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2.4.3 Decomposition of inequality at the country level
We decompose the level and change of earnings inequality at the country level
into a part resulting from earnings differences between sectors, and a part
stemming from earnings differences within sectors (intrasectoral inequality).
We use the mean log deviation since this indicator does not leave a residual.
Intrasectoral inequality is calculated as the sum of the mean log deviation in
all separate sectors weighted by the number of individuals working in the
sector relative to the total number of working individuals. The between-sector
part is the weighted sum of the arithmetic mean earnings in the distinct sectors
as a fraction of the mean earnings of the total population.9 Sectors are defined
at the two-digit level, and the three-digit level for the manufacturing and
transport and telecommunications sectors.10
9 The decomposition is defined as:
with sectors indexed {k = 1, ..., g} weighted by their share of employed individuals νk, where
the sector includes the individuals indexed {j = 1, ..., n} with earnings ykj, weight wkj, and
arithmetic mean earnings -y. The first element on the right-hand side is inequality within
industries, and the second consists of inequality between industries (see text). See also
Kampelmann (2009) which contains an appendix with a decomposition of the mean log
deviation that can be transposed to ours. The differences over time are defined as:
MLD2005 – MLD1985 = (Within2005 + Between2005) – (Within1985 + Between1985) = Within2005 –
Within1985 + Between2005 – Between1985.
10 Of course, the share of inequality between groups depends on the number of distinguished
groups. As an extreme case, the share of between-group inequality becomes 100 per cent
when every individual is defined as a separate group. Yet, for our study with a relatively
small number of sectors in comparison to the number of households, the results are not
that sensitive to the number of sectors that are defined. As an example, if we differentiate
between 9 rather than 19 industries by taking the manufacturing and transport and tele-
communication sector at the aggregated rather than at the disaggregated level, the share
of within-sector inequality for the United States in 2005 only rises from 96.2 to 97.0 per
cent.
Table 2.2 Decomposition of inequality within and between sectors over time 
 Level of mean log deviation at 
the country level 
 Share of mean log deviation 
due to within-sector 
inequality (%) 
 Difference 2005-1985 in mean 
log deviation over time 
 1985 1995 2005  1985 1995 2005  Total Within Between 
Czech Republic . 0.145 0.182  . 92.4% 96.0%  0.037a 0.040a -0.004a 
Denmark 0.176 0.160 0.178  95.4% 95.4% 96.5%  0.002 0.004 -0.002 
Finland 0.241 0.216 0.152  87.6% 91.8% 93.7%  -0.090 -0.069 -0.020 
Germany 0.202 0.232 0.300  95.0% 94.9% 94.1%  0.098 0.091 0.008 
Ireland . 0.196 0.285  . 93.5% 93.6%  0.089a 0.083a 0.006a 
Sweden 0.211 . 0.238  95.3% . 96.1%  0.027 0.027 -0.001 
United Kingdom 0.246 . 0.316  94.5% . 92.8%  0.070 0.060 0.009 
United States 0.316 0.329 0.341  95.1% 95.3% 96.2%  0.025 0.028 -0.002 
Average 0.232 0.213 0.249  93.8% 93.9% 94.9%  0.032 0.033 -0.001 
Note  We differentiate between 19 industries: all two-digit sectors apart from the manufacturing and transport and 
telecommunications sectors, for which we utilise the subsectors. The average is the unweighted arithmetic average for 
the available observations of that period. a Difference between 2005 and 1995 
Source Own calculations by authors based on LIS (2013) 
	 	
 
MLD ∑ log 	 log 	  
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The decomposition presented in Table 2.2 reveals that the largest share of the
level of inequality at the country level is a result of intrasectoral earnings
dispersion, rather than differences in average earnings between industries.
Intrasectoral inequality also dominates the growth of inequality at the country
level; between-industry inequality even decreased slightly on average over
time as noted in the last column.
2.4.4 Trends in inequality within industries
To analyse patterns of the level of intrasectoral inequality, we use the Gini
coefficient, which is the most frequently used inequality measure in the literat-
ure. In addition, it can be corrected for underestimation bias in case of small
sample sizes (roughly from n < 30) by multiplying it by nn – 1, called the first
order correction (Deltas, 2003). For the regressions we also use the mean log
deviation at the sectoral level.11
We first pool data from all available periods to compare the levels of
inequality across industries and countries in Table 2.3. The rank of each
observation at the sectoral and subsectoral level is placed between brackets.
The bottom row shows the unweighted average level of intrasectoral inequality
per country (‘country average’), and the right column displays the unweighted
average level of inequality for each sector (‘sector average’).
From Table 2.3 we can see the importance of the sector in understanding
earnings inequality. The difference between the highest and lowest level of
intrasectoral inequality within countries is on average at least as high as the
difference between the highest and lowest level of country-level inequality.12
Thus, at the sectoral level within countries, there is as much spread in levels
of earnings dispersion as there is at the country level. This implies that a
substantial part of the manifestation of inequality is ignored in a country-level
approach.
The importance of the sector becomes even more noticeable when we look
at the rankings of levels of intrasectoral inequality within each country. This
shows that there are only a few differences between countries in their sectoral
11 The correlation between the first-order corrected Gini index and the MLD at the sectoral
level is 0.89.
12 The countries with the most equally and unequally distributed earnings are Denmark (0.257)
and the United States (0.421); their level of inequality differs by 0.164 Gini points for the
full sample. If we first average the degree of intrasectoral inequality across countries, then
we find that mining has the most equally distributed earnings (0.223), whilst agriculture
has the most unequally distributed earnings (0.394); a difference of 0.170 Gini points. If
we instead first calculate per country the difference between the sectors with most equally
and unequally distributed earnings and then take the average, we come to an even higher
difference of 0.210 Gini points.
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levels of inequality. Agriculture, wholesale, and the financial sector ubiquitous-
ly stand out as sectors with high relative levels of sectoral inequality, shown
by low rankings and a sectoral level of inequality higher than its country
average.13 The opposite holds for mining, utilities, and the manufacturing of
transport and metals.
There are only a few differences between countries in their relative levels
of intrasectoral inequality. In Czech Republic earnings are more equally dis-
tributed in agriculture. At the subsectoral level, we can see that there are
country differences in ranking of inequality within other manufacturing,
transport, and telecommunications.
As the differences between countries in their levels of intrasectoral inequality
are relatively small, we pool the sectoral levels for all countries and examine
13 The high level of earnings inequality within agriculture can partly be explained by the use
of individual rather than household earnings information. Using household information
the level of inequality drops from 40.4 to 35.7, whereas for the other sectors the inequality
based on individual and household information are at par on average. The regression results
are not sensitive to the inclusion of agriculture.
Table 2.3 Earnings inequality across sectors and countries, pooled across time  




        
  
Agriculture 0.280 (5) 0.356 (1) 0.493 (1) 0.357 (3) 0.410 (1) 0.402 (1) 0.381 (3) 0.470 (1) 0.394 (1) 
Mining 0.211 (9) 0.211 (8) 0.225 (8) 0.192 (9) 0.164 (9) 0.169 (9) 0.294 (8) 0.322 (8) 0.223 (9) 
Manufacturing 0.285 (3) 0.230 (5) 0.236 (6) 0.294 (5) 0.289 (6) 0.255 (5) 0.316 (7) 0.360 (5) 0.283 (5) 
Utilities 0.243 (8) 0.190 (9) 0.220 (9) 0.231 (8) 0.238 (8) 0.202 (8) 0.274 (9) 0.288 (9) 0.236 (8) 
Construction 0.261 (6) 0.228 (6) 0.263 (4) 0.274 (6) 0.311 (5) 0.221 (7) 0.332 (6) 0.360 (5) 0.281 (6) 
Wholesale 0.353 (1) 0.293 (3) 0.292 (3) 0.402 (1) 0.376 (2) 0.330 (3) 0.420 (1) 0.435 (2) 0.363 (2) 
Trans. and 
telecom 
0.260 (7) 0.223 (7) 0.233 (7) 0.268 (7) 0.247 (7) 0.253 (6) 0.336 (5) 0.331 (7) 0.269 (7) 
Finance 0.339 (2) 0.298 (2) 0.300 (2) 0.386 (2) 0.371 (3) 0.334 (2) 0.401 (2) 0.427 (3) 0.357 (3) 
Community 0.280 (4) 0.249 (4) 0.257 (5) 0.327 (4) 0.325 (4) 0.290 (4) 0.375 (4) 0.395 (4) 0.312 (4) 
Subsectoral level 
        
  
Man. food 0.324 (2) 0.228 (4) 0.231 (3) 0.324 (3) 0.266 (8) 0.277 (2) 0.337 (4) 0.364 (4) 0.294 (3) 
Man. textile 0.336 (1) 0.254 (1) 0.284 (1) 0.324 (3) 0.289 (4) 0.259 (4) 0.356 (1) 0.388 (1) 0.311 (1) 
Man. wood 0.256 (9) 0.189 (12) 0.222 (6) 0.244 (12) 0.276 (7) 0.217 (10) 0.296 (9) 0.369 (3) 0.259 (9) 
Man. paper 0.318 (3) 0.228 (5) 0.221 (7) 0.346 (2) 0.289 (4) 0.254 (7) 0.327 (6) 0.345 (6) 0.291 (4) 
Man. chemicals 0.293 (4) 0.238 (2) 0.231 (4) 0.263 (8) 0.278 (6) 0.266 (3) 0.299 (8) 0.344 (7) 0.277 (6) 
Man. minerals 0.258 (8) 0.228 (5) 0.195 (11) 0.301 (5) 0.308 (2) 0.217 (10) 0.262 (11) 0.323 (9) 0.261 (8) 
Man. metals 0.260 (6) 0.196 (11) 0.208 (9) 0.252 (9) 0.222 (11) 0.211 (12) 0.271 (10) 0.318 (10) 0.242 (11) 
Man. machinery 0.255 (10) 0.223 (8) 0.227 (5) 0.292 (6) 0.300 (3) 0.257 (5) 0.322 (7) 0.347 (5) 0.278 (5) 
Man. transport 0.229 (12) 0.199 (9) 0.172 (12) 0.251 (10) 0.213 (12) 0.218 (9) 0.242 (12) 0.303 (12) 0.228 (12) 
Other man. 0.260 (6) 0.225 (7) 0.208 (10) 0.379 (1) 0.322 (1) 0.279 (1) 0.339 (3) 0.387 (2) 0.300 (2) 
Transport 0.250 (11) 0.230 (3) 0.239 (2) 0.274 (7) 0.255 (9) 0.257 (6) 0.333 (5) 0.342 (8) 0.272 (7) 
Telecom 0.291 (5) 0.198 (10) 0.215 (8) 0.244 (11) 0.223 (10) 0.246 (8) 0.341 (2) 0.306 (11) 0.258 (10) 
Country average 0.278 0.234 0.246 0.296 0.284 0.258 0.326 0.358 0.285 
Note First order corrected Gini index, full sample, pooled across periods. Sector average: arithmetic average of sectoral 
earnings inequality per sector. Country average: arithmetic average of sectoral earnings inequality per country. 
Number between brackets: sectoral or subsectoral inequality level ranking within a country 
Source Wang et al. (2014a) 
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the developments over time in Figure 2.2.14 Mirroring the trend at the country
level, sectoral earnings in general have become more dispersed over time. Still,
inequality decreased in agriculture, which has the highest level of earnings
inequality on average. Also within the manufacturing of minerals subsector
inequality reached its top around 1985. In only four sectors, next to the two
aforementioned also construction and manufacturing other, earnings were more
dispersed in 1985 or 1995 than in 2005.
Particularly interesting is the comparison between the manufacturing sector,
exposed to trade, and the sheltered community sector. Contrary to what we
would expect from the application of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem at the
sectoral level, we see on average higher levels and a stronger increase of
inequality in the sheltered community sector than in the manufacturing in-
dustry.
14 The figure barely changes if we restrict the sample to the four countries for which we have
data for all periods (Denmark, Germany, Finland, and the US). Inequality within the
manufacturing of minerals in 1985 then becomes more pronounced.
Figure 2.2 Trends of sectoral earnings inequality over time 
	
 
Note First order corrected Gini index, average for a sector and period across available countries 























































































































































2.4.5 Trends in sectoral levels of employment
Increased inequality at the country level could also be a result of employment
shifts between sectors or job loss in certain sectors (see also Atkinson, 2003;
Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005). Even though the LIS database allows for
the standardised calculation of sectoral earnings inequality for multiple coun-
tries over time, unfortunately, it is not possible to track individual employment
shifts over time. This is due to the fact that the LIS database is a time series
rather than a panel at the individual level.
Using a number of proxies we try to depict employment effects at the
sectoral level in an indirect fashion. First, we use our own LIS-based data
(Wang et al., 2014a) to calculate the relative employment size of sectors to map
total labour shifts between sectors. The relative employment size is defined
as the number of persons engaged per industry divided by the total number
of persons engaged in a country.
In general, the sectoral employment sizes appear to be relatively stable
over time, as shown in Figure 2.3 pooled across countries.15 Most clearly
perceptible is the drift in employment from manufacturing, in particular the
manufacturing of machinery, towards the financial sector (see also Oesch,
2013). We can also discern a minor reduction in employment in agriculture
and mining, whereas a small increase is observable in construction and whole-
sale. There is hardly any fluctuation in the largest sector, the community sector.
15 For 1985 data are missing for a number of sectors, causing the sum of all relative employ-
ment sizes to differ from 1 for this period. The ratios presented in Figure 2.3 are corrected
for this overestimation. Restricting the figure to the four countries for which data are
available for all periods only causes minor shifts.
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For the relative employment size the differences between countries are again
small.16 In Czech Republic still a little over one in three persons is employed
in agriculture, mining, or manufacturing, compared to less than one in four
for the other countries. The community sector is relatively large in Finland
and Denmark (around 40.0 per cent compared to 31.0 per cent on average in
the other countries). The Anglo-Saxon countries are characterised by a com-
paratively extensive financial sector (around 14.0 per cent compared to 10.6
per cent). The manufacturing industry, in particular the manufacturing of
transport, metal, and chemicals, is relatively large in Germany (29.7 versus
20.3 per cent).
As a second employment indicator, following Mahler et al. (1999) who coin
this inequality between sectors, we also calculate the relative median earnings,
defined as the sectoral median labour earnings divided by the national median
16 Results are available upon request, see also Thewissen et al. (2013b).
Figure 2.3 Trends of relative employment size over time 
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Note Relative employment size, average for a sector and period across available countries 



























































































































































labour earnings. When job loss mainly occurs at the lower end of the earnings
distribution in a sector, we should see an increase in the sectoral relative
median earnings.
Figure 2.4 shows that there are few fluctuations in relative median earnings
over time, pooled across countries.17 This seems to suggest that the loss of
employment within the manufacturing sector was not concentrated at the low
end of the earnings distribution. The largest change took place in agriculture,
where the (low) earnings went up significantly between 1995 and 2005. Appar-
ently, in agriculture individuals at the lower end of the earnings distribution
saw an increase in their earnings, as indicated by an increase in relative median
earnings combined with a decrease in earnings inequality. Also within the
mining and utilities industry, homogeneous sectors with low earnings dis-
persion and a decreasing employment size, we can see increasing median
earnings.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 display that both the relative employment size and
median earnings of the community sector have been stable over time. From
this we infer that it is not likely that low-skilled labour was shed in sectors
exposed to trade, and that subsequently this labour went to the sheltered
community sector, as could be hypothesised from the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem.
17 Restricting the figure to the four countries for which data are available for all periods only
causes minor shifts.
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Also for the relative median earnings there are few country-level differences.18
Mining, utilities, transport and telecommunications, and finance pay relatively
well in all countries. On the contrary, earnings are uniformly low in agri-
culture, followed by the manufacturing of textile and wholesale. The sectoral
median earnings for the manufacturing industry are below 1 for Czech Re-
public and Ireland (0.95 and 0.97), whilst only in these two countries the
median earnings are above 1 in the community sector (1.04 and 1.06). Prin-
cipally in Finland the relative median earnings are low in agriculture (0.45
to 0.71 on average for the other countries), whilst earnings are above average
for mining in the UK (1.59 to 1.25) and utilities in Ireland (1.71 to 1.28). Within
the manufacturing industry the differences between countries are even smaller.
18 Results are available upon request, see also Thewissen et al. (2013b).
Figure 2.4 Trends of relative median earnings over time 
	
 
Note Relative median earnings, average for a sector and period across available countries 



















































































































































2.5 REGRESSION ANALYSES OF SECTORAL TRENDS
2.5.1 The regression model and data
Our database consists of country-industry data, which allows us to exploit
variation within countries across industries and over time. Following Bassanini,
Nunziata, and Venn (2009), we estimate the following equation using OLS:
inequalityijt = β0 + β tradeijt + γ technijt + instititδ + Xitµ + ϕiθ + ϕjθ + εijt
Our main dependent variable is earnings inequality within sector j, country
i, and period t. Employment effects are explored using the relative employment
size and relative median earnings at the sectoral level as dependent
variables.19
For sectoral exposure to international trade (β tradeijt) we use the OECD
STAN database (2011b) where we calculate trade values in percentage of sectoral
added value. We differentiate between import and export as advocated by
Mahler (2004). Unfortunately there is no sufficient information on sectoral
foreign direct investment.20 For our sectoral indicator of technological progress
(γ technijt) we follow OECD (2011a) and Michaels et al. (2014) and use the share
of compensation of ICT capital in total capital compensation from EU-KLEMS
(2011).21 The rise of ICT could potentially affect a large segment of the
workforce and its adoption took place during a relatively brief period (Goldin
and Katz, 2008). This indicator should be seen as a proxy to gauge techno-
logical change, as technological change exhibits itself in multiple fashions,
many of which are unobservable (OECD, 2011a). Acknowledging its limitations,
it is the best sectoral indicator available for comparisons across countries and
time.22
To test the waning labour market institutions hypothesis, we add a vector
of institutional variables at the country level (instititδ). We take a measure of
19 All dependent variables are multiplied by 100 in the regressions to enhance readability
of the coefficients in the tables.
20 Our regressions do not provide evidence for inequality-enhancing effects of inward or
outward FDI (available upon request).
21 The sectoral definition in EU-KLEMS differs slightly from the one in LIS. There is only
information available for the individual sectors ‘machinery n.e.c.’ and ‘electrical and optimal
equipment’, and for ‘wholesale and retail trade’ and ‘hotels and restaurants’ rather than
the aggregates we use, namely, the manufacturing of machinery, and wholesale. We
transform the EU-KLEMS indicators to these aggregate sectors by taking the average ICT
intensity of the two respective individual sectors, weighted by the share of the gross value
added at current basic prices from EU-KLEMS data of the respective sector. We use data
from 1993 for Sweden 1992. Calculations are available upon request.
22 See Michaels et al. (2014) for a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of this indicator.
In the sensitivity analyses reported below, we examine alternative indicators of technological
progress.
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overall employment protection legislation from OECD data (2009). Visser (2011)
provides us with data on union coverage, defined as the proportion of
employees covered by wage bargaining agreements, and the level of wage
coordination, where a higher number indicates a more centralised level of wage
bargaining. The vector Xitµ contains two common control variables measured
at the country level, namely, the unemployment rate and real GDP per capita
divided by 100, from the OECD National Accounts (2012b). The relationship
between GDP per capita and inequality is strongly contested in both causal
directions (see e.g., Thewissen, 2014) but it corrects for effects from possible
differences in economic development between countries. Inclusion of the
country-level unemployment rate can be seen as a rough control for labour
market efficiency differences between countries.
We also control for unobserved industry-specific developments, such as
the fact that industries might be exposed to different demand dynamics in
their product markets, by including interactions of sector dummies and the
trend ϕjθ. The set ϕiθ includes interaction terms of the country dummies and
the trend, to control for unobserved effects that have comparable effects on
earnings within different industries at the country level. Standard errors εijt
are clustered at the country level to allow for general forms of heteroskedastic-
ity and autocorrelation within countries.
2.5.2 Descriptive statistics for the independent variables
Table 2.4 shows that the degree to which sectors are exposed to international
trade and ICT intensity differs substantially. Also the increase over time in
international trade differs per sector. The largest increase took place in the
manufacturing of textile and manufacturing of transport; in mining import
rose significantly while exports remained stable. The amount of international
trade barely rose in the utility sector.
As can also be seen from Table 2.4, for a number of sectors no data on
international trade are available. Of particular importance are the community
sector, which can be expected to be relatively sheltered against international
trade, and the financial sector, in which the relative employment size grew
relatively fast.23
Also for the levels and developments of ICT propensity we can see differ-
ences between sectors. The starkest increases took place in other manufacturing,
telecommunications, and mining. The ICT propensity decreased sharply in
23 The results are comparable if we calculate the relative employment size in percentages
of the total employment size of the sectors which are included in the regressions rather
than all sectors (available upon request).
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agriculture, which is fully due to high values in Germany around 1985.24
Minor reductions occurred in the manufacturing of wood, minerals, and
transport.
Table 2.5 summarises the country-level data for the incorporated set of institu-
tions per country. On average the union coverage rate decreased and employ-
ment protection legislation became less strict. Finland and Sweden are the only
countries in which the union coverage rate increased over time. In the UK and
Ireland employment protection legislation became (somewhat) stricter. There
is not much fluctuation in the level of wage coordination within countries over
time. In Sweden wage coordination became more decentralised whereas it
became more centralised in Denmark (see for a further discussion on this
Thewissen et al., 2013b).
24 These extreme values for Germany drop out in the regressions as no data on export and
import are available for 1985 and 1990. Without Germany the ICT propensity in agriculture
in 1985 decreases to 0.02, causing the average ICT propensity in 1985 to drop to 0.12.
Table 2.4 Trends in international trade and technological change at the sectoral level 
  
Import 
(% sectoral value added) 
 
Export 
(% sectoral value added) 
 ICT 
(share in total capital 
compensation) 
  1985 1995 2005  1985 1995 2005  1985 1995 2005 
Sectoral level            
Agriculture 21.15a 33.15 47.85  22.57a 21.43 25.81  0.19 0.02 0.03 
Mining 285.94a 223.97 459.81  46.72a 35.01 49.97  0.03 0.05 0.11 
Manufacturing 91.63 114.36 144.40  88.25 132.12 167.30  0.10 0.09 0.12 
Utilities 3.13a 2.23 3.79  1.06a 1.30 5.47  0.04 0.05 0.05 
Construction . . .  . . .  0.06 0.28 0.12 
Wholesale . . .  . . .  0.21 0.17 0.18 
Transport and 
telecommunications  
. . . 
 
. . . 
 
0.23 0.20 0.26 
Finance . . .  . . .  0.09 0.10 0.12 
Community . . .  . . .  0.14 0.16 0.18 
Subsectoral level            
Man. food 50.75 57.56 81.07  59.80 100.24 83.18  0.07 0.07 0.09 
Man. textile 208.18 249.14 503.79  95.18 161.39 264.39  0.07 0.07 0.13 
Man. wood 65.16 73.67 83.37  72.08 86.08 81.69  0.08 0.06 0.07 
Man. paper 31.15 58.10 54.91  64.57 87.59 83.03  0.14 0.13 0.16 
Man. chemicals 130.61 135.74 166.18  96.18 131.70 188.81  0.06 0.06 0.09 
Man. minerals 41.20 44.93 65.52  30.37 55.16 63.09  0.09 0.07 0.07 
Man. metals 87.43 111.04 123.94  72.77 95.02 111.63  0.07 0.08 0.13 
Man. machinery 124.23 177.30 209.20  109.38 181.77 239.74  0.18 0.14 0.18 
Man. transport 174.15 269.00 424.87  120.47 171.65 245.23  0.26 0.13 0.20 
Other man. 75.77 87.87 132.52  66.65 95.82 110.70  0.09 0.12 0.26 
Transport . . .  . . .  0.13 0.14 0.15 
Telecommunications . . .  . . .  0.30 0.29 0.40 
Average 99.32 117.00 178.66  67.57 96.88 122.86  0.13 0.12 0.15 
Note Import and export are expressed in % of sectoral value added, pooled for countries for which data are available. a Data 
from 1990. The average is the unweighted arithmetic average for the available observations of that period 
Source Import and export from OECD STAN, share of ICT in total capital compensation from EU-KLEMS 
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2.5.3 Intrasectoral inequality
As shown in Table 2.6 no evidence is found for the hypothesis that inter-
national trade leads to higher intrasectoral earnings inequality. The only
borderline significant result is the negative association between export and
the first order corrected Gini index, which suggests that sectors more exposed
to export actually have a more compressed earnings structure. The sectoral
ICT propensity is insignificant in all regressions, providing no evidence for
the skill-biased technological change hypothesis.
The union coverage rate is consistently significant and its negative sign
corresponds to our hypothesis that stronger trade unions are associated with
lower earnings inequality. The level of wage coordination is significant only
for the Gini index regressions, whereas employment protection legislation
becomes significant in the regressions with the mean log deviation as the
dependent variable. We find mixed evidence for significant associations
between the unemployment rate at the country level and sectoral inequality.
It might be that when the unemployment rate is high, people with earnings
at the lower end of the distribution are most prone to job loss resulting in
lower earnings inequality, or that starters with relatively low earnings postpone
entry to the labour market (Elsby et al., 2010).
Table 2.5 Trends in institutions at the country level 
 
Union coverage rate (%)  Level of wage coordination  Employment protection 
legislation 
 
1985 1995 2005  1985 1995 2005  1985 1995 2005 
Czech Republic . 60.0 43.5  . 2 2  . 1.90 1.90 
Denmark 83.0 84.0 83.0  3 3 4  2.40 1.50 1.50 
Finland 77.0 82.2 90.0  4 3 4  2.33 2.16 2.02 
Germany 78.0 72.0 64.3  4 4 4  3.17 3.09 2.12 
Ireland . 60.0 54.6  . 5 5  . 0.93 1.11 
Sweden 85.0 94.0a 94.0  4 3 a 3  3.49 2.24a 2.24 
UK 64.0 36.1 34.7  1 1 1  0.60 0.60 0.75 
US 19.9 17.4 13.8  1 1 1  0.21 0.21 0.21 
Average 65.9 63.2 59.7  2.8 2.8 3.0  1.88 1.58 1.48 
Note a Data from around 2000. The average is the unweighted arithmetic average for the available observations of that 
period. Level of wage coordination is divided into: 5 = economy-wide bargaining, 4 = mixed industry- and economy-
wide bargaining, 3 = industry-level bargaining with no (standard) pattern setting, 2 = mixed industry- and firm-level 
bargaining, 1 = fragmented or no bargaining 





Increased inequality at the country level could also be a consequence of em-
ployment loss, in particular at the bottom end of the earnings distribution
(Atkinson, 2003; Kenworthy and Pontusson, 2005). We first use the relative
employment size of a sector as our dependent variable. If trade and techno-
logical change were associated with job loss, we should expect a negative
association with the relative employment size of the sector. Second, median
earnings should go up if job loss mainly occurred for people at the lower end
of the earnings distribution. As the sectoral employment indicators are
expressed in percentages relative to the national level so that they average
out to around 100 at the country level, the institutional and control variables
at the country level lose their interpretation. The country-level variables are
therefore left out of the regressions, although the results are not affected by
their inclusion.
Table 2.6 Panel data regressions for earnings inequality within sectors 
 First order corrected Gini index  Mean log deviation 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Sectoral data      
Import -0.002   -0.000  
 (0.354)   (0.876)  
Export  -0.008*   -0.009 
  (0.066)   (0.155) 
Share of ICT 1.311 0.672  0.676 0.353 
 (0.494) (0.774)  (0.771) (0.886) 
Country level data      
Union coverage rate -0.138*** -0.136***  -0.230*** -0.225*** 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Level of wage -1.070** -0.973**  -0.533 -0.421 
coordination  (0.012) (0.017)  (0.525) (0.608) 
Employment protection 1.089 1.054  3.129*** 3.076*** 
legislation  (0.228) (0.217)  (0.008) (0.006) 
Unemployment rate -0.195** -0.177**  -0.019 -0.001 
 (0.039) (0.050)  (0.879) (0.993) 
Real GDP per  -0.006 -0.007  -0.020 -0.020 











 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.004) 
N*T*I 345 345  345 345 
Adjusted R2 0.628 0.630  0.429 0.431 
Note OLS with country*period and sector*period interaction effects, full sample, 1985-2005, clustered standard errors. 
Significance levels are noted by *** (1 per cent), ** (5 per cent), or * (10 per cent). The constant is allowed to vary at the 
sectoral level 
Source First order corrected Gini index and mean log deviation from Wang et al. (2014a), import and export from OECD 
STAN, share of ICT in total capital compensation from EU-KLEMS, union coverage and level of wage coordination 
from Visser (2011), all other data from OECD 
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We can see in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.7 that import is negatively
associated with the relative employment size of industries.25 We can infer
from this that the relative number of jobs has decreased in sectors more
exposed to import. This is in line with the hypothesis that trade leads to job
loss in import-competing sectors, and it corresponds to the sectoral findings
for Germany and the UK of Oesch (2013). A causal interpretation does not seem
warranted, however, since it could be that less productive sectors have shed
labour and increased imports to fill these gaps. From the results we can
conclude that for a given sector, an increase in import of 1 percentage point
of the sectoral value added is on average associated with a 0.002 percentage
point lower relative employment size in a period, holding constant the control
variables.
The results provide no evidence for job creation in sectors with a large
export fraction. In addition, the finding that the ICT propensity is insignificant
in all regressions does not correspond with the skill-biased technological
change job loss hypothesis. The fact that we find a decline in employment in
import-competing industries combined with no significant association with
technological progress is in line with the industrial findings from Autor et
al. (forthcoming) for the US.
In case that low wage jobs for low-skilled workers have disappeared we should
expect higher relative median earnings in sectors that became more exposed
25 The number of observations decreases as we leave out the UK 1986, for which data are
missing for a number of individual industries which would induce an upward bias to the
relative employment sizes of individual industries as we would underestimate total employ-
ment size (the denominator). The only difference when including UK 1986 is that ICT
propensity becomes significant at the 10 per cent for the import regression. The results
are fully comparable if we would also exclude waves for which information on a subsector
within the manufacturing industry is missing (in addition to UK 1986 also SWE 1992; DNK
1987 and 1992).
Table 2.7 Panel data regressions for the relative employment size and relative median earnings 
 Relative employment size  Relative median earnings 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Import -0.002***   -0.016*  
 (0.008)   (0.054)  
Export  0.001   0.014 
  (0.421)   (0.504) 
Share of ICT 0.706 0.380  3.208 0.407 
 (0.138) (0.487)  (0.741) (0.968) 
Constant 2.495*** 2.450***  103.473*** 102.716*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
N*T*I 336 336  345 345 
Adjusted R2 0.627 0.606  0.663 0.653 
Note OLS with country*period and sector*period interaction effects, full sample, 1985-2005, clustered standard errors. 
Significance levels are noted by *** (1 per cent), ** (5 per cent), or * (10 per cent). The constant is allowed to vary at the 
sectoral level 
Source Relative employment size and relative median earnings from Wang et al. (2014a), import and export from OECD 




to international trade or more skill intensive. Yet, the regressions presented
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.7 actually show a negative association between
import and the relative median earnings, albeit only significant at the 10 per
cent level.26 This finding indicates that the diminution of employment found
in the former regressions is not associated with job loss for the low-skilled,
which is not in line with our hypothesis that trade hurts the lowly skilled.
An alternative explanation is that sectors responded to import with wage
moderation to remain competitive, so that relative median earnings did not
go up.
2.5.5 Sensitivity tests
We perform multiple tests to examine the sensitivity of our findings; the results
are available on request. We first use different specifications or data sources
for our dependent variables. Results are fully comparable when we use data
from OECD STAN (2011b) on the relative employment size. Import is still found
to be negatively associated with the relative employment size with a coefficient
of comparable size significant at the 1 per cent level.27 Next, we inspect
whether our results are robust to different household definitions. We
recalculate earnings and employment for household heads only, most likely
a more homogeneous group in which part-time work is less widespread. There
are still no signs of inequality-enhancing effects of trade or technological
change. The positive association between employment protection legislation
and inequality becomes significant in all inequality regressions, while the level
of wage coordination is no longer significant in any regression. Import remains
to have a significant association with the relative employment size, whereas
the significance between import and the relative median earnings disappears.
The results are fully comparable to the ones presented above when we include
household heads and their spouses. When we base our regressions on equival-
ised household earnings rather than individual information, as Mahler et al.
(1999) did, a number of changes appear. We still do not find inequality-enhanc-
ing effects of trade, but in all regressions there is a positive association between
the ICT propensity and within-sector inequality. In addition, the EPL index is
positive and the level of wage coordination is negative in all regressions.
Import still has a negative association with the relative employment size, while
the association between import and relative median earnings disappears. Thus,
26 For these regressions we do not exclude the country/period observations for which data
on individual industries are missing, as there is no clear upward or downward bias when
a certain industry is not included in the calculation of median earnings at the country level.
Results are fully comparable if we exclude UK 1986, or in addition to this Sweden 1992
and Denmark 1987 and 1992.
27 The coefficient is with -0.00136 slightly less negative than the one found with LIS data (-
0.00160).
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based on household level data we do find evidence for skill-biased techno-
logical change. Nevertheless, the original calculations based on individual data
are preferable as with household-level information earnings of the spouse or
other household members are attributed to sectors in which they were not
necessarily made.
As a second set of sensitivity tests, we use different indicators or specifica-
tions for trade and technological change. Our results by and large remain
comparable when we restrict our sample from 1995 onwards, when trade
between developed and developing countries mainly increased. Export becomes
insignificant and so does the union coverage rate for the mean log deviation,
and the level of wage coordination. Next, we use different sectoral indicators
for technological change, namely, the contribution of ICT capital to value added
growth from EU-KLEMS and R&D spending relative to the sectoral value added
from OECD STAN.28 The results remain similar; export is no longer significantly
associated with the first order corrected Gini index when R&D spending is used
as technological change indicator. Interactions of labour market institutions
and the sectoral indicators (import, export, and ICT intensity) are generally
insignificant, providing no evidence that the country-level labour market
institutions mitigate the effects of international trade or technological change
on earnings inequality.
As a third sensitivity test, we control for supply effects. As Goldin and
Katz (2008) argue, it is not only the increased demand for high-skilled labour
that may explain increased earnings inequality, changes in the supply are
relevant too. Inclusion of the share of hours worked by low-skilled, medium-
skilled, and high-skilled workers at the sectoral level from EU-KLEMS data does
not have consequences for our results and the shares of hours worked are
generally insignificant.29 The same holds when we run regressions with the
average years of total schooling for the total population aged 25 and over from
Barro and Lee (2013) as a measure of total supply of skills available at the
country level. In addition, we include the average hours worked per sector
from EU-KLEMS data in our regressions to control for sectoral differences in
the prevalence of part-time work.30 Export is no longer significantly associated
with the first order corrected Gini index, the EPL index becomes significant
in all four regressions while the level of wage coordination is no longer sig-
nificant. The average hours worked is insignificant in all regressions.
Fourth, we test for effects of our selected sample of sectors. The results
remain firm when we exclude industries in which the number of included
28 For the contribution of ICT capital to value added growth data for Ireland 1995 are taken
from the Groningen Growth and Development Centre. For the R&D spending we use data
from 2001 for Denmark 2000, and data from 1987 for the UK and US 1986.
29 Due to data availability for the US the data are based on the SIC rather than NAICS sectoral
classification, which should have negligible consequences.
30 Data from EU-KLEMS are complemented with OECD STAN data on total hours worked
by employees divided by the number of employees for the US 2000 and 2004.
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individuals in the LIS micro data is below 30, or when we include the commun-
ity sector by assuming that no trade took place by replacing the zeros for
missing values. Also from a more general test, excluding sectors one by one,
we find that import remains significantly associated with the relative employ-
ment size. The coefficient becomes twice as large (-0.003) when the mining
sector is excluded. The significant association between the union coverage rate
and earnings inequality is also robust to the exclusion of sectors, whilst the
relationships between export and the first order corrected Gini coefficient and
between import and relative median earnings disappear frequently.
Last, we allow for more lenient specifications by excluding the interactions
of country dummies and the time trend, sector dummies and the trend, or
both, or by including fixed effects at different levels rather than interactions.
This comes at a high price, as it makes the results more susceptible to un-
observed heterogeneity bias. There are still no signs of inequality-enhancing
effects of international trade or technological change. Without the country and
time trend interactions or country dummies the institutions become significant
in all regressions with earnings inequality as dependent variable. Again, the
initially found negative significant association between import and the relative
median earnings and between export and the first order corrected Gini index
disappears regularly.
All sensitivity tests considered, the relationships between import and the
relative employment size, and the union coverage rate and sectoral earnings
inequality remain firm. The associations between export and the first order
corrected Gini index, and between import and the relative median earnings,
that were significant at the 10 per cent level only, disappear frequently. There
are no indications of inequality-enhancing effects of trade.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter aims to contribute to our understanding of developments and
causes of earnings inequality by using new sectoral data for eight countries
between 1985 and 2005. Our study shows the importance of taking into account
sectoral trends for our understanding of earnings inequality. In fact, there is
on average as much spread in intrasectoral levels of inequality within countries,
as there is in levels of country-level inequality between countries. In addition,
the same intrasectoral trends can be found in our set of included countries.
Agriculture, wholesale, and the financial sector ubiquitously stand out as the
sectors with the most unequally distributed earnings, whereas mining, utilities,
and the manufacturing of metals and transport are characterised by low levels
of earnings dispersion in all countries. Hence, these results suggest that a
substantial part of the manifestation of inequality is overlooked or ignored
when studies confine themselves to country-level inequality trends only.
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Our decomposition shows that the level and the increase of inequality at
the country level is by and large determined by intrasectoral inequality devel-
opments, instead of earnings differences between sectors. Intrasectoral earnings
inequality has increased in the vast majority of sectors, although the rise differs
per sector. In the sector with the highest level of inequality, agriculture, there
is actually a trend towards more equalisation. From our comparison of the
relative employment sizes of industries over time we see an employment shift
from the manufacturing industry towards the financial sector.
Our sectoral design allows us to differentiate between three explanations
put forward to explain rising inequality at the country level. By means of cross-
sectional pooled time-series we do not find evidence for associations between
international trade and earnings inequality, in line with other sectoral studies
(Mahler et al., 1999; OECD, 2011a; Michaels et al., 2014). Yet, the reported results
denote that the employment size has decreased in sectors that are more
exposed to import, corresponding to findings for the UK and Germany (Oesch,
2013). No further evidence is found that this job loss has occurred at the bottom
end of the earnings distribution. This corresponds to the hypothesis that trade
can lead to job loss, even though the results do not suggest that this job loss
took place at the bottom end of the earnings distribution where most low-
skilled workers are located. Indeed, our finding that job loss is not biased
towards the low-skilled is consistent with the fact that we do not find evidence
that trade leads to inequality. Causal interpretations of these results do not
seem warranted, since it could be that less productive sectors have shed labour
and increased imports to fill these gaps, leading to a negative association
between imports and relative employment size. In addition, sectors might have
responded to import competition with wage moderation to remain competitive,
causing a negative association between imports and the relative median
earnings.
Our regressions with intrasectoral inequality as the dependent variable
point to labour market institutions as important variables. This corresponds
to our observation that levels of intrasectoral inequality increased in almost
all sectors. The union coverage rate at the country level is found to be negative-
ly associated with sectoral earnings inequality, which corresponds to the
hypothesis that waning trade union power is an explanation for rising inequal-
ity (e.g., Koeniger et al., 2007). These results are robust to different sensitivity
analyses. Further analysis using sectoral data on union coverage rates could
provide more insight into how trade unions’ influence works its way into
sectoral earnings differences – unfortunately, such data are not available with
sufficient detail for our set of countries over time (e.g., Pinto and Beckfield,
2011; Kristal, 2013).
The regression results are not in line with the skill-biased technological
change hypothesis, as we do not find significant associations between several
indicators of technological progress and any of the dependent variables.
Michaels et al. (2014) report effects of technological progress for a larger group
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of countries, but their study is focused on polarisation in skill demand rather
than earnings inequality, and that they only use two periods over time. It
therefore seems relevant to further analyse in what way polarisation seeps
through to inequality at the sectoral level.
Methodologically, with our sectoral approach the number of observations
increases and (unobserved) industry-specific developments can be taken into
account. Yet, the regressions do not provide causal evidence on the effects
of international trade, technological change, and labour market institutions
on earnings inequality. Other confounding factors, in particular in product
markets, can be expected to affect both earnings and employment, as well as
trade and technology opportunities. There could also be dependencies between
sectors that have not been taken into account in this study. In addition, indi-
vidual labour market transitions cannot be tracked directly by means of the
used database, which opens up an interesting avenue for further research.
Acknowledging these limitations, the analyses presented here encourage a
sectoral approach in understanding inequality, in which heterogeneity between
sectors is accounted for. As there is as much variation in levels of intrasectoral
inequality within countries as there is between levels of country-level inequal-
ity, the sectoral dimension is crucial for our understanding of the manifestation
of earnings inequality. In addition, a sectoral approach could help our theoret-
ical understanding of inequality and its causes, as there are clear differences
in the degree to which sectors are exposed to factors that potentially drive
inequality, in particular, technological change and international trade. Indeed,
our sectoral approach points to the direction of trade unions having an
equalising effects on earnings, whereas no support is found for international
trade or technological change, two popular explanations for rising inequality.
3 Competing with the dragon
Employment and wage effects of Chinese trade
competition in 17 sectors across 18 OECD
countries1
ABSTRACT
The rapid rise of China on the global economic stage could have substantial
and unequal employment and wage effects in advanced industrialised demo-
cracies given China’s large volume of low-wage labour. Thus far, these effects
have not been analysed in the comparative political economy literature. Build-
ing on new pooled time-series data, we analyse the effects of Chinese trade
competition across 17 sectors in 18 countries between 1990 and 2007. Our
empirical findings reveal overall employment declines and higher earnings
inequality in sectors more exposed to Chinese imports. We devote particular
attention to a new channel, increased competition from China in 59 foreign
export markets, which positively affects the high-skilled whilst the low-skilled
bear the brunt. Hence, this study shows that neglecting the competition in
foreign countries leads to underestimation of the distributive effects of trade.
More generally, our findings provide new insights into how international trade,
technological change, and labour market institutions contribute to the widely
observed trend of rising inequality.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades China’s manufacturing exports to advanced
industrialised democracies have grown enormously. As a result of its
liberalisation of product and financial markets, its growth in productivity, and
its World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession in 2001, China became the
world’s largest exporter of goods in the span of two decades between early
1990s and 2010 (OECD, 2012c).
1 This chapter appeared as Thewissen, S., Van Vliet, O. (2014) Competing with the dragon:
Employment and wage effects of Chinese trade competition in 17 sectors across 18 OECD
countries, LIS Working Paper Series no. 623. Earlier versions of this study were presented
at the 7th ECPR-SGEU Conference, 5-7 June 2014 The Hague, the 2014 LIS Summer Work-
shop, 29 June-5 July, Luxembourg and the 26th SASE Annual Conference, July 10-12 2014
Chicago. We thank all the participants, Michael Blauberger, Koen Caminada, Kees
Goudswaard, John Peters, David Rueda, and Vera Troeger for their helpful comments and
suggestions. All errors remain ours.
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Given China’s large volume of low-wage labour, its growing exports can
potentially have substantial consequences for the wages and employment
possibilities of employees in OECD countries. Globalisation as such has a long
history of being examined as a cause of rising earnings inequality in the
comparative political economy literature. Studies tend to use imports and
exports with less developed countries summed together as a percentage of
GDP as indicator; most studies report insignificant associations between this
measure and wage inequality (Pontusson et al., 2002; Rueda and Pontusson,
2000; Oliver, 2008). Huber and Stephens (2014) do not find significant effects
of total imports and exports as a percentage of GDP on wage inequality. Yet,
these studies do not devote specific attention to China’s rise on the global
economic stage. In addition, trade is measured at the country level even though
there are substantial differences in the degree to which sectors within countries
are exposed to trade. Furthermore, an important theoretical channel through
which trade has an impact on employment and wages is neglected. Traditional
measures of trade only capture direct linkages between trading partners. These
approaches disregard that exporting sectors are also affected by the rise of
China when foreign export markets switch to Chinese imports instead.
Recent studies in international economics and labour economics reveal
strong distributive effects of the rise of China on the global economy in single-
country studies. Autor et al. (2013) and Autor et al. (forthcoming) find that
rising Chinese import competition on US labour markets has reduced employ-
ment and wages in manufacturing sectors. For Norway, Balsvik et al. (forth-
coming) find negative employment effects, but no indications of wage effects.
These authors attribute these dissimilarities in results to the lower flexibility
of Norwegian labour market institutions compared to the US Although these
case studies insightfully depict country-specific developments, they do not
allow for a general assessment of employment and wage effects of Chinese
trade competition across a broader group of OECD countries with diverse
political-economic institutions.
We aim to complement our existing knowledge of determinants of earnings
inequality by analysing the developments in employment and wages in 17
sectors across 18 OECD countries between 1990 and 2007. This approach allows
us to examine the distributive effects of Chinese trade competition, while we
can account for institutions found to be relevant in the comparative political
economy literature on wage inequality (e.g. Rueda and Pontusson, 2000;
Mahler, 2004; Martin and Swank, 2012). With respect to this literature, we seek
to make three contributions.
First, existing research pertains to distributive effects of international trade
in general, but does not devote attention to effects of Chinese trade in parti-
cular. We empirically test whether increased Chinese trade competition pro-
vides an explanation for rising levels of inequality in Western countries (Brad-
ley et al., 2003; OECD, 2011a; Huber and Stephens, 2014). Second, we extend
our analysis of trade effects on the distribution of earnings by taking into
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account Chinese competition on foreign export markets. This route has been
neglected thus far in the existing inequality literature. Third, we take the sector
as the unit of analysis. Exposure to international trade and therefore its labour
market effects vary substantially across sectors (Scheve and Slaughter, 2004;
Hays et al., 2005; Walter, 2010; Oesch, 2013). Our central hypothesis is that
sectors with greater exposure to Chinese trade competition experience stronger
labour market effects. Building on Mahler et al. (1999) and Thewissen et al.
(2013b), we examine the sectoral variation in employment, wages, and earnings
inequality using a new sectoral dataset based on LIS micro data (Wang et al.,
2014a). Furthermore, our study is complementary to recent research on de-
industrialisation. We inspect the evolution of the manufacturing sectors in
detail, whilst recent accounts mainly focus on developments in the services
sectors (Rehm, 2009; Ansell and Gingrich, 2013; Wren, 2013; Dancygier and
Walter, forthcoming).
The chapter is organised as follows. We begin by reviewing the literature
and formulating hypotheses on the effects of Chinese trade competition, skill-
biased technological change and labour market institutions on employment
and earnings inequality. In Section 3.3, we discuss the data and methods and
specify the measure for Chinese export competition in foreign markets.
Subsequently, Section 3.4 presents the results of the analysis. Section 3.5
summarises the main findings and concludes.
3.2 LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESES
Our theoretical understanding of the distributive effects of Chinese exports
is based on two standard trade models from international economics. In the
Ricardo-Viner model, sectors are the central unit of analysis as it is assumed
that factor mobility is limited. Employees in sectors with higher exports as
a result of the reduction of trade restrictions benefit, whereas employees in
sectors with increased imports loose (Samuelson, 1971; Hays, 2009). In contrast,
the Stolper-Samuelson model (1941), in which factor mobility is assumed to
be perfect, hinges on factor endowments. Owners of abundant production
factors profit from trade.
Increased trade competition stemming from China may affect workers
in OECD countries in two ways. First, Chinese imports in OECD countries can
substitute the domestic production of goods, resulting in a reduced labour
demand. Hence, it can be expected that sectors with more Chinese exports
experience negative employment and wage effects. The findings of Autor et
al. (2013) and Balsvik et al. (forthcoming) for respectively the US and Norway
support this hypothesis. Second, Chinese exports may also affect sectors by
generating increased competition in the foreign markets where sectors sell
their products. As an example, it could be that a German manufacturer has
a large market share in France, but that France substitutes German imports
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for Chinese products (Balsvik et al., forthcoming). Thus, we hypothesise that
the employment size of sectors more exposed to Chinese trade competition
will shrink.
Furthermore, we predict that employment and wage effects of Chinese
trade competition are not equally shared across all workers. Given the relative
abundance of low-skilled labour in China, mainly the low-skilled employees
in exposed manufacturing sectors in OECD countries will be affected by Chinese
exports. Therefore, we hypothesise that sectoral exposure to Chinese trade
competition is associated with negative employment and wage effects for low-
skilled employees. For high-skilled workers, however, expectations are less
clear-cut. Based on an empirical analysis for the UK, Bloom et al. (2012) find
positive wage effects of Chinese trade competition for high-skilled workers.
As more competition from China does not imply more exports to China, on
the contrary, these positive effects are not an indication of the typical winners
from the Stolper-Samuelson model. Instead, according to recent insights from
international economics (e.g. Melitz, 2003), increased competition triggers firms
to increase their productivity in order to survive. Indeed, Bloom et al. (2012)
find that Chinese trade competition has a positive impact on innovation and
productivity. In order to achieve this, firms hire more high-skilled workers,
leading to positive labour market effects in sectors that are more exposed to
Chinese competition. Thus, we expect positive employment and wage effects
for high-skilled workers in sectors more exposed to Chinese export competition.
Last, as we predict that the high-skilled gain from Chinese trade competition
whilst this negatively affects the low-skilled, we expect that sectors more
exposed to Chinese trade competition have higher levels of intrasectoral
earnings inequality.
Another explanation for rising levels of labour market inequality is the
effect of so-called skill-biased technological change (Goldin and Katz, 2008;
Oesch, 2013; Wren, 2013). According to this argument, technological innovation
complements the high-skilled, whilst it substitutes routine labour by capital.
The demand for high-skilled labour increases, leading to more employment
opportunities and higher wages for highly educated workers. In contrast, the
demand for low-skilled labour decreases, resulting in fewer jobs and lower
wages for lowly educated workers. These effects of technological change are
supported by various empirical studies on the US (Autor et al., 2003; Goldin
and Katz, 2008). Focusing on the labour market effects of information and
communication technologies (ICT), Michaels et al. (2014) extend this empirical
evidence to sectors in Japan and nine European countries.
Prompted by the fact that the theoretically predicted labour market effects
of trade and technological change are rather similar, there has been a debate
which of the two is most responsible for growing levels of inequality. A recent
study on the US by Autor et al. (forthcoming) pushes this debate forward by
showing that the effects of trade and technological change actually differ. The
authors find that sectors with a greater exposure to trade competition exper-
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ience overall declines in employment. In contrast, technological change yields
neutral effects on overall employment, but substantial compositional effects
within sectors, as low-skilled employment declines and high-skilled employ-
ment grows. Hence, we expect that technological change has positive employ-
ment and wage effects for highly educated workers and negative employment
and wage effects for lowly educated workers, without affecting the overall
employment size of the exposed sector.
A third line of explanations for the variation in employment and wages,
and one that is central in the current comparative political economy literature,
emphasises the importance of labour market institutions. As employers and
employees bargain over wages and other working conditions, the outcomes
of these negotiations are a function of a country’s system of labour relations
and political power distributions (Kenworthy, 2001; Martin and Swank, 2012;
Huber and Stephens, 2014). A first factor is the share of employees covered
by wage bargaining agreements (Wallerstein, 1999). When more employees
are covered by bargaining agreements, there is less variation in wages between
workers. Hence, we expect bargaining coverage to be negatively associated
with wage inequality.
In addition to the coverage, also the level of coordination of wage bargain-
ing may affect labour market outcomes. In the wage inequality literature, the
main hypothesis on this score is that countries with centralised systems of
wage bargaining have a more compressed wage distribution. Centralised wage
bargaining creates fewer and smaller wage differentials as more firms and
industries are covered by the same wage settlements (Wallerstein, 1999; Rueda
and Pontusson, 2000; Mahler, 2004). As the existing empirical evidence is based
on country-level studies, it is an empirical question whether and how
coordination affects wage inequality within sectors.
Moreover, the coordination of bargaining may also have employment
effects. High wage settlements may have adverse effects on employment if
wages are not in line with productivity. Hence, as multiple sectors are involved
in the bargaining, the resulting wage settlement may harm employment in
low-productivity sectors (Iversen and Wren, 1998). On the other hand, it could
also be expected that in highly coordinated bargaining systems, the employ-
ment implications of wage determination are taken into account more explicitly
by unions and employment organisations as norms of fairness and solidarity
become more dominant (Soskice, 1991; Wallerstein, 1999).
Furthermore, labour market outcomes may be influenced by employment
protection legislation (EPL). EPL increases the gap between employees with a
permanent contract (insiders) and employees without a permanent contract
(outsiders). The costs of dismissal increase with the strictness of EPL, which
gives insiders bargaining power in wage setting (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001;
Rueda, 2007). Hence, we expect that the strictness of EPL is positively related
to earnings inequality. Moreover, EPL might also yield distributive effects
between skill groups. Because of a substantial component of fixed costs, EPL
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protects low-skilled workers more than high-skilled workers (Koeniger et al.,
2007).
Finally, the political ideology of governments might also have an impact
on the wage dispersion. In the wage inequality literature, two effects are
highlighted. First, since governments are extensively involved in private-sector
wage setting in many advanced industrial countries, the ideology of govern-
ments might have a direct effect on wage inequality. Hence, left-wing govern-
ments can be expected to pursue greater wage inequality than liberal or
conservative governments (Wallerstein, 1999). A second and more indirect
argument is that governments might influence wages and employment through
minimum wage legislation, taxes, and other forms of income policies. Again,
it may be expected that left-wing governments adopt policies that lead to less
inequality (Rueda and Pontusson, 2000; Pontusson et al., 2002; Oliver, 2008).
3.3 DATA, MEASURES AND METHOD
3.3.1 Dependent variable
To examine the labour market effects of import and export competition at the
sectoral level across countries and over time, we use multiple data sources.
First, we analyse sectoral employment effects, using the relative employment
size. This measure is defined as the number of employees in a sector divided
by the number of employees in the national economy. Data are taken from
the EU-KLEMS database (2011) that consists of harmonised data from national
statistical institutes (Timmer et al., 2010; O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009).2 The
effects of trade with China may vary across skill groups, but the EU-KLEMS
data do not contain information on the skill levels of the employees. Yet,
sectoral information on the share of hours worked per skill group is available.
Following other studies (OECD, 2011a; Michaels et al., 2014), we use this
measure, relying on data from the EU-KLEMS March 2008 release.
In addition to the employment effects, we examine sectoral wage effects
across different skill groups. We use the wage bill share per skill group, based
on EU-KLEMS data. A second measure that we use to examine the wage effects
is the level of earnings inequality within a sector, measured by the Gini index.
Data come from the Leiden LIS Sectoral Income Inequality Dataset (Wang et
al., 2014a). This database is constructed on the basis of LIS micro data (LIS,
2014). It includes income from wages and self-employment for individuals
aged between 25 and 54 across sectors. The analysis focuses on 17 sectors at
2 For Canada we have to use the EU-KLEMS March 2008 dataset.
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the 2-digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 3.1 level3
across 18 capitalist countries4 and utilises annual data for the years 1990-2007.5
3.3.2 Measuring Chinese trade competition
For our measure of exposure to Chinese import competition, we follow existing
sectoral studies (Mahler et al., 1999; Michaels et al., 2013) and measure this
as the value of the total imported goods as a share of the value added for
sector i in country j in year t. This measure is the sectoral equivalent of imports
as a share of GDP at the country level.6 Data on imports come from the OECD
STAN Bilateral Trade Database (2011b) and value added is taken from EU-KLEMS
(2011).
To capture the Chinese competition in foreign markets p to which sectors
export their goods, export competition for sector i in country j at time t is
measured as follows:
(3.1)
The second part of equation 3.1 measures the difference in exports from the
sector type i of China and country j to country p, relative to the total exports
– from all countries – of sector type i to country p.7 Hence, this measure
3 See Table A3.1 in the appendix for the ISIC codes. We leave out total manufacturing; and
manufacturing of chemical, rubber, plastics, and fuel products (23t25) in our descriptives
and regressions to avoid having sectoral overlap, as we include all constituent sectors
separately.
4 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland,
France, the UK, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the US.
5 The beginning is set by data availability on imports from China and the end is due to data
availability from EU-KLEMS. Information on shares of hours worked per skill group is
only available up to and including 2004.
6 As a simple test we calculate the correlation between total imports in value added at the
country level from our database and imports of goods and services in percentages of GDP
from World Bank National Accounts. The correlation is 0.93, with a comparable mean (32.0
versus 35.2 from the World Bank) and standard deviation (both 17.5).
7 We restrict our analysis to 59 partner countries as data for other countries contain too many
missings. We calculate Chinese exports to each of the 59 partner countries at the sectoral
level for our sample of countries individually as follows. We collect both export data
reported by China at the sectoral level, and import data reported by each of the 59 partner
countries at the sectoral level. The correlation between the two is 0.99. To maximise data
availability, we first interpolate both time series. Next, we extrapolate the export data from
China using the trend in import data from the separate partner countries. As a final check
we calculate the percentage of (unweighted) values at the country partner sector year level
larger than +1 and smaller than -1. These numbers would be the result of data differences
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indicates the difference between the export market shares of the sectors i from
China and country j in country p. Subsequently, the pressure from the Chinese
competition in the foreign market p depends on the relative importance of
foreign market p for sector i in country j. Therefore, the competition in foreign
market p is weighted by the first term of equation 3.1, which is the value of
the exported goods from sector i in country j to country p divided by the total
exports of sector i in country j.8 An advantage of the export competition
measure used in this study over the measures used by Autor et al. (2013) and
Balsvik et al. (forthcoming), is that our measure accounts for the temporal
variation in the exports from sector i in country j, whereas the other measures
only include the initial market share of this sector. For the export competition
measure, sectoral data from the OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database are col-
lected for 59 partner countries p, including all OECD countries, all European
countries, the BRIICS, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand, which
amounts to little over half a million observations, covering around 85 per cent
of all imports for our sample of countries.
Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 show that China is becoming an increasingly
important trade partner for developed countries. Figure 3.1 presents averages
for all sectors, whereas Table 3.2 presents trade exposure per sector averaged
across countries. Between 1990 and 2007, the imports from China as a per-
centage of value added increased in all sectors but the mining industry. The
export competition measure shows negative values for all sectors in 1990. This
indicates that in the foreign markets, the value of the exports from the OECD
countries is on average larger than the value of the Chinese exports. Over time,
the exposure to Chinese competition has rapidly increased for exporting firms,
as indicated by less negative values.
Interestingly, the exposure to import and export competition from China
varies considerably across sectors. This is also reflected by a low correlation
between the two measures (0.25). For instance, exposure to Chinese export
competition in the electrical manufacturing sector increased between 1990 and
2007, whereas it hardly changed in the paper industry. However, exposure
to Chinese imports in the home markets did increase substantially in the paper
industry.
impossible that the difference between Chinese and home country’s exports to a partner’s
sector divided by total exports to this partner’s sector is larger than 1. The 0.2 per cent of
all observations for which this is the case are changed to missings.
8 We make two amendments to this weighting factor to make sure it adds to 1 at the sector
country year level. First, we multiply the weighting factor by the difference between total
country exports and the sum of country exports to each individual country, since we ‘only’
collect data for 59 countries rather than to all countries. Second, for each indicator separately
we correct for missing trade information from a partner country, which is only a minor
adjustment (the correlation between the corrected and uncorrected series is above 0.97).
Employment and wage effects Chinese trade competition, 17 sectors across 18 OECD countries 47
Figure 3.1 Evolution of Chinese imports and exports competition 
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3.3.3 Other independent variables
To account for effects of skill-biased technological change on employment and
wages, we follow Michaels et al. (2014), Massari et al. (2013), and Wren (2013)
and include ICT capital compensation as a share of sectoral value added from
the EU-KLEMS dataset (2011).9 We include two measures to account for wage-
setting institutions, namely the bargaining coverage, which is defined as the
proportion of employees covered by wage bargaining agreements, and the
level of wage coordination.10 Both measures are taken from the ICTWSS data-
base (Visser et al., 2013).11 As a measure for the strictness of employment
9 As Michaels et al. (2014) also note, since capital compensation is calculated as a residual,
it could be negative. We replace values by zeros if negative (3 per cent of total observations).
We calculate the indicator by multiplying ICT capital compensation as a share of total capital
compensation by capital compensation, and divide this by value added, where we have
placed capital compensation and value added in real dollars using OECD information on
exchange rates. We have to use the EU-KLEMS March 2008 version for Portugal.
10 We linearly interpolate the bargaining coverage rate.
11 For Ireland there are only 3 observations available for bargaining coverage in the fourth
version of ICTWSS; the first observation is for 2000. We use the third ICTWSS version for
this country and we interpolated the data. The correlation between the linearly interpolated
series from the third and fourth version for the 9 overlapping observations is 0.89.
Table 3.1 Imports and exports exposure 
Sector 
Exposure to imports from China 
(% value added) 
 Chinese exports exposure (index) 
 1990 2007 Change  1990 2007 Change 
Agriculture  0.4 0.7 0.3  -0.08 -0.08 0.00 
Mining  3.4 3.0 -0.4  -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 
Total manufacturing 1.1 16.2 15.1  -0.09 0.00 0.09 
Man. food  0.6 1.7 1.1  -0.08 -0.07 0.00 
Man. textiles 10.4 128.6 118.2  -0.04 0.11 0.15 
Man. wood  1.1 9.1 8.0  -0.10 -0.05 0.05 
Man. paper  0.1 1.9 1.8  -0.13 -0.12 0.01 
Man. coke, chemicals, rubber 0.7 6.2 5.5  -0.09 -0.06 0.03 
Man. coke  0.5 2.0 1.5  -0.10 -0.12 -0.03 
Man. chemicals 0.8 6.2 5.4  -0.08 -0.05 0.03 
Man. rubber  0.8 12.0 11.3  -0.12 -0.05 0.08 
Man. other non-metal 0.5 7.2 6.7  -0.11 -0.02 0.09 
Man. basic metals 0.4 9.3 8.9  -0.10 -0.03 0.07 
Man. machinery 0.6 17.3 16.7  -0.10 -0.01 0.09 
Man. electrical 1.3 75.7 74.4  -0.08 0.08 0.16 
Man. transport equip 0.1 5.4 5.3  -0.13 -0.08 0.05 
Man. n.e.c 4.3 41.9 37.7  -0.07 0.04 0.11 
Average (unweighted) 1.7 21.5 19.8  -0.09 -0.03 0.06 
Source  Trade data from OECD STAN Bilateral Database, value added from EU-KLEMS 
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protection legislation, the EPL index from the OECD (2014a) is included. To
analyse the impact of left-wing governments, we use the percentage of total
cabinet posts held by left-wing parties from the Comparative Political Data
Set (Armingeon et al., 2012). Furthermore, employment and wages may be
affected by cyclical dynamics. To control for these dynamics, we include a
number of variables. At the sectoral level, we include the volume of gross value
added. Data are taken from the EU-KLEMS dataset (2011). For more general
economic conditions at the country level, we include the unemployment rate.
As low-skilled workers are more substitutable than high-skilled workers, the
bargaining position of low-skilled workers is more directly and more disad-
vantageously affected by unemployment (Pontusson et al., 2002). Hence,
unemployment can be expected to be positively associated with earnings
inequality. Unemployment rates are taken from the OECD (2014b) Labour Force
Statistics. Finally, we include real GDP per capita from the OECD (2014c)
National Accounts.
Last, we include a measure of total excluding Chinese imports as a share
of sectoral value added to account for the effect of other imports. Chinese
imports and total excluding Chinese imports are substantively and empirically
distinct, as indicated by a low correlation (0.14) and a much more rapid
average rise of Chinese imports (15.2 instead of 2.0 per cent on average per
year for our sample).
3.3.4 Method
An important issue in the analysis of time-series cross-section data is non-
stationarity. Indeed, we find evidence for non-stationarity of our main
variables.12 The study relies on an error correction model, in which changes
of the dependent variable are regressed on the lagged levels and the changes
of the independent variables. Such a model is better able to cope with non-
stationarity than specifications in levels only (Beck, 1991; De Boef and Keele,
2008). Given the nature of the data in many studies in comparative political
economy, it is a conventional estimator in the field (Iversen and Cusack, 2000;
Ansell and Gingrich, 2013; Wren et al., 2013). In an error correction model,
the lagged levels capture the long-term structural effects, whereas the changes
capture the short-term transitory effects (Podestà, 2006). Hence, the estimated
equation is:
12 We conduct Im-Pesaran-Shin tests for each of our time series individually, where the time
trend and a lag structure are allowed to differ across time series. The lion’s share of our
time series suffers from stationarity. Further tests show that first differencing our variables
removes the persistence in the majority of the time series for our variables.
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∆yijt = α0 + α1yijt–1 + β0∆xijt + β1xijt–1 + β2zit–1 + εijt (3.2)
Here, ∆yijt denotes the first difference in the dependent variable in sector i in
country j and year t; α0 is the intercept and εijt is the error term. For the vector
of independent variables xijt the short-term effects are indicated by β0. The long-
term effects are indicated by β1/–α1.
To analyse the data, the study relies on OLS regression analyses. The main
model does not include sector or country fixed effects, since the inclusion of
both a lagged dependent variable and unit dummies renders the estimator
inconsistent (Nickell, 1991). Nevertheless, estimating the model with sector
or country dummies generally replicates the main results. Despite the fact that
the lagged dependent variable absorbs autocorrelation in the error term,
Breusch-Godfrey tests indicate that there is still autocorrelation left. Therefore,
the error term is specified to follow a panel-specific AR(1) process. In addition,
we use panel-corrected standard errors to correct for panel-heteroskedasticity
and contemporaneous spatial correlation (Beck and Katz, 2011).
3.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
3.4.1 Employment effects
The results of estimation of employment effects are presented in Table 3.2.
Model 1 starts with the analysis of the relative employment size of a sector,
defined as the number of people working in a sector divided by people work-
ing in the national economy. As this ratio sums to one for each country-year
observation, we leave out country-level variables as they lose their inter-
pretation.13 Our findings indicate that Chinese imports are negatively asso-
ciated with the employment size.14 This result provides empirical support
for the hypothesis that imported Chinese goods substitute domestically pro-
duced goods leading to negative employment effects. The employment effects
of total imports excluding Chinese imports are comparable but smaller. Models
2 and 3 show that the negative employment effects from Chinese imports
mainly impinge on low-skilled workers. Exposure to Chinese export com-
petition seems to have a negative effect on overall employment, but only in
the short run as the coefficient for the lagged level is not significant. For low-
skilled workers, there is a negative effect of Chinese export competition on
their hours worked. In sectors that are exposed to strong competition from
13 Our results hardly change when we include the labour market institutions: import com-
petition becomes insignificant whilst export competition becomes significant.
14 Our main results do not change when we restrict our analysis to the 3777 observations
for which we also have information on share of hours worked per skill group. Total
excluding Chinese imports become insignificant.
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China in their foreign export markets, there is less work for lowly educated
workers. Interestingly, there is more work for highly educated workers in these
sectors. In response to the increased competition, firms seek to increase their
productivity and highly educated workers benefit from this.
With respect to technological change, the results indicate that there is no
significant association between technological change and the employment size
of sectors. Nevertheless, technological change is negatively related to the share
of hours worked by lowly educated workers and it is positively related to the
share of hours worked by highly educated workers. Taken together, these
results lend support to the argument that technological change alters the
composition of employment within sectors rather than the overall employment
size of sectors. In sectors with greater skill-biased technological change, the
number of low-skilled jobs declined whilst the number of high-skilled job
increased.
Among the institutional variables, EPL is positively associated with the share
of hours worked by lowly educated workers, whereas it is negatively asso-
ciated with the share of working hours of the highly educated workers. In
line with our expectation, these results indicate that EPL provides more pro-
tection for low-skilled workers than for high-skilled workers. For the
coordination of wage bargaining, we find a negative association with the share
of working hours of low-skilled workers. The coverage of wage bargaining
and the political ideology of governments do not yield significant employment
effects.
Turning to the economic control variables, the unemployment rate is
negatively associated with the share of hours worked by low-skilled workers,
whereas it is not significantly associated with the share of hours worked by
high-skilled workers. These results are in line with the theoretical argument
that unemployment affects the labour market position of low-skilled workers
more adversely than the position of high-skilled workers. Furthermore, the
results provide some evidence for positive employment effects of the value
added and GDP per capita.
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3.4.2 Wage effects
Table 3.3 presents the results of the regression analyses of wage bill shares.
Exposure to Chinese export competition is negatively associated with the wages
Table 3.2 Chinese import and export competition and employment 
 Δ Relative 
employment 
size 
 Δ Share of 
hours worked 
low-skilled 
 Δ Share of 
hours worked 
high-skilled 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Δ Chinese imports (x 10-1) -0.177  7.317  2.513 
(0.535)  (0.286)  (0.432) 
Chinese imports (t-1) (x 10-1) -0.259**  -4.612*  -0.631 
(0.039)  (0.061)  (0.588) 
Δ Chinese exports comp -0.141**  0.060  0.111 
(0.015)  (0.964)  (0.924) 
Chinese exports comp (t-1) 0.001  -0.782**  0.596*** 
(0.787)  (0.018)  (0.000) 
Δ Total excluding Chinese imports (x 10-1) 0.001  0.167**  0.054 
(0.489)  (0.014)  (0.671) 
Total excluding Chinese imports (t-1) (x 10-1) -0.003**  0.008  0.018 
(0.019)  (0.782)  (0.797) 
Δ Technology -0.048  2.605  -0.091 
(0.699)  (0.328)  (0.971) 
Technology (t-1) -0.012  -3.114***  3.073*** 
(0.875)  (0.000)  (0.004) 
Δ Value added 0.028***  0.070  0.101 
(0.005)  (0.495)  (0.265) 
Value added (t-1) 0.004  0.009  0.194*** 
(0.655)  (0.910)  (0.005) 
Bargaining coverage (t-1)   -0.007  0.001 
  (0.148)  (0.394) 
Bargaining coordination (t-1)   -0.136**  0.022 
  (0.032)  (0.435) 
Left government (t-1)   0.001  -0.000 
  (0.593)  (0.408) 
EPL (t-1)   0.436***  -0.103* 
  (0.009)  (0.081) 
Unemployment rate (t-1)   -0.028**  0.002 
  (0.037)  (0.784) 
GDP per capita (x 10-3) (t-1)   0.023***  -0.005 
  (0.004)  (0.494) 
Lagged dependent variable -0.026***  -0.012**  0.009 
(0.000)  (0.014)  (0.208) 
Constant 0.007  -1.014***  0.262 
(0.525)  (0.001)  (0.373) 
N 4270  3777  3777 
Adjusted R2 0.12  0.18  0.08 
Note  Error correction model with panel-corrected standard errors and panel-specific AR(1) structure. 1990-2007 
for the relative employment size, 1990-2004 for the shares of hours worked low- and high-skilled. P-values 
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of low skilled workers, whereas it is positively associated with the wages of
high skilled workers. In line with the results for the employment effects, these
results indicate that sectors with great exposure to Chinese export competition
face substantial distributive effects. Furthermore, Chinese imports do not reach
significance in these analyses. This suggests that the distributive effects of
Chinese imports run via employment rather than via wages, as we predicted
from our theoretical section for our set of countries with more rigid labour
market institutions (Balsvik et al., forthcoming).
Table 3.3 Chinese import and export competition and wage bill shares 
 Δ Wage bill share 
low-skilled 
 Δ Wage bill 
share high-
skilled 
 (1)  (2) 
Δ Chinese imports (x 10-1) 3.130  6.414 
(0.557)  (0.137) 
Chinese imports (t-1) (x 10-1) -2.592  -0.908 
(0.129)  (0.670) 
Δ Chinese exports comp 1.647  -0.673 
(0.182)  (0.754) 
Chinese exports comp (t-1) -0.773***  0.537* 
(0.007)  (0.056) 
Δ Total excluding Chinese imports 
(x 10-1) 
0.183***  0.023 
(0.009)  (0.907) 
Total excluding Chinese imports (t-
1) 
(x 10-1) 
0.026  0.022 
(0.512)  (0.865) 
Δ Technology 2.990  0.025 
(0.232)  (0.995) 
Technology (t-1) -2.472***  3.540** 
(0.000)  (0.015) 
Δ Value added 0.124  0.050 
(0.122)  (0.637) 
Value added (t-1) 0.025  0.168* 
(0.620)  (0.071) 
Bargaining coverage (t-1) -0.005  0.000 
(0.313)  (0.973) 
Bargaining coordination (t-1) -0.147***  0.026 
(0.000)  (0.569) 
Left government (t-1) 0.001  -0.001 
(0.529)  (0.418) 
EPL (t-1) 0.461***  -0.110 
(0.001)  (0.357) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) -0.025**  0.008 
(0.016)  (0.618) 
GDP per capita (x 10-3) (t-1) 0.024***  -0.002 
(0.000)  (0.859) 
Lagged dependent variable -0.019***  0.004 
(0.000)  (0.627) 
Constant -1.195***  0.439 
(0.000)  (0.444) 
N 3777  3777 
Adjusted R2 0.21  0.06 
Note Error correction model with panel-corrected standard errors and panel-specific AR(1) structure, 1990-2004.  
P-values in parentheses, *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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For technological change, the results indicate a negative effect for low-skilled
workers and a positive effect for high-skilled workers. As expected, skill-biased
technological change increases the differences in wages between lowly and
highly educated workers. As to EPL, the results suggest that it is mainly the
low-skilled workers who benefit from the increased bargaining power. The
results for the unemployment rate correspond to the estimations of the employ-
ment effects. Low-skilled workers are more severely affected by high levels
of unemployment and this culminates in negative wage effects.
Subsequently, we analyse Gini coefficients to examine the distributive
consequences of Chinese trade competition. This allows us to tap into levels
of inequality at the sectoral level. Yet, as these estimations rely on LIS instead
of EU-KLEMS data for this measure, the set of sectors and countries is different
and the number of observations is substantially smaller.15 Even though this
alters some of our results since we lose power and as outliers become more
influential, our main results remain visible.
The results in Table 3.4 show that sectors that are more exposed to imports
from China are characterised by more dispersed earnings. This corresponds
to our previous findings presented in Table 3.2 and 3.3. Furthermore, we see
that exposure to total imports excluding those from China are negatively rather
than positively related to intrasectoral inequality, suggesting that the labour
market effects of Chinese imports differ from those of imports in general. The
coefficient is very small. In model 1, the long-run effect of Chinese export
competition – the coefficient of the lagged level – does not reach significance.
The coefficient of the first difference suggests even a negative effect in the short
run. However, a jack-knife analysis presented in Table A3.2 (appendix) in-
dicates that these results are driven by a single country, the US16 Model 2
shows that when the US are not included, the long-run effect of Chinese export
competition is positive and strongly significant. This indicates that export
competing sectors are characterised by greater earnings inequality. The US has
a disproportional effect on the coefficients with 20 per cent of the observations.
The country combines high levels of inequality with a large domestic market
with relatively low overall levels of exports.
15 For the LIS data we have to lump together the manufacturing of coke (23), manufacturing
of chemicals (24), and manufacturing of rubber (25). The same holds for the manufacturing
of machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified (29) and electrical and optical equip-
ment (30t33). The included country-waves are: Czech Republic (1996 and 2004), Finland
(1991, 1995, 2000, 2004, 2007), Germany (1994, 2000, 2004, 2007), Denmark (1992, 1995, 2000,
2004), the UK (1999, 2004, 2007), Ireland (1994-1996 which is combined to one wave, with
earnings corrected for inflation, 2004, 2007), Sweden (1992, 2000, 2005), and the US (1991,
1994, 2000, 2004, 2007). We move away from an annual model to one in which available
waves are directly linked over time (so for Czech Republic the dependent variable is the
difference in first order corrected Gini between 1996 and 2004, and lagged levels refer to
1996).
16 Our other main findings hardly change when we conduct a jack-knife analysis.
Employment and wage effects Chinese trade competition, 17 sectors across 18 OECD countries 55
Interestingly, we do not find robust evidence for inequality-enhancing
effects of skill-biased technological change, as the coefficient for technological
change does not reach significance. The difference between these and our
previous estimations of employment and wages could be due to the lower
number of observations here. In line with our hypothesis, the results indicate
that higher degrees of bargaining coverage are associated with lower levels
of earnings inequality. When more employees are included in the wage settle-
ments, there are smaller and fewer wage differentials between employees. The
fact that we do not find significant effects for bargaining coverage in the
estimations presented above indicates that bargaining coverage can explain
the variation in earnings inequality better than the variation in employment
or wage shares. The positive effects for EPL suggest that stricter EPL contributes
to segmented labour markets with greater earnings inequality between insiders
and outsiders. The positive effect of the coordination of wage bargaining
contradicts our expectation and the findings in earlier studies. This is probably
a reflection of the mechanism that coordination tends to link wages across
sectors and therefore reduces inequality at the country level rather than within
sectors. Unemployment increases earnings inequality, which corresponds with
the results that unemployment is mainly detrimental to low-skilled workers.
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3.4.3 Sensitivity analysis
We perform a number of additional tests to examine the robustness of our
results. First, we account for other emerging economies to examine the unique-
ness of the Chinese trade competition. The sum of imports from India,
Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, and Thailand – which is lower and grew
Table 3.4 Chinese import and export competition and intrasectoral earnings inequality 
 Full sample  Without US 
 (1)  (2) 
Δ Chinese imports (x 10-1) -0.022  -0.071 
(0.951)  (0.876) 
Chinese imports (t-1) (x 10-1) 0.787***  0.774** 
(0.007)  (0.045) 
Δ Chinese export comp -0.152***  -0.136 
(0.000)  (0.155) 
Chinese export comp (t-1) 0.014  0.096*** 
(0.444)  (0.006) 
Δ Total excluding Chinese imports 
(x 10-1) 
0.011  0.004 
(0.616)  (0.879) 
Total excluding Chinese imports (t-
1) 
(x 10-1) 
-0.056***  -0.066*** 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
Δ Technology -0.081  -0.038 
(0.862)  (0.943) 
Technology (t-1) -0.215  -0.146 
(0.220)  (0.464) 
Δ Value added  0.001  0.000 
(0.880)  (0.968) 
Value added (t-1) -0.002  -0.005 
(0.692)  (0.410) 
Bargaining coverage (t-1) -0.002***  -0.002*** 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
Bargaining coordination (t-1) 0.011***  0.009** 
(0.004)  (0.029) 
Left government (t-1) 0.000  0.000 
 (0.140)  (0.173) 
EPL (t-1) 0.014**  0.028*** 
(0.021)  (0.000) 
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.003***  0.003*** 
(0.005)  (0.000) 
GDP per capita (x 10-3) (t-1) 0.001***  0.002*** 
(0.001)  (0.000) 
Lagged dependent variable -0.432***  -0.462*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 0.132***  0.111*** 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
N 250  202 
Adjusted R2 0.42  0.45 
Note  Error correction model with panel-corrected standard errors and panel-specific AR(1) structure, 1990-2007.  
P-values in parentheses, *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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less than the imports from China – is never significant in the regressions and
it does not affect our main results. In the regressions on earnings inequality,
the coefficient for the lagged level of Chinese export competition becomes also
significant when the US is included.
Furthermore, the rise of the Chinese economy may not only increase the
competition for sectors in OECD countries, it may also increase the exports of
these sectors to China, which could have positive employment effects. To
account for these effects, we use two measures, namely the exports to China
and the net imports from China, defined as imports from China minus exports
to China. The coefficients for exports to China are never significant, whilst
employing net imports leads to fully comparable findings as presented above.
Another aspect of globalisation that might have distributive consequences
is the increased international flows of capital, although the economic theory
on such effects is developed less (Mahler, 2004; but see Burgoon and Raess,
2014). As in other recent inequality studies (e.g. Michaels et al., 2014), capital
flows are not included in our main analyses, because there is only limited
bilateral data on capital at the sectoral level. Utilising the limited data available
(OECD, 2014d), we run regressions with the total foreign direct (FDI) investment
positions, inflows, and outflows. None of these variables reaches significance,
nor does including these variables affect the main results for the other
variables.
3.5 CONCLUSIONS
With the rapid expansion of the Chinese economy, the international trade arena
has changed substantially for manufacturing sectors in Western countries in
the last two decades. Yet, to date this surge of China has not received much
attention in comparative political economy on inequality. We contribute to
our understanding of the effects of Chinese trade competition by analysing
employment and wage effects for a broad set of advanced industrialised
democracies. We use sectoral measures of Chinese trade competition between
1990 and 2007 for 18 countries. Moreover, we include a measure that taps into
export competition stemming from China.
Accounting for institutional variation across countries, our analysis shows
employment declines in sectors that are more exposed to imports from China.
Furthermore, effects on wages and employment are not equally shared across
skill levels, as we hypothesised. The lowly educated workers bear the brunt
of the substitution of domestic production by Chinese imports. This translates
into higher levels of earnings inequality in sectors that compete more strongly
with Chinese imports.
Existing studies report distributive effects of Chinese imports on employ-
ment levels in the US and Norway, whilst wage effects are only found in the
US (Autor et al., 2013; Balsvik et al., forthcoming). Our study generalises these
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findings to a set of 18 OECD countries with diverse labour market institutions.
The distributive effects of Chinese import competition are channelled through
employment rather than wages.
With respect to the increased competition from China in foreign export
markets, our results show distributive effects. This implies that current accounts
where competition for exporting sectors is neglected leads to underestimation
of the distributional effects of trade competition. Sectors with greater exposure
to export competition experience declines in employment and wages for low-
skilled workers and rises in employment and wages for high-skilled workers.
The production work of low-skilled workers is substituted by Chinese exports,
resulting in a lower demand for low-skilled labour. For the high-skilled
workers, our results tend to support earlier findings for the United Kingdom
indicating that stronger competition triggers innovation and productivity
increasing activities in exporting sectors, which increases the demand and so
employment and wages for high-skilled workers (Bloom et al., 2012).
Skill-biased technological change is often put forward as an additional
determinant of rising earnings dispersion. We find neutral effects of techno-
logical change on the overall employment size of sectors. However, in sectors
with greater technological innovation, we find negative employment and wage
effects for low-skilled workers and positive employment and wage effects for
high-skilled workers. Interestingly, these findings suggest that the effects of
Chinese trade competition in the US which have recently been found by Autor
et al. (forthcoming) also apply to other OECD countries. Technological change
has merely distributive consequences, whereas international trade is also
related to overall declines in employment.
More generally, our study stresses the importance of considering the
substantial differences in Chinese imports and overall globalisation, and the
large variation in exposure across sectors. Theoretically, we would expect trade
competition from China to have particularly strong distributive effects given
its large volume of low-wage labour. Our empirical evidence supports this.
Our sectoral approach acknowledges the substantial variation in wages and
employment on the one hand, and the exposure to Chinese imports and
technological change on the other. A sectoral approach seems to be a fruitful
direction for the analysis of the determinants of the widely observed trend
of increasing inequality across OECD countries over the past decades. Future
research could shed more light on employment shifts between sectors when
detailed micro-level panel data becomes available.
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APPENDIX 3.1 – SECTORAL DEFINITIONS
Table A3.1 Sectors 
ISIC code Full name 
AtB Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing 
C Mining and Quarrying 
D Total Manufacturing 
15t16 Food products, Beverages and Tobacco 
17t19 Textiles, Textile Products, Leather and Footwear 
20 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 
21t22 Pulp, Paper, Paper Products, Printing and 
Publishing 
23t25 Chemical, Rubber, Plastics and Fuel Products 
23 Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel 
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products 
25 Rubber and Plastics Products 
26 Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
27t28 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal Products 
29 Machinery and Equipment, not elsewhere classified 
30t33 Electrical and Optical Equipment 
34t35 Transport Equipment 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Δ Chinese 
imports (x 10-1) 
-0.022 -0.456 0.023 0.689*** 0.041 -0.086 0.034 -0.051 -0.071 
(0.951) (0.285) (0.950) (0.000) (0.927) (0.834) (0.915) (0.892) (0.876) 
Chinese imports 
(t-1) (x 10-1) 
0.787*** 1.144*** 0.596** 0.502*** 0.725** 0.833*** 0.779*** 0.734** 0.774** 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.011) (0.000) (0.040) (0.006) (0.001) (0.020) (0.045) 
Δ Chinese 
export comp 
-0.152*** -0.118*** -0.106*** -0.205*** -0.202*** -0.142*** -0.152*** -0.140*** -0.136 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.155) 
Chinese export 
comp (t-1) 
0.014 -0.019 0.034 0.019 -0.005 0.026 0.002 0.024 0.096*** 





0.011 0.013 0.022 0.021 0.044*** 0.010 0.012 -0.011 0.004 
(0.616) (0.535) (0.473) (0.432) (0.000) (0.650) (0.626) (0.620) (0.879) 
Total excluding 
Chinese imports 
(t-1) (x 10-1) 
-0.056*** -0.051*** -0.048*** -0.065*** -0.097*** -0.060*** -0.051*** -0.033*** -0.066*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ Technology -0.081 -0.367 0.149 0.450 -0.058 -0.131 -0.420 -0.142 -0.038 
(0.862) (0.367) (0.661) (0.263) (0.914) (0.804) (0.395) (0.754) (0.943) 
Technology 
(t-1) 
-0.215 -0.264 -0.150 -0.182 -0.101 -0.227 -0.236* -0.155 -0.146 
(0.220) (0.217) (0.235) (0.146) (0.447) (0.214) (0.098) (0.486) (0.464) 
Δ Value added 0.001 0.007** 0.000 -0.000 0.004 0.001 -0.007 -0.006 0.000 




-0.002 -0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.023*** -0.002 0.007 0.003 -0.005 
(0.692) (0.326) (0.753) (0.592) (0.000) (0.611) (0.115) (0.262) (0.410) 
Bargaining 
coverage (t-1) 
-0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 




0.011*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.007** 0.020*** 0.009*** 0.010* 0.012*** 0.009** 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.027) (0.000) (0.002) (0.095) (0.000) (0.029) 
Left government 
(t-1) 
0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.140) (0.116) (0.756) (0.367) (0.080) (0.016) (0.175) (0.511) (0.173) 
EPL (t-1) 0.014** 0.003 -0.002 0.018** 0.020*** 0.010* 0.011* 0.015* 0.028*** 
(0.021) (0.805) (0.812) (0.012) (0.000) (0.082) (0.064) (0.051) (0.000) 
Unemployment 
rate (t-1) 
0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.250) (0.100) (0.753) (0.001) (0.011) (0.001) (0.000) 
GDP per capita  
(x 10-3) (t-1) 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001*** 0.002*** 




-0.432*** -0.420*** -0.351*** -0.486*** -0.567*** -0.437*** -0.445*** -0.430*** -0.462*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.132*** 0.093*** 0.144*** 0.130*** 0.197*** 0.156*** 0.134*** 0.128*** 0.111*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 250 238 214 204 202 226 226 238 202 
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.46 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.45 
Note  Error correction model with panel-corrected standard errors and panel-specific AR(1) structure. P-values in 
parentheses. *p<0.1. **p<0.05. ***p<0.01 
	 	
4 Is it the income distribution or
redistribution that affects growth?1
ABSTRACT
This chapter addresses the central question in political economy how the
objectives of attaining economic growth and restricting income inequality are
related. Thus far few studies explicitly distinguish between effects of income
inequality as such and effects of redistributing public interventions to equalise
incomes on economic growth. In fact, most studies rely on data that do not
make this distinction properly and in which top-coding is applied so that
enrichment at the top end of the distribution is not adequately captured. This
study aims to contribute using a pooled time-series cross-section design
covering 29 countries, using OECD, LIS, and World Top Income data. No robust
association between inequality and growth or redistribution and growth is
found. Yet there are signs for a positive association between top incomes and
growth, although the coefficient is small and a causal interpretation does not
seem to be warranted.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The attainment of economic growth and the restraining of income inequality
are amongst the most important socio-economic objectives of welfare states.
Economic expansion implies a higher aggregate standard of living and more
utility-enhancing consumption possibilities for society as a whole. The goal
of limiting income inequality pertains more to ideological concepts of fairness,
humanitarianism and equality of human beings. Rawls (1971), for example,
argues that societies should have ‘fair equality of opportunities’, enabling every
citizen to pursue personal goals, not limited beforehand by financial con-
1 This chapter is published as Thewissen, S. (2014) Is it the income distribution or redistribu-
tion that affects growth? Socio-Economic Review 12(3): 545-571. The chapter is reprinted with
permission. I thank Koen Caminada, Kees Goudswaard, Marike Knoef, Olaf van Vliet, Jim
Been, Kees van Paridon, Willem Adema, Michael Förster, Maxime Ladaique, Wen-Hao
Chen, Y-Ling Chi, Leila Chebbi, and two anonymous reviewers and the editor of Socio-
Economic Review for their input. The usual disclaimer applies. Supplementary information
is available at the journal website.
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straints. In addition, the objective of limiting inequality is generally linked
to the provision of a certain level of income security guaranteed by the state.
The question of what the core objectives of society should be is largely
ideological. Conversely, how the objectives of economic growth and limited
income inequality can be reached is a more technical question, although not
less contested in academic and political debates. The crux here is whether states
are able to stimulate economic growth whilst at the same time limit income
inequality through their policies – or the absence of them. To attain high
economic growth, policies should not have too high costs in terms of forgone
output, and the (financing of) public expenditures should not negatively affect
incentives beneficial to growth (OECD, 2012d). Limiting income inequality
requires that state actions are relatively more beneficial to people with low
income more in the long run.
States play an important role in alleviating inequality by redistributing
income (Brady, 2003). The general view in economics, however, is that re-
distribution based on economic outcomes such as income reduces marginal
benefits of gaining wealth, leading to lower incentives, which retards growth.
Okun (1975) coins this the ‘big trade-off ’, as this negative effect of redistribu-
tion on the attainment of growth ‘plagues us in dozens of dimensions of social
policy’. The alleged trade-off is considered to be the primary problem for the
contemporary welfare state by many politicians and researchers (Pierson and
Castles, 2006; Sapir, 2006).
Another branch in political economy has focussed on the effects of income
inequality on economic development (e.g., Voitchovsky, 2005; Barro, 2008).
Inequality can affect growth by leading to more social unrest or by inhibiting
people lacking financial means to invest in themselves to realise their potential,
although it could also incite people to put forth additional efforts as the relative
benefits are higher.
We might thus expect an effect from the income distribution as well as
from the policies put in place to equalise incomes on economic growth. Yet
surprisingly, few studies properly distinguish between those two effects. In
the substantial amount of literature on the effects of income inequality on
growth, hardly any study also takes into account effects through the
redistributive system which might cause bias due to omitted variables (e.g.,
Aghion et al., 1999; Banerjee and Duflo, 2003; Barro, 2008); a similar story holds
for the redistribution to growth literature (e.g., Romer and Romer, 2010). In
fact, in the often used Deininger and Squire (1996) database, no consistent
distinction is made between the income distribution before and after govern-
ment intervention through taxes and transfers (Banerjee and Duflo, 2003,
p. 284). Moreover, studies generally only cover generic measures of inequality
across the population in which top- and bottom-coding are applied. In this
way, enrichment at the top, an important development in inequality, is left
out of the analysis (Atkinson et al., 2011).
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This study investigates the associations between economic growth on the
one hand and inequality and redistribution on the other; a primary problem
for the contemporary welfare state and a question in which political science
and economics collide (Pierson and Castles, 2006; Sapir, 2006; Lübker, 2007).
The possible negative economic effects of the current widespread rise in
inequality have also been expressed recently by international organisations
(e.g., OECD, 2011a, 2012d, 2012e; ILO, 2012). Employing a pooled time-series
cross-section design of a total of 29 OECD countries and using data from OECD
and Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) that accurately differentiate between
disposable and market income, this study does not find robust associations
between generic measures of income inequality and economic growth, nor
between redistribution and economic growth. Yet employing recently collected
data from the World Top Incomes Database (Alvaredo et al., 2012), this study
finds signs for positive associations between the share of income held by the
top end of the distribution and economic growth, although the coefficients
are small.
4.2 THEORETICAL SECTION
4.2.1 Inequality and growth
Four main channels through which inequality can affect economic growth can
be discerned in the existing literature. They all focus on actual income or
income differences between people, and thus should be tested using inequality
figures after taxes and transfers. Two lines of reasoning predict a positive
effect. First, higher dispersion can incite people to put forth additional effort
or to invest in their human capital, as the rewards of this additional effort are
higher compared to the situation in an egalitarian society. Rooth and Stenberg
(2011) provide exploratory evidence that income inequality in Swedish regions
increased economic growth by stimulating commuting patterns. Within firms,
a higher wage dispersion can enhance productivity (Mahy et al., 2011). Second,
if high income classes have higher marginal propensities to save, and if the
rates of savings and investment are positively related, more unequal societies
will grow relatively faster (Castelló-Climent, 2010). It could also be that a
concentration of capital is crucial for the construction of new activities with
high set-up costs (Galor and Tsiddon, 1997). Possibly, because of the
internationalisation of the capital market, the relationship between inequality
and savings has weakened. Firms in countries with lower saving rates can
rely on the savings available in other countries to finance their investments.
Two reasons are commonly put forward for why inequality can slow down
growth. First, more unequal societies might be less socio-politically stable as
inequality lowers costs of participating in disruptive actions. This can reduce
the security of property and contract rights and, ultimately, discourage invest-
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ment (Keefer and Knack, 2002). Within this literature, a specific manifestation
of inequality – called ‘polarisation’ by Esteban and Ray (2011) or in the inter-
national relations literature more commonly referred to as ‘horizontal inequal-
ity’ (e.g., Østby, 2008; Cederman et al., 2011) – is said to be an important
determinant of (growth-disrupting) tensions and civil war. Rather than inequal-
ity between individuals, these indicators refer to inequalities between certain
(ethnic) groups. Yet inequalities between groups may play a less important
role in affecting economic growth in developed countries because property
rights are relatively well secured (Barro, 2008). In addition, data for developed
countries on these measures are not universally available.2 More tailored to
developed countries, a number of arguably less mainstream studies claim that
inequality has been a root cause of the current financial crisis by leading to
structural economic imbalances. According to this perspective, increasing
shareholder power and capital share of income, both manifested in higher
levels of inequality, has led to a financial bubble and high levels of household
debt, which eventually burst, severely affecting gross domestic product (GDP)
(Hein, 2011; Stockhammer, 2013; Van Treeck, 2014). A second channel pertains
to the alleged negative effects of inequality on the stock of human capital.
Credit market imperfections inhibit people lacking financial means to fully
realise their potential, dampening investment in human capital and overall
knowledge building, thereby reducing economic output. As the economic
importance of schooling has increased in current knowledge-based economies,
this channel might have become more imperative (Galor, 2011).
It could be that developments at the top end of the distribution have
distinctive effects on economic growth (Voitchovsky, 2005). The lines of reason-
ing about why inequality might stimulate growth might also hold for the level
of concentration at the top end of the income distribution (Andrews et al.,
2011). High rewards can incite people to invest, and in particular, a con-
centration of asset ownership could facilitate large investments. Regarding
negative effects, there is no reason to expect that high top income shares are
associated with lower average stocks of human capital, which could be the
case for inequality across the society. Yet it could be that the rich use their
wealth to lobby for rent-seeking policies that disrupt growth (see also Hacker
and Pierson, 2010).
A difficulty in understanding the consequences of inequality on growth
is the possibility of reverse effects. Unless all people benefit in equal pro-
portions to their income, growth itself also affects the income distribution.
Growth might benefit the poor by leading to higher tax revenues and higher
demands for goods produced by low-income groups, although other scholars
2 Esteban et al. (2007) calculate polarisation measures for five countries over time, whilst
Duclos et al. (2004) consider a larger subset of developed countries, but only at two points
in time. Also horizontal inequality data sets generally address (grids within) developing
countries and are limited across time (Østby, 2008; Cederman et al., 2011).
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do not find evidence for this trickling down (Kenworthy, 2010). Famously,
Kuznets (1955) argues that the long-term effect of growth on inequality shows
an inverted U-shape pattern. During initial phases of development only part
of the labour moves towards modern sectors, leading to a higher wage dis-
persion, whilst the rest lags behind. Eventually more and more people become
active in this modern sector, leading to a catch-up and a more equalised
distribution. In this sense, economic growth is the forerunner of income equal-
ity.
4.2.2 Redistribution and growth
Not only the level of inequality but also the policies put in place to equalise
incomes through means-tested transfers or progressive taxing to finance public
expenditures might affect growth (Goudswaard and Caminada, 2010). Accord-
ing to the well-known trade-off argument, the alteration of market outcomes
by public redistribution leaves people to change their behaviour by reducing
financial incentives to gain individual wealth (Allegrezza et al., 2004). With
lower marginal returns to work, substitution to leisure becomes more attractive.
A related argument is that public provision, for example, in the form of unem-
ployment benefits, can make people dependent on government support. The
very creation of unemployment benefits might lead to higher unemployment
rates, as people are less inclined to seek jobs (Kenworthy, 2003; Bassanini and
Duval, 2006).
Empirical evidence for the trade-off hypothesis on the macro level is more
mixed (see also the empirical literature overview in Online Appendix 1 of the
Socio-Economic Review publication). Romer and Romer (2010) present
macroeconomic evidence for ‘exogenous tax changes’ in the USA, which are
fiscal changes implemented to influence long-term growth rather than short-
term counter-cyclical reactions, using a VAR model. They estimate that a 1
per cent increase in exogenous tax lowers growth with 2.5 per cent permanent-
ly. Conversely, Lindert (2004) stresses that the welfare state is a free lunch.
He shows that growth patterns of strongly redistributing states, for instance
Sweden, have not been surpassed by economic growth in more liberal states
such as the USA or the UK. According to Lindert, generous welfare states have
come up with strategies to minimise behavioural changes, most notably by
universal provision instead of means testing, and by relying on taxes for which
elasticities are relatively low. According to Kenworthy (2003), the negative
effects of public intervention on employment also prove better than expected
from the trade-off argument. He only reports a weak negative effect of higher
replacement rates on employment.
Other arguments focus on the alleged lower effectiveness of public alloca-
tion of recourses. Reallocation increases transaction costs, as aptly captured
by Okun’s (1975) metaphor of a leaky bucket: ‘The money must be carried
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from the rich to the poor in a leaky bucket. Some of it will simply disappear
in the transit, the poor will not receive all the money that is taken from the
rich’.
Public policies that potentially have redistributing effects may facilitate
growth by publicly providing for insurances against risks, such as unemploy-
ment, disabilities and old age, that markets cannot (efficiently) provide for
(Boadway and Keen, 2000). In addition, the existence of a safety net might
also make people less risk-averse and more innovative, which might be
beneficial to economic growth.
Yet there might also be a reverse effect in the situation that economic
growth influences the need and demand for redistribution. Growth shapes
possibilities for government provisions, such as public insurances against
unemployment, sickness or on pensions, commonly referred to as Wagner’s
law (Meltzer and Richard, 1983). In addition, in a system with automatic
stabilisers, greater inequality because of economic turmoil leads to more
redistribution by default (Immervoll and Richardson, 2011). In addition,
countries can implement short-term policies to respond to economic downturns,
which are generally designed to stimulate employment and in this way affect
redistributive levels (Chung and Thewissen, 2011).
4.2.3 Combining the lines of reasoning
Figure 4.1 schematically displays the arguments discussed earlier about why
we might expect effects of income inequality and redistribution, in some way
isolated from each other, on economic growth. Yet there are also likely to be
direct links between redistribution and income inequality. All current welfare
states decrease income inequality through redistribution (Immervoll and
Richardson, 2011). This implies that the ‘total’ effect of redistribution on growth
consists of a direct effect of redistribution on growth, and an effect on growth
by alleviating income inequalities. For instance, in the scenario that inequality
hampers growth, lowering it via redistribution can be seen as a social invest-
ment – so that ‘the welfare state can be an irrigation system which supports
economic efficiency and growth’ (Korpi, 1985) – albeit with possible costs on
its own.
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There might also run a causal relationship from inequality to redistribution
by influencing preferences for redistribution. If preferences are determined
by income, then the majority will favour distorting redistribution when the
(gross) mean income exceeds the (gross) median income (Lübker, 2007; Fin-
seraas, 2010). Here, we should expect a negative effect of inequality before
taxes and transfers on growth, by leading to more redistribution. Yet the
empirical literature on the effects of inequality on the amount of redistribution
is quite inconclusive. Kenworthy and McCall (2008) do not find any evidence
for a positive effect of inequality before taxes and transfers on the level of
redistribution, tracking eight countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Lübker
(2007) also does not find evidence that public support for redistribution rises
with inequality across countries.
Banerjee and Duflo (2003) also make use of political economy arguments,
but they predict a nonlinear relationship between inequality and growth,
concluding that ‘growth rate is an inverted U-shape function of net changes
in inequality’. According to them, changes in inequality in any direction are
associated with lower growth. Based on a political economy model, they argue
that ‘planned changes in inequality’ or ‘hold-ups’ are more common in
situations of extreme equality and extreme inequality.
4.3 METHODOLOGY
4.3.1 Estimation methods
The inequality to growth literature from the 1990s generally connects a coun-
try’s income distribution at the beginning of a long time period, usually around
30 years, to the average growth rate during that period (Persson and Tabellini,
1994; Rodrik and Alesina, 1994; Perotti, 1996). The regressions are estimated
by ordinary least squares (OLS). By and large, the estimations report negative
associations, leaving Benabou (1996) to argue that ‘these regressions, run over
a variety of data sets and periods with many different measures of income
distribution, deliver a consistent message: initial inequality is detrimental to
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long-run growth’. Yet OLS estimations yield biased results when unobserved
time-invariant country effects, such as culture and adopted technological levels,
are correlated with the included explanatory variables. Therefore, later studies
turn to pooled time-series cross-sectional data to examine how changes in
income distribution affected the growth rate in the subsequent 5- or 10-year
period, mostly by using fixed effects estimation (Barro, 2000; Forbes, 2000;
Castelló-Climent, 2004). Generally, the negative coefficient becomes insig-
nificant.
Even though fixed effects estimation is unaffected by heterogeneity bias,
it is quite sensitive to measurement error for relatively time-invariant stock
variables. Monte Carlo studies indicate underestimation of the effects of
physical and human capital in growth regressions (Hauk and Wacziarg, 2009).
Because the levels of income inequality and redistribution are also relatively
stable over time, fixed effects estimation might under-report those factors. A
number of authors cope with these problems by using system-generalised
method of moments (GMM) (Castelló-Climent, 2004; Voitchovsky, 2005). Yet
GMM has disadvantages as well. The procedure of first-differencing and using
lags as instruments involves a loss of multiple periods of data. In addition,
its first-differenced nature does not allow for inclusion of the level of income
as a control variable to account for conditional convergence (see Section 3.3).
This article uses fixed effects regressions, controlling for a set of growth
determinants explained in Section 3.3 and unobserved heterogeneity across
time and countries. To limit the possibility of reverse causality, inequality or
redistribution at the beginning of the period is regressed on the average
economic growth in the years after that period. Extensive sensitivity tests are
conducted. Fixed-effects regressions are employed as Hausman tests indicate
that the country effects are correlated with the other explanatory variables,
even though all results still hold when random effects or pooled OLS is used
which both exploit also the variation between countries, with coefficients of
comparable size.3
4.3.2 Inequality and redistribution indicators
An important concern is the availability and quality of data, especially for
the income distribution before taxes and transfers. The larger income inequality
databases that include observations for developing countries suffer from
measurement error, low comparability between countries and heterogeneity
in survey design (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001). Many studies, as can be
seen in Online Appendix 1 of the Socio-Economic Review publication, rely on
the Deininger and Squire (1996) income distribution database. This database
3 Results available on request.
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does not consistently distinguish between the income distribution before and
after taxes and transfers so that hypotheses cannot be tested properly (Banerjee
and Duflo, 2003, p. 284). Moreover, these data sources generally do not ade-
quately capture enrichment at the top due to top-coding, even though the surge
of top incomes has been noted as an important trend in the distribution within
affluent democracies with possibly distinctive effects on economic growth
(Hacker and Pierson, 2010; Atkinson et al., 2011).
Because data quality is such a main concern, this article employs data from
three different sources. First, we use the OECD database on income distribution
and poverty, which contains comparable country-level data for multiple
distribution indicators after taxes and transfers, for entire and working-age
population (OECD, 2011a). For inequality after taxes and transfers, we employ
three indicators, namely, the Gini coefficient, the squared coefficient of
variation (SCV) and the mean log deviation (MLD), for the entire and working-
age population. The Gini is sensitive to changes around the middle of the
distribution, whilst the SCV and MLD indicators are more sensitive to the upper
and lower tail of the income distribution, respectively. For the distribution
before taxes and transfers, only the Gini for the entire and working-age popula-
tion are available. Even though we refer to these indicators as based on ‘entire’
and ‘working-age population’, they do not cover top incomes well due to top-
coding.
Second, the Leiden LIS Budget Incidence Fiscal Redistribution Dataset is
used, which contains data on inequality and redistribution standardised across
countries and over time based on LIS household data (Wang and Caminada,
2011). Here, only the Gini for the entire population (in which again top incomes
are not well covered due to top-coding) for primary and disposable income
are available. The OECD and LIS data use the same income definition for dis-
posable income (after taxes and transfers), and both apply a square root
equivalence scale. Yet primary income from the LIS data is not exactly the same
as income before taxes and transfers in the OECD data set, as primary income
also includes private transfers and other cash income, although these are
generally relatively small amounts (Caminada et al., 2012). Another difference
is that the LIS micro data are based on standardised surveys rather than ques-
tionnaires. The two measures after taxes and transfers, which we refer to as
disposable income inequality, are highly correlated (0.91), whereas the cor-
relation is lower between the OECD inequality indicator before taxes and
transfers and primary income from LIS (0.72); we refer to these last indicators
as market income inequality.
Third, we use the World Top Incomes Database (WTID), which contains
information on the income shares of the top 10, 5, and 1 per cent per country
over time to capture concentration of income at the top end of the distribution
(Alvaredo et al., 2012). The estimates are based on the amount of income
reported to the tax authorities to an estimate of total personal income from
the same year taken from a country’s national accounts. Unfortunately, no
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information on top income shares after taxes and transfers, and thus the
amount of redistribution, is available. The three indicators are highly correlated
(between 0.89 and 0.98).4
In line with Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005), redistribution is defined
in an absolute fashion, namely, the difference between the Gini before and
after taxes and transfers for the OECD data, and as the difference between the
Gini for primary and disposable income for the LIS data. Absolute measures
are not expressed relative to the market income distribution. In this way the
coefficients are easier to interpret. Relative measures tracked over time are
essentially the ‘percentage change in percentage change’ (Caminada et al., 2012,
p. 7). The absolute redistribution measures from OECD and LIS are highly
correlated (0.86).
In total, 29 OECD member states are included in the regressions.5 Because
of data coverage, the exact country sample differs slightly per data set
regression.6 In total our data set contains eight periods of five years each, from
1970 to 2009. For the OECD data, no information is available for 1970–1974 and
1980–1984. All results shown are robust to the exclusion of a single country
or period (unless stated otherwise).7 Results are comparable when 10-year
periods are used instead.8 Our data set is unbalanced mainly due to missing
observations for Eastern European countries; leaving out those countries does
not affect the results in any significant way.
4 In Finland (1989) and Canada (1982) the data suffer from trend breaks due to changes in
tax collection. The trends prior to the changes have been adjusted based on the average
difference in overlapping years (1990–1992 for Finland, 1982–2000 for Canada). Missing
years in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland and the UK have been
linearly interpolated.
5 Australia (AUS), Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Canada (CAN), Czech Republic (CZE),
Denmark (DNK), Estonia (EST), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), Germany (DEU), Greece (GRC),
Hungary (HUN), Ireland (IRL), Israel (ISR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Luxembourg (LUX),
the Netherlands (NLD), New Zealand (NZL), Norway (NOR), Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT),
Slovenia (SVN), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CHE), Turkey, (TUR), the UK
(GBR) and the US (USA). A limited number of observations are available for Mexico, but
we exclude it because it is an outlier, combining low redistribution, high inequality and
tempestuous growth.
6 For the OECD data, no information is available for EST and SVN for our main inequality
indicator, the Gini after taxes and transfers. In addition to that, AUT, IRL, POL, ESP, CHE
and TUR drop out for the redistribution regressions. For the LIS data, no information is
available for JPN, NZL, PRT and TUR. Last, for the WTID, no data are available for AUT,
BEL, CZE, EST, GRC, HUN, ISR, LUX, POL, SVN and TUR. JPN and IRL are excluded
because they do not have data for all three top income indicators. The results shown still
hold when JPN and IRL are included.
7 Results available on request.
8 The top shares become significant at the 10 per cent level, and redistribution becomes
significant at the 5 per cent level, but only for the OECD data and only when the level
of inequality is excluded as a control variable.
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4.3.3 The MRW framework
This article adopts the Mankiw et al. (1992) (MRW) framework, to investigate
the associations with growth. The MRW design was originally constructed to
estimate the rate of income convergence between countries, but is also often
used in the inequality to growth literature (e.g., Voitchovsky, 2005; Rooth and
Stenberg, 2011). Real GDP growth per person is regressed on the level of real
GDP per capita, population growth and the stocks of human and physical
capital. Due to convergence, the initial level of income is thought to have a
negative effect on subsequent growth. The same holds for population growth,
as ‘high population growth lowers income per capita because the amounts
of both physical and human capital must be spread more thinly over the
population’ (Mankiw et al., 1992). The stocks of physical and human capital
are expected to have positive effects on subsequent economic growth. Yet these
last two variables are also channels through which inequality or redistribution
might affect growth, as discussed in the theoretical section. Therefore, addi-
tional tests are conducted leaving out the stocks of physical and human capital.
The MRW framework can be written in the following way as a fixed effects
model, with yit as the level of real GDP per person for country i at time t; xit
as the vector of the other control variables; git as the independent variable of
interest, that is, inequality, redistribution or both; and a set of ai country and
ηt period dummies; and idiosyncratic error term uit:
To prevent endogeneity problems, economic growth is measured as the differ-
ence between the level of GDP per capita at the end of the period and at the
beginning of the period plus one year, as the level of GDP per capita at the
beginning of the period is already present as an explanatory variable. As five-
year periods are taken, excluding the first year, the growth rate is divided
by 3 to end up with having an average annual growth rate. For the period
1970-1974 for instance, economic growth is measured as the difference in log
GDP per capita between 1974 and 1971, whilst initial level of income is defined
as log GDP per capita in 1970. Standard errors are clustered on country level
to allow observations within countries to be correlated; the significance of the
results does not change when other corrections to the standard errors are
made.9
9 Results are fully comparable when robust standard errors are used. When panel-corrected
standard errors with a general AR(1) error process are employed, the only difference is
that the Gini, working-age population, becomes borderline significant at the 10 per cent
level and the top 10 per cent income share becomes significant at the 1 per cent level. Results
are shown for clustered standard errors. The contemporaneous correlation of standard errors
between certain countries cannot be calculated due to too many differences in the periods
for which data are available.
ln y!"!! − ln y!"!! !
3 = β! ln y!" + γ ln g!" + ln x!" β + u!" + a! + η! 
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Two baseline equations are formulated. When the income distribution
indicator refers to the entire population, economic growth, level of income
and population growth are also expressed per capita. For the indicators fo-
cussing on working-age population, the growth model variables are expressed
per working-age person as well. As is common in the growth literature, all
variables are expressed in natural logarithm, including the inequality and
redistribution indicators. Hence, these coefficients should be interpreted as
elasticities. Following Andrews et al. (2011), the top income shares are not
expressed in logs; the coefficients of the shares should be interpreted as a
percentage point change in top share associated with a percentage change in
growth.10
Economic growth and level of income are expressed as real GDP growth
per person, 2005 purchasing power parity (PPP) in US dollars. Population
growth is defined as the growth of the total population between 15 and 64
at the beginning of the period. The stock of physical capital is measured as
the average annual total gross fixed capital formulation in percentage of real
GDP; for the stock of human capital, the average years of total schooling for
the total population aged 25 and over is used. All data come from OECD
Annual Labour Force Statistics (2012f) and National Accounts (2012g), except
for the human capital indicator (Barro and Lee, 2011).
4.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
4.4.1 Data description and trends
The data reveal a moderate trend towards increasing disposable income
inequality, as graphically displayed in Figure 4.2. The OECD data Gini for the
entire population increased on average from 29.6 to 30.8 (from 27.3 to 30.9
for the five countries without any missing values). The LIS data display a
comparable rise (from 27.2 to 29.5 and from 27.2 to 31.0 for the five countries
without missings). Interestingly, in both data sets France, Greece, Ireland, Spain
and Switzerland show a decrease over time for the longest time span available.
Slovenia and Estonia, which are only in the LIS data set, and Turkey, only
covered by OECD data, also show lower inequality over time. Inequality in
Belgium rose according to LIS data whilst it decreased according to OECD data.
This probably is a consequence of different coverage; inequality around 2005
is not available for LIS data, which is when Belgium became more equalised
according to the OECD data. Denmark became more equal according to LIS,
whilst the opposite is true according to the OECD figures, a consequence of
a higher inequality estimate in the first year covered (1985) in the LIS data set.
10 The results do not change when the top shares are expressed as natural logarithm (available
on request).
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The data sets indicate that market incomes have grown further apart than
disposable incomes. The Gini for the entire population for OECD data increased
on average from 39.9 to 47.6 (from 38.8 to 45.6 for the five countries without
missing observations), and according to the LIS estimates from 37.8 to 46.4
(from 37.8 to 46.7 for the five countries without missing observations). Australia
is the only country for which market income inequality decreased according
to the OECD data set, but this is probably due to limit coverage, because the
LIS data with a longer time span report an increase in inequality over time.
Market income inequality decreased marginally so in Ireland and Estonia, both
only covered by LIS data. Results are more contradictory for France, which
again might be due to longer coverage by the LIS data.
Figure 4.3 shows that the share of income held by the top 1 per cent
increased in all countries for which information up to 2005 is available, except
Finland. Yet in Finland, the top share in 2005 was higher than in every other
period, apart from the first one in 1970. The three countries for which data
are available only up to 1995, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland,
show a decrease in top income shares. The share of income held by the top
5 per cent shows a comparable pattern. Yet here we see a marginal decrease
over the full time period for France and Spain and a larger decrease for
Sweden, although again, the income share of the 5 per cent in 2005 was higher
in every other period apart from the first one. The top 10 shares are closely
in line with the top 5 shares, except from an increased share in Finland and
a decrease in Denmark (results not shown here).
	
Figure 4.2 Gradual and widespread rise in disposable income inequality within the OECD area  
 





Note Data refer to the Gini, entire population, after taxes and transfers. ‘Average all’ is the unweighted average for all 
countries. ‘Average’ is the unweighted average for the countries without missing observations (CAN, NLD, SWE, 
GBR, and USA for OECD; and CAN, DEU, SWE, GBR, and USA for LIS) 




The average level of absolute income redistribution has increased over time
as shown in Figure 4.4. The OECD data set reports an average increase from
10.3 to 17.3 from 1975 to 2005 (11.6 to 14.7 for the five countries without
missing values), whilst the LIS data set displays a rise from 10.5 to 17.0 (10.5
to 15.7 for the five countries without missings). The LIS data set shows in-
creasing redistribution over time in all countries; according to the OECD data,
redistribution decreased in Australia, Israel, and the Netherlands, which is
probably due to differences in the time span covered.
	
	
Figure 4.3 Enrichment at the top of the income distribution 
 





Note Data refer to the pretax top income share. ‘Average all’ is the unweighted average for all countries. ‘Average’ is the 
unweighted average for the countries without missing observations (AUS, CAN, FIN, FRA, JPN, NZL, NOR, SWE, 
GBR, USA) 
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The data sets indicate a moderate positive correlation between market inequal-
ity and redistribution, which is in line with the median voter model. Re-
distribution and disposable income inequality are negatively and stronger
correlated. Still, the higher levels of redistribution have not fully compensated
the widening of market incomes, as shown by increased inequality in dispos-
able income over time. Both data sets show a positive correlation between the
rise of disposable income inequality and redistribution per country over time,
indicating that the countries with the sharpest rise in inequality also were the
ones with the largest increase in redistribution. Yet this correlation is much
higher for the OECD data (0.77) than for LIS (0.17), which is probably due to
different coverage of countries and periods.
4.4.2 Associations between inequality and growth
Simple associations between changes in income inequality, for both OECD and
LIS data, and changes in economic growth summarised in Figure 4.5 reveal
an inconclusive pattern because the sign of the association differs per data
source.11 France displays a substantial decrease in inequality for the LIS data,
11 The difference between 2000-2004 and 1985-1989 is used for all scatterplots, because other-
wise the crisis from 2008 onwards would disproportionally affect the picture and few data
points before 1985 are available.
Figure 4.4 Higher levels of redistribution over time 
 





Note Data refer to the absolute redistribution, entire population. ‘Average all’ is the unweighted average for all countries. 
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but this does not affect the trend line. The trend lines have a low R-squared
value.
Also, for the top income shares simple plots do not indicate clear associations
over time, as shown in Figure 4.6. For the top 5 per cent income share the
association is somewhat clearer, which seems to be due to Portugal showing
a more rapid rise in top 5 per cent than in top 1 per cent income shares.
Figure 4.5 Inconclusive associations between trends in inequality and economic growth 
 
OECD data      LIS data 
	
Changes in income inequality    Changes in income inequality 
	
Note Indicators are defined as the log difference in real GDP growth per capita and Gini, entire population, disposable 
income between 2000 and 1985 (OECD data: CZE, HUN, and PRT 2000 and 1990; AUS 2000 and 1995; TUR 1995 and 
1985; LIS data: FRA, HUN, POL, ESP, and CHE 2000 and 1990; GRC and SVN 2000 and 1995; CZE 1995 and 1990)  
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Table 4.1 presents fixed effects estimation results in which we control for
unobserved heterogeneity and other potential growth determinants. The results
consistently indicate that inequality after taxes and transfers does not have
a clear association with economic growth. This holds for all inequality indi-
cators with different sensitivity for changes in the distribution and for both
the OECD and LIS data. Thus, the results do not support the theories that
inequality stimulates growth by inciting people to put forth additional effort
or that it negatively affects growth by decreasing the stability. In addition,
no systematic evidence is found for positive effects of inequality through the
savings channel or negative effects through decreasing the human stock, as
the exclusion of respectively the stock of physical capital or stock of human
capital do not strongly affect the results.12 The coefficients of the inequality
measures are robust to the exclusion of countries and, by and large, to the
exclusion of periods.13 Also excluding the new EU member states, which might
12 The Gini, working-age population becomes borderline significant at the 10 per cent level,
but this loses significance in particular when GRC is excluded (the p value of the inequality
coefficient drops to 0.49).
13 The Gini, entire population of the OECD data becomes significant at the 5 per cent level
without FIN, but much weaker without GRC, DEU or NOR. For the SCV and MLD, and
Gini, entire and working-age population, the coefficient sometimes becomes significant
at the 10 per cent level, but this is never in any robust fashion; the results become strongly
insignificant without DEU (SCV), NOR (MLD) or GRC (Gini entire and working-age
Figure 4.6 No clear associations between trends in top shares and economic growth 
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Note Indicators are defined as the log difference in real GDP growth per capita and the difference in top shares between 
2000 and 1985 (DEU, NLD, and CHE: 1995 and 1985) 










































































show different patterns due to their relatively recent economic transitions, does
not affect the results in a significant way.14
Further evidence that there is no evident relationship between income inequal-
ity across the society and economic growth for affluent countries comes from
Table 4.2. Here, the Gini before taxes and transfers for entire and working-age
population from OECD data and the Gini for primary income for the entire
population from LIS data are not robustly associated with economic growth.15
Thus, these results are not in line with the prediction that inequality before
taxes and transfers lowers growth by leading to more redistribution. Leaving
out the new EU member states or human capital or investment as explanatory
variables does not affect these results.
population). The SCV and MLD for the working-age population and Gini for the LIS data
never become significant. A number of inequality indicators become (positively) significant
when certain periods are excluded, but the specific period differs per indicator and for
other periods, the p values drop substantially.
14 The SCV, entire population, becomes significant when excluding the new member states.
Yet this is due to DEU; excluding DEU yields a p value of 0.31.
15 The Gini, entire population of the OECD data never becomes significant. The working-age
population version becomes significant without NLD but much weaker (p = 0.66) when
GRC is excluded. The LIS Gini, primary income, becomes borderline significant without
HUN or IRL, but becomes weaker when POL or GBR are excluded (p > 0.3).
Table 4.1 No clear associations between inequality after taxes and transfers and economic 
growth 
 Baseline  OECD    LIS 
   Entire population  Working age population  Entire 
population 
   Gini SCV MLD  Gini SCV MLD  Gini 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
Income 
inequality 
  0.029 0.003 0.016  0.031 0.001 0.002  0.010 
  (0.150) (0.286) (0.118)  (0.106) (0.450) (0.408)  (0.362) 
Level of 
income 
-0.102***  -0.098*** -0.094*** -0.094***  -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.116***  -0.102*** 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Population 
growth 
0.234  0.226 0.216 0.203  0.275** 0.289 0.280  0.224 
(0.140)  (0.136) (0.311) (0.317)  (0.049) (0.190) (0.212)  (0.489) 
Physical 
capital 
0.005  0.005 0.004 0.005  -0.002 -0.003 -0.003  -0.000 
(0.749)  (0.733) (0.830) (0.751)  (0.920) (0.869) (0.863)  (0.995) 
Human 
capital 
-0.012  -0.005 -0.010 -0.006  -0.010 -0.019* -0.021  -0.010 
(0.225)  (0.604) (0.363) (0.532)  (0.254) (0.086) (0.115)  (0.472) 
Constant 0.317***  0.196** 0.285*** 0.242***  0.318*** 0.440*** 0.449***  0.294*** 
 (0.000)  (0.018) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.008) 
N 121  121 107 107  119 105 105  123 
Countries 27  27 24 24  27 24 24  25 
R2 0.702  0.707 0.713 0.719  0.716 0.714 0.715  0.683 
F-test 47.189***  50.176*** 61.658*** 65.264***  55.906*** 86.948*** 78.507***  10.905*** 
Note Country fixed effects, 1975-2009 for OECD; 1970-2009 for LIS, five year periods with period dummies, clustered 
standard errors, P values between brackets. Significance levels are noted by *** (1 per cent), ** (5 per cent), or * (10 per 
cent). All variables in logs. Columns 1-4 and 8: per capita sample. Columns 5-7: working age population sample. All 
inequality indicators are measured after taxes and transfers 
Source OECD (2011a) and Wang and Caminada (2011) 
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Yet the results show an association between growth and the top income shares.
This seems to imply that developments at the top end of the distribution have
distinctive effects on economic growth. The positive association is in line with
the predictions that high rewards can incite people to invest or that a con-
centration of asset ownership facilitates large investments. It is not in line with
the theory that the rich use their wealth to lobby for rent-seeking policies that
disrupt growth. Still, the coefficients are small, pointing to a weak relationship.
The coefficients for the top 1 and 5 income shares imply that for a given
country, a percentage point change in top shares across time is associated with
an on average 0.002 per cent higher annual economic growth during that five-
year period, holding the control variables constant. Over the total period, for
the countries without missing values the top 1 and top 5 income shares
increased roughly by 4 percentage points on average. Thus, according to the
estimates, we should expect an associated 0.008 per cent higher annual eco-
nomic growth during that same period. These weak associations are also found
by Andrews et al. (2011),16 and they seem to be in line with the observation
16 Their sample slightly differs from ours. We exclude the period 1960-1970 but include FIN,
ITA, NOR and PRT as country cases. Also, Andrews et al. only use the top 1 per cent and
top 10 per cent income shares.
Table 4.2 Indications for positive associations between top income shares and economic growth 
 Baseline  OECD   LIS  WTID   
 





























 (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) 
Income 
inequality 
  0.011 0.035  0.023  0.001** 0.002** 0.002** 
  (0.718) (0.186)  (0.161)  (0.047) (0.030) (0.019) 
Level of income 
-0.110***  -0.111*** -0.128***  -0.101***  -0.113*** -0.111*** -0.110*** 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population 
growth 
0.310**  0.278 0.258  0.211  -0.163 -0.135 -0.149 
(0.042)  (0.122) (0.187)  (0.507)  (0.535) (0.588) (0.557) 
Physical capital 
0.004  0.007 0.001  0.001  -0.031 -0.023 -0.018 
(0.820)  (0.742) (0.943)  (0.966)  (0.106) (0.180) (0.210) 
Human capital 
-0.010  -0.009 -0.019  -0.011  -0.018 -0.011 -0.011 
(0.462)  (0.551) (0.229)  (0.431)  (0.355) (0.547) (0.544) 
Constant 
0.342***  0.296* 0.348**  0.241*  0.440*** 0.404*** 0.403*** 
(0.000)  (0.086) (0.041)  (0.051)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 98  98 96  122  108 112 112 
Countries 21  21 21  25  16 16 16 
R2 0.716  0.717 0.722  0.686  0.708 0.711 0.703 
F-test 25.12***  30.608*** 47.006***  16.595***  27.285*** 36.937*** 49.095*** 
Note: Country fixed effects, 1975-2009 for OECD; 1970-2009 for LIS, five year periods with period dummies, clustered 
standard errors, P values between brackets. Significance levels are noted by *** (1 per cent), ** (5 per cent), or * (10 per 
cent). All variables in logs, except the top income share variables. Columns 1, 2, 4-7: per capita sample. Column 3: 
working age population sample 
Source: OECD (2011a), Wang and Caminada (2011), and Alvaredo et al. (2012) 
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from Kenworthy (2010) that the rise of top shares has not resulted in faster
growth or rising incomes for those at the bottom – nor in retarding growth.
All in all, the results seem to suggest that the enrichment at the top end of
the distribution has not affected growth in any noticeable fashion.
The positive signs are fully robust to the exclusion of countries for the top
5 and top 1 income shares; see also Online Appendix 2 of the Socio-Economic
Review publication. By and large, this also holds for the exclusion of periods.17
For the top 10 income share, results become borderline insignificant without
Denmark or Portugal, but become significant at the 1 per cent level when we
exclude Norway. Leaving out 1980-1984 leads to an insignificant coefficient
for the top 10 income share, most likely a consequence of the substantial
increase of the top 10 income share in particularly Portugal and the UK during
this period.
As a further test, we check for nonlinear relations between income inequal-
ity and economic growth, as proposed by Banerjee and Duflo (2003, p. 267)
to analyse whether changes in inequality in any direction lead to lower growth.
We find insignificant coefficients for the Banerjee and Duflo specification
(results not shown here) for both OECD and LIS data. It is possible that the
(somewhat) larger country sample of Banerjee and Duflo, which includes a
number of developing countries, can explain the difference in results of this
study and theirs.
4.4.3 Associations between redistribution and growth
Now we address the relationship between income redistribution and economic
growth. Simple plots shown in Figure 4.7 do not reveal a uniform picture.
The OECD data denote a negative association, whilst a positive one is reported
for the LIS data. Again, the R-squared values are low.
17 Leaving out 1980-1984 leads to a borderline insignificant coefficient for the top 5 per cent
income share, and the same holds for leaving out 1990-1994 for the top 1 per cent income
share (p values of 0.13). Yet without 1975-1979 or 1995-1999 the coefficients become signi-
ficant again.
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The pooled time-series cross-section estimations reported in Table 4.3 do not
yield significant associations between redistribution and economic growth for
both OECD and LIS data. This does not support the trade-off argument, nor
the reasoning that redistribution facilitates growth by providing public in-
surances that (also) redistribute income. Also the regressions in which we
control for the level of inequality after taxes and transfers, in columns (3) and
(6), do not yield significant associations for our variables of interest. In fact,
the coefficients of the redistribution indicators are hardly affected by the
inclusion of the inequality indicator. Hence, the insignificant results of the
inequality regressions presented earlier in Table 4.1 were not due to spurious
relations because of not taking into account the amount of redistribution. We
also cannot conclude that redistribution mitigates effects of inequality.
Figure 4.7 Inconclusive associations between income redistribution and growth 
 
OECD data       LIS data 
	
Changes in redistribution    Changes in redistribution 
 
Note Indicators are defined as the log difference in real GDP growth per capita and absolute redistribution, entire 
population, between 2000 and 1985 (OECD data: HUN and PRT 2000 and 1990; AUS, CZE, and FRA 2000 and 1995; 
LIS data: FRA, HUN, POL, ESP, and CHE 2000 and 1990; AUT, GRC, and SVN 2000 and 1995; CZE 1995 and 1990) 


















































































The redistribution coefficients remain insignificant when countries are
excluded, when investment or human capital are omitted as explanatory
variables, when the new EU member states are left out of the analyses or when
periods are excluded.18 Results also do not change when we use the same
set of observations for OECD and LIS data.
4.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study addresses how the socio-economic objectives of attaining growth
and restricting income inequality are related to each other. Thus far studies
do not simultaneously investigate effects of inequality on growth and re-
distribution on growth, even though the existing literature provides reasons
why the income distribution might affect growth, and also why public re-
18 Excluding GBR yields a borderline significant coefficient for the OECD data regressions
without inequality, but the p value drops to 0.4 when JPN is excluded. Excluding 2000-2004
leads to a significant coefficient for redistribution based on the OECD data, but it is strongly
insignificant without 1985-1989 or 2005-2009 (p > 0.5). Leaving out 2005-2009 for the LIS
data leads to a borderline significant association for redistribution, but again, this disappears
without 1990-1994 or 1995-1999 (p > 0.8).
Table 4.3 Income redistribution does not seem to have a clear association with growth 
 OECD     LIS   
 












 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Income 
redistribution 
  -0.014 -0.012   0.008 0.008 
  (0.131) (0.276)   (0.413) (0.390) 
Income 
inequality 
   0.016    0.011 
   (0.474)    (0.339) 
Level of income 
-0.110***  -0.111*** -0.111***  -0.102*** -0.099*** -0.100*** 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population 
growth 
0.310**  0.386** 0.356*  0.220 0.199 0.203 
(0.042)  (0.023) (0.051)  (0.489) (0.538) (0.537) 
Physical capital 
0.004  -0.006 -0.004  -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(0.820)  (0.746) (0.827)  (0.987) (0.999) (0.991) 
Human capital 
-0.010  -0.009 -0.007  -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 
(0.462)  (0.497) (0.622)  (0.426) (0.365) (0.407) 
Constant 
0.342***  0.404*** 0.336**  0.329*** 0.307** 0.268** 
(0.000)  (0.000) (0.025)  (0.003) (0.011) (0.026) 
N 98  98 98  122 122 122 
Countries 21  21 21  25 25 25 
R2 0.716  0.728 0.730  0.681 0.683 0.685 
F test 25.118***  24.431*** 55.120***  10.680*** 15.148*** 14.988*** 
Note Country fixed effects, 1975-2009 for OECD; 1970-2009 for LIS, five year periods with period dummies, clustered 
standard errors, P values between brackets. Significance levels are noted by *** (1 per cent), ** (5 per cent), or * (10 per 
cent). All variables in logs. Per capita sample. Income redistribution: absolute redistribution. Income inequality: Gini 
after taxes and transfers, disposable income 
Source OECD (2011a) and Wang and Caminada (2011) 
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distribution to equalise incomes can influence economic output. Moreover,
many studies rely on data that do not properly distinguish between inequality
before or after taxes and transfers. A second contribution of this article is that
it includes a set of generic inequality measures from two data sources, namely,
OECD and LIS data, both before and after taxes and transfers, and it also in-
vestigates associations between top income shares and economic growth.
Theoretically, the rise of top income shares might alter growth differently than
generic inequality across the bottom 99 per cent of the population. The em-
pirical analyses presented here using a pooled time-series cross-section design
of 29 OECD countries seem to suggest that there are no clear signs of asso-
ciations between generic measures of inequality and growth, or redistribution
and growth. Yet we find significant positive associations between top shares
and economic growth, although the coefficients are small.
The empirical analyses do not provide evidence for theories predicting
a positive effect of inequality on growth, through the savings or incentives
channel, or for theories suggesting a negative effect of inequality, by affecting
stability or the attainment of human capital. This finding corresponds to other
studies employing a pooled time-series cross-section design to investigate the
effects of inequality on growth (Forbes, 2000; Castelló-Climent, 2004). The
finding that top income shares are positively associated with growth might
provide some support for the argument that high rewards can incite people
to invest or that a concentration of asset ownership could facilitate large
investments. Still, the small coefficient corresponds more to the argument that
top income shares do not boost growth – nor that they retard it (Kenworthy,
2010).
We also do not find significant associations for redistribution, for both the
OECD and LIS data set. Therefore, the results do not support the trade-off theory,
as also found for instance by Lindert (2004). The coefficient remains insigni-
ficant when the level of income inequality is held constant, thus, it does not
seem to be so that any negative (positive) effects of redistribution are cancelled
out because of positive (negative) effects of inequality.
It is important to keep in mind that the number of observations is relatively
low. Also, the fixed effects estimation employed here assists in controlling for
unobserved country differences, but it is known to have low predictive power
when variables are highly persistent over time, which is the case for the levels
of income inequality and redistribution within affluent countries, although
similar results are obtained when random effects or pooled OLS are used. An
alternative to increase the number of observations could be to employ a
regional design. An extra advantage is that such a design automatically holds
constant the redistributing effects of national policies and institutions (e.g.,
Rooth and Stenberg, 2011).
A second limitation of the design employed here is that the results cannot
offer causal evidence due to the possibility of reverse effects of economic
growth on inequality and the need and demand for public interference. Future
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research could focus on the persistent issue to separate the two causal effects,
for instance, by exploiting an exogenous shock in redistribution or inequality,
not resulting from a fluctuation in growth or vice versa. Last, this study used
an indicator of overall absolute redistribution. An interesting possibility for
future research is to compare the effects of different kinds of redistributing
instruments on growth, such as means-tested spending, progressive taxing
or a minimum wage.
All in all, the question how the socio-economic objectives of attaining
economic growth and restricting income inequality are related to each other
will continue to be one of the most central questions in political economy. This
study has tried to contribute to this debate by describing the importance of
taking into account both effects through inequality itself and redistribution
on economic growth. In addition, it shows the importance of using high-quality
data sources for generic measures of inequality that consistently distinguish
between inequality before and after taxes and transfers, but also the use of
top income data, as the estimations indicate that enrichment at the top can
have different effects on economic growth.
5 Technological change as a determinant of
redistribution preferences1
ABSTRACT
Technological change is widely considered to be a key driver of the economic
and occupational structure of affluent countries. Current advances in informa-
tion technology have led to significant substitution of routine work by capital,
whilst occupations with abstract or interpersonal manual task structures are
complemented or unaffected. We develop a simple theoretical framework in
which individuals in routine task intensive occupations prefer public insurance
against the increased risk of future income loss resulting from automation.
Moreover, we contend that this relation will be stronger for persons employed
in sectors particularly exposed to technological change, and for richer indi-
viduals who have more to lose from automation. In this way we combine
occupational and sectoral elements of risk exposure, whilst we revisit the role
of income in shaping redistribution preferences. The implications of our
theoretical framework are tested using survey data for 23 European countries
between 2002 and 2012.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Technological change is widely regarded to be a main driver of long-term
economic development (Romer, 1990). By complementing occupations with
certain skill profiles whilst making others redundant, it structures employment
and significantly shapes the occupational structure (Goldin and Katz, 2008;
Oesch, 2013). This entails that technological innovations can have far-reaching
social implications that differ across occupations. These implications played
a key role for instance in the work of Marx. He regarded technology to be
the instrument through which the organisation and execution of work could
1 This chapter appeared as Thewissen, S., Rueda, D. (2015) Technological change as a deter-
minant of redistribution preferences, Leiden Department of Economics Research Memorandum
no. 2015.01. Financial support from the Leiden University Fund and the KETEL 1 scholarship
fund is gratefully acknowledged. An earlier version of this study was presented at the 4th
European Political Science Association (EPSA) annual general conference, 19-21 June 2014
in Edinburgh. We thank all participants, Nils-Christian Bormann, Koen Caminada, Kees
Goudswaard, Robert Hellpap, Lieke Kools, Stefanie Reher, and Margit Tavits for their help-
ful suggestions. All errors remain ours.
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be separated, so that labour could be transformed into deskilled operative
work. More optimistically, technological change enables specialisation and
skill upgrading, which facilitated societies to shift from routine labour parti-
cularly in agriculture towards manufacturing, and later services (Erikson and
Goldthorpe, 1992; Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Wren, 2013).
Current technological innovations particularly take place in computer-based
information technology. Its precipitous implementation in the last decades
has been spurred by significant real price declines in computing power (Autor
et al., 2003). Computers are capable in performing routine tasks, which are
well defined and repetitive. On the other hand, computer capital complements
complex and more ambiguous abstract tasks structures, whilst it does not have
clear effects on interpersonal service tasks. Studies report significant decreases
in the share of routine occupations, which tend to lie in the middle of the
educational and wage distribution. Information technology therefore does not
lead to linear upskilling of work, but rather to a process of polarisation (Spitz-
Oener, 2006; Autor et al., forthcoming).
Given the pervasive substitutive effects of information technology on
routine occupations, we might expect individuals holding routine occupations
to prefer additional nonmarket protection to insure against increased risk of
employment and wage loss. The conception that preference for insurance
against job risks can fuel preferences for redistributive social protection plays
a prominent role in the comparative political economy literature. Allusion to
risks resulting from technological change have been made within this literature,
for instance by Iversen and Cusack (2000) who state that ‘[…] most of the risks
being generated in modern industrialized societies are the product of techno-
logically induced structural transformations inside national labor markets. […]
It is these structural sources of risk that fuel demands for state compensation
and risk sharing’. Yet, occupational susceptibility for technological change is
not directly examined by these authors. Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) are to our
knowledge the only ones mentioning routine occupations as a group having
higher redistribution preferences. The authors, however, do not operationalise
this in terms of routine task intensity, but differentiate a routine group based
on educational lines.
In this chapter we devote explicit attention to risks of technological change
depending on the degree of routine task intensity of occupations as a determin-
ant of redistribution preferences. Because of the widespread implementation,
advances in information technology is widely regarded to be a main driver
of rising earnings inequality and can therefore be seen as an influential occu-
pational risk (Goldin and Katz, 2008; Michaels et al., 2014). We develop a
simple theoretical framework in which risk-averse individuals prefer to insure
against occupational hazards by means of redistribution when markets cannot
provide such insurance.
Moreover, we argue that insurance preferences resulting from risks of
technological change will be accentuated by two factors. First, the degree of
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routine task intensity of occupations will be a stronger determinant of prefer-
ences for social protection for individuals employed in sectors particularly
exposed to technological change. Second, we argue that income plays a
moderating role, since individuals will have more to lose from automation
when their income level is higher. By introducing these moderating variables
we aim to bridge the gap between studies emphasising occupational and
sectoral risks (Rehm, 2009). Furthermore, we revisit the role of personal income
in shaping redistribution preferences, allowing income to have a negative effect
on the level of preferred redistribution in the spirit of Meltzer and Richard
(1981), whilst it amplifies the effects of risks on redistribution preferences.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. In Section 5.2
we propose a simple theoretical argument and derive its main empirical
implications. We discuss our measure of routine task intensity and our dataset
that covers 23 countries between 2002 and 2012 in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4
we examine the empirical validity of our hypotheses and conduct extensive
sensitivity tests. We conclude in Section 5.5.
5.2 OUR ARGUMENT
Our line of reasoning is as follows. Current technological innovations involve
an occupational risk for individuals depending on the degree to which their
occupation is susceptible to automation. The ease of automation increases when
an occupation contains more routine tasks. As individuals are risk averse, they
favour more redistribution to insure against the risk of automation when the
routine task intensity (RTI) of their occupation goes up. Moreover, we theorise
that this positive effect of RTI on preferences for redistribution is moderated
by two factors. The first factor is risk exposure, which increases when an
individual is employed in a sector where technological change plays a promin-
ent role. Second, RTI becomes a more important determinant of redistribution
preferences when an individual has more to lose from automation, that is,
when his or her income is higher.
5.2.1 Technological change as an unequally distributed occupational risk
The first element of our argument is that technological change causes an
employment risk for individuals with routine occupations that can relatively
easily be automated. As already mentioned in the introduction, current techno-
logical innovations in information technology are generally viewed to have
strong and dissimilar effects across occupations (Goldin and Katz, 2008; Oesch,
2013; Wren, 2013). These developments complement individuals with abstract
or personal tasks, whilst individuals in routine occupations face an increased
risk of being substituted by capital (Autor et al., forthcoming). Routine tasks
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can be partitioned into step-by-step rules, and do not require cognitive or
service task skills that are more difficult to automate (Goos and Manning, 2007;
Goos et al., 2014). Routine tasks susceptible to automation might well be
complex and can require extensive educational training, such as bookkeeping.
Because of this, information technology advancements do not impact occupa-
tions linearly across educational lines. In fact, routine occupations tend to lie
in the middle of the educational and income distribution (Oesch, 2013).
Information technology has generally been found to have substantial effects
on the occupational structure in affluent countries in the last decades (see also
Autor et al., 2003; Spitz-Oener, 2006 for single-country studies). Oesch (2013)
finds a decrease of relative employment between 29 and 41 per cent in routine
occupations in Denmark, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK from
around 1990 to 2008, whilst employment in non-routine analytical and inter-
active occupations went up by 23 to 41 per cent. Michaels et al. (2014), using
data for the US, Japan, and nine European countries between 1984 and 2004,
report strong polarising effects of information technology, accounting for a
quarter of the growth in relative demand towards non-routine high-skilled
labour. Goos et al. (2014) extend this to 1993-2010 for 16 Western European
countries, estimating that technological change and offshoring can account
for three quarters of the observed increase in high-skilled non-routine work
and the observed decrease in medium-skilled routine employment. Interesting-
ly, these studies all find much weaker or insignificant effects of international
trade and offshoring once the impact of technological change is accounted
for.
5.2.2 Routine task intensity as determinant of preferences for redistribution
Having put forward that technological change is an employment hazard for
individuals in routine occupations, we will now argue that this occupational
risk translates into increased preferences for redistribution.
In the classic comparative political economy approach redistribution
preferences are a function of material self-interest (Meltzer and Richard, 1981).
From this model we would predict that preferences for redistribution are
decreasing in the relative level of present individual income at the micro level.
An implication of this is that increased market earnings inequality will lead
to greater political demand for redistribution at the macro level.
More recently, scholars have distinguished an insurance component of
redistribution preferences that incorporates an intertemporal element. When
individuals are risk averse, they will prefer to insure against uncertain future
income levels. Individuals will favour additional nonmarket insurance when
they are presently exposed to an increased risk of job or wage loss, assuming
that markets cannot provide for insurance against such risks. Social protection
arrangements such as unemployment benefits or social assistance offer insur-
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ance for individuals against job and wage loss. As these forms of social security
are redistributive (e.g., Nelson, 2011), the redistribution preferences for indi-
viduals exposed to risks will go up (Sinn, 1995; Moene and Wallerstein 2001;
Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Iversen and Soskice 2009; Rehm 2009). This insur-
ance perspective in understanding determinants of social protection was
pioneered and formally modelled by two papers. We will contrast our reason-
ing to theirs.
Iversen and Soskice (2001; IS from here onwards) argue that individuals
with more specific as opposed to general skills favour more insurance as
protection against their investment in human capital. In the IS model there
is a homogeneous risk of job loss across the electorate, but the opportunities
for reemployment are lower for individuals who invested in specific skills.
Holding income and risk aversion constant, an increase in the ratio of specific
versus general skills will lead individuals to prefer higher levels of nonmarket
insurance.
Moene and Wallerstein (2001; MW from here onwards) have a slightly
different ambition. Using a micro level model, they seek to explain a macro
level phenomenon that runs counter to the Meltzer-Richard model, that is,
why a more skewed income distribution can in fact lead to lower levels of
redistribution. MW theorise that insurance is a normal good, leading individuals
to favour more public insurance when their income rises. Assuming that
individuals are sufficiently risk averse, so that the insurance motive dominates
the Meltzer-Richard redistribution motive, then income will positively affect
preferences for redistribution, holding risk and risk aversion constant. From
this MW conclude that a means-preserving increase in earnings inequality that
lowers the income of the median voter decreases preferences for insurance.
In the MW model risk of job loss is a function of income; it is lower (or set to
zero) for high-income than for low-income groups.
Our point of departure lies closer to the IS model, as we explicitly recognise
an occupational hazard, independent of the level of income, that translates
into higher preferences for nonmarket protection. We slightly deviate from
the IS model by theorising that the risk of job or wage loss is heterogeneous
across the electorate, depending on the occupational level of RTI, instead of
proposing that reemployment possibilities differ conditional on occupational
risk. The implication is similar, however; given a level of income and risk
aversion, the occupational risk leads individuals to favour higher levels of
nonmarket insurance.
Hypothesis 1: The level of routine task intensity of an occupation positively affects
preferences for redistribution
As already stated, technological change has not yet been recognised as an
occupational threat in the redistribution preferences literature as far as we
know. How does the degree of RTI compare to occupational risks that have
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been described in the comparative political economy literature? We will show
later that correlations among occupational risks are low.
Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) mention routine occupations in their study which
also looks at occupational characteristics and redistribution preferences. As
we show in more detail in Appendix 5.1, their operationalisation follows
educational and income lines and does not capture the degree of routine task
intensity of occupations. Kitschelt and Rehm also do not argue that individuals
in routine occupations favour more redistribution as an insurance against
increased risk of job loss due to automation. Rather, elaborating on Oesch
(2006), they are interested in occupations as socialisation profiles. They differ-
entiate occupations based on discretionary disposal over own work (the ‘logic
of authority’), where the hypothesis is that individuals with more discretionary
space and authority over subordinate employees will find the preserving of
material incentive to be important, and therefore will be against redistribution.
The two groups with the lowest degree of authority are coined skilled and
unskilled routine, versus professionals and associate professionals. The differ-
ences across these groups are measured by dummies rather than by means
of a continuous measure of the routine task intensity of occupations.
We already introduced the degree of skill specificity from the IS model
(see also Cusack et al., 2006). Skill specificity pertains to job risks following
investments in human capital. It comprises a scale of specific versus general
skills, instead of whether a certain skill (be it specific or general) is routine,
manual, or abstract. There are no a priori reasons to believe that the degree
of specificity of skills (and therefore occupations) is related to the degree of
RTI. As an example, models, salespersons, and demonstrators have the most
general skills, whilst stationary-plant and related operators have the most
specific skills. In terms of routine task intensity, however, these occupations
are very comparable – both are very average as we will also show later.
A second occupational risk is the outsourcing of certain parts of the pro-
duction process as performed by certain occupations (Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2008). The crucial occupational factor here is the degree to which
parts of the production process can be executed abroad, which is generally
called offshorability. Walter and co-authors have applied the concept of offshor-
ability to redistribution preferences (2010; 2014; Dancygier and Walter, forth-
coming; Rommel and Walter, 2014). There is an analytic distinction between
offshorable and automatable occupations (Oesch, 2013: 18-19; Goos et al., 2014;
Autor et al., forthcoming). Certain occupations can relatively easily be executed
abroad, but require non-routine cognitive skills that are difficult to automate.
Examples are architecture, software developing, or statistical analysis. Other
occupations are routine and can be computerised relatively straightforwardly,
but require spatial proximity. Examples here are security guards or customer
service clerks.
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5.2.3 Moderating factors
The last part of our argument concerns factors that moderate the (positive)
effect of RTI on preferences for redistribution. We will argue that the import-
ance of RTI as a determinant of nonmarket insurance preferences will be
increasing in the degree of sectoral risk exposure and the level of present
income. By considering factors that moderate the translation from job risk to
preferences for insurance, we part from the IS and MW models. Moreover, the
role of the level of present income in affecting redistribution preferences in
our model differs from theirs.
We hypothesise that RTI becomes a stronger predictor of redistribution
preferences for individuals employed in sectors more exposed to technological
change. This can be the result of an increased actual risk of job or wage loss
(e.g., Michaels et al., 2014; Thewissen and Van Vliet, 2014), or it can be a
consequence of increased visibility of this risk as relatively more individuals
employed in the same sector are exposed to risk of automation too. Sectoral
differences in risk exposure are examined more frequently in studies on
preferences for insurance (e.g., Rehm, 2009; Walter, 2010).2 Yet, occupational
factors are generally seen as more important determinants of nonmarket
protection preferences than sectoral factors. Human capital is more tied to an
occupation than to an industry, and occupations are considered to be more
important socialisation factors (Oesch, 2006; Rehm, 2009; Kitschelt and Rehm,
2014).
Hypothesis 2: Sectoral exposure to technological change strengthens the positive
effect of the occupational level of routine task intensity on preferences for re-
distribution
We propose to view income as a second factor that accentuates the preferred
level of insurance for individuals holding more routine occupations. If an
individual has relatively more to lose from an occupational risk, then this risk
will become a more decisive factor in preferred levels of nonmarket protection.
This view deviates from existing models of redistribution preferences. In the
Meltzer-Richard model individuals do not have an insurance motive so that
the level of income always negatively affects preferred levels of redistribution.
Income enters the IS model in a comparable fashion; in their regression results
the level of redistribution preferences is also negatively associated with levels
of present income. MW, however, argue that insurance is a normal good so
2 We do not include industry-level risks other than technological change in our regressions,
such as FDI in value added (Walter, 2010), unemployment rates (Rehm, 2009), or the share
of foreign-born workers (Dancygier and Walter, forthcoming). This is because we can only
define sectors at a highly aggregated level as we will explain later. Yet, we incorporate
occupational equivalents of these variables as sensitivity tests.
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that individuals will favour more when their income level goes up. In a follow-
up paper (2003) the authors do not explicitly argue that richer individuals
prefer more insurance than poorer individuals. Rather, a more skewed income
distribution will lead to lower levels of insurance against income loss compared
to a more equalised country with the same mean income and risk distribution.
We still follow Meltzer-Richard in hypothesising that income has a negative
direct effect on redistribution preferences. Yet, we add a moderating effect
of income to this. We pose that RTI translates into higher favoured levels of
insurance particularly when individuals have more to lose. Thus, in our model,
income has a direct negative effect on preferred levels of redistribution, but
it will positively influence the effects of RTI on redistribution preferences.
Hypothesis 3: The individual level of present income strengthens the positive effects
of the occupational level of routine task intensity on preferences for redistribution
To our knowledge, individual levels of income or sectoral exposure have not
been considered as moderating factors in existing studies on redistribution
preferences. Other scholars have argued that educational levels moderate the
effects of offshoring on redistribution preferences, since high-skilled individuals
benefit from globalisation whilst low-skilled individuals lose (Walter, 2010;
Dancygier and Walter, forthcoming). In addition, country-level institutions
that mitigate risks have been put forward as a moderating factor in the effects
of skill specificity on preferences for insurance (Gingrich and Ansell, 2012).3
5.3 DATA
5.3.1 Routine task intensity across occupations
In our theoretical section we argued that individuals holding routine occupa-
tions particularly bear risks of wage or employment loss from automation.
We use the routine task intensity index from Goos et al. (2014), who rely on
Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor et al. (forthcoming). Goos et al. (2014) dis-
tinguish between routine, manual, and abstract task inputs, derived per occupa-
tion from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). The RTI index measures
the log routine task input per occupation, minus the log manual and abstract
task inputs, so that the measure is increasing in the relative importance of
routine tasks vis-à-vis manual and abstract tasks. As the RTI index gauges the
tasks structure of an occupation, the index is time- and country-invariant. Goos
et al. (2014) rescale these actual measures to mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
3 We test for the effects of these possibly confounding factors in our sensitivity analysis.
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Measures are available at the 2-digit occupational International Standard
Classification of Occupations (ISCO)-88 level.4
Another occupational measure of the degree of routine task intensity comes
from Oesch (2013). Oesch codes occupations at the 4-digit ISCO-88 level into
multiple non-routine and routine occupations drawing on Spitz-Oener (2006),
also differentiating between routine, manual, and abstract (or analytical and
interactive) tasks. These occupational categories can be combined into a
dummy equal to 1 if an occupation is routine, and equal to 0 if otherwise. This
dummy indicator and the continuous variable from Goos et al. (2014) are quite
highly correlated (0.73). As we have more variation and more observations
for the continuous Goos et al. RTI index, we use this one as our benchmark
and use the Oesch (2013) dummy as a sensitivity test.
The European Social Survey (ESS) provides us with pooled time-series cross-
section data of redistribution preferences of individuals. It has a standardised
occupational identifier at the 4-digit ISCO-88 level for 2002-2010 and ISCO-08
for 2012. We recode the 2012 wave into ISCO-88 definitions using the ILO 4-digit
correspondence table.5 By means of this occupational identifier we can link
individuals to the RTI index of Goos et al. (2014). Our analysis draws on ESS
surveys between 2002-2012 for the 23 countries for which at least two waves
of information is available.6
To obtain a better understanding what type of occupations score high and
low on the RTI index, we postpone our definition of redistribution preferences
for a moment and first discuss our operationalisation of education and income.
We define the level of education by years of education maximised to 25. Our
measure of present income is constructed using respondents’ answers to the
ESS survey question on household’s total net income. Respondents answer on
the basis of a show-card, which contains categories identifying income ranges
for weekly, monthly, or annually income. We transform the income bands into
their survey-specific midpoints, following Rueda et al. (2014) and Rueda (2014).
The highest income band, which has no upper limit, is assumed to follow a
4 For six groups at the 2-digit ISCO-88 level no information on RTI is available. These
agricultural, supervisory, and residual occupational groups are also excluded by Goos et
al. (2014), Autor et al. (forthcoming), and Autor and Dorn (2013).
5 The correspondence table can be found here: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/
stat/isco/isco08/index.htm. A number of occupations are not included in the ILO cor-
respondence table but can easily be transformed to ISCO-88 at the 2-digit level; coding
is available upon request. Only a couple of occupations (for 0.1 per cent of the sample)
cannot unequivocally be coded and are left out. None of our results change when we
exclude 2012 in which the ISCO-08 coding is used, as shown in the sensitivity tests. We
have to exclude individuals in all waves for which information is only available at the
1-digit ISCO level (0.8 per cent of the total sample).
6 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.
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Pareto distribution (Hout, 2004; Kopczuk et al., 2010).7 Self-reported household’s
total net income is recoded into annual 2010 PPP-adjusted US dollars using
exchange rate information from the OECD (2014e). In our regressions we place
income in natural log.
Table 5.1 lists the occupations ranked by their level of RTI. We can see that
on average non-routine occupations have a higher wage and educational level.
Yet, these relationships are not very strong; particularly middle-paid and
middle-skilled occupations have high values of RTI (Autor et al., forthcoming;
Goos et al., 2014). This is also reflected in relatively low correlations between
the RTI index and income (-0.14) and educational level (-0.17). General
managers have the least routine occupation, a profession with above-average
wage and skill level, but the second-least routine are drivers and mobile-plant
operators, a low-skilled low-paid occupation. The most routine occupations
are customer service and office clerks, and precision workers. These middle-
skilled occupations require relatively few cognitive or interpersonal skills and
can fairly easily be partitioned into step-by-step rules.
In our theoretical section we already discussed findings from the labour
economics literature that automation is a significant risk for individuals holding
routine occupations (Autor et al., 2003; Spitz-Oener, 2006; Goos et al., 2014;
Michaels et al., 2014). Using the ESS data we can also look at developments
in employment measured by headcounts and wages. As shown in Table 5.1,
we can see that within the relatively short time frame of 2002-2012 non-routine
occupations (with a negative RTI score) saw on average an increase in their
employment share and a higher increase in their wage compared to routine
occupations (with a positive RTI score).
7 From 2002-2006 respondents were shown 12 categories that were the same across all
countries. The waves 2008-2012 distinguish between 10 categories that differ per country.
Moreover, the income bands of the show-card cover substantially different income ranges.
We calculate the survey specific midpoints. For the upper band we apply the Hout (2004)
calculation, with frequency f and lower limits L, and the country- and wave-specific highest
income band indexed as top and next-to-last as top–1: where
. There are a small number of observations for which this calcula-
tion leads to incorrect top income calculations, as the number of people in the last or next-to-
last income band is too low. We exclude the top income band persons in Czech Republic
2002 (two persons), Hungary 2004 (one), Slovak Republic 2004 (seven), and Slovenia 2006
(one). Leaving out these country waves does not affect our main results.
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5.3.2 Redistribution preferences
The ESS contains a question designed to directly capture what we aim to
explain: whether or not an individual supports government redistribution.
Respondents are asked whether they agree or disagree on a five-point scale
to the following statement: ‘Using this card, please say to what extent you
agree or disagree with each of the following statements: The government
should take measures to reduce differences in income levels’. This variable
is recoded to capture support for government redistribution. Our final measure
Table 5.1 Levels and changes in employment shares and wages for occupations ranked by their 
level of RTI 

















Non-routine  -0.68 14.1 42522 12.61  61.06 0.26 
General managers 13 -1.52 14.0 45287 21.56  3.78 3.991 
Drivers and mobile-plant operators 83 -1.50 11.4 30073 11.95  4.23 0.31 
Life science and health professionals 22 -1.00 17.7 55880 3.65  2.06 0.93 
Physical, mathematical and 
engineering science professionals 
21 -0.82 16.6 52930 6.67 
 
3.94 0.44 
Corporate managers 12 -0.75 15.4 60583 8.99  6.42 -4.90 
Other professionals 24 -0.73 16.5 49217 9.21  6.43 0.04 
Personal and protective services 
workers 
51 -0.60 12.4 31930 13.51 
 
9.37 0.56 
Other associate professionals 34 -0.44 14.3 42901 13.23  10.23 0.17 
Physical and engineering science 
associate professionals 
31 -0.40 14.0 40254 20.93 
 
5.05 -1.33 
Life science, health associate 
professionals 
32 -0.33 14.9 39797 12.92 
 
3.93 -0.19 
Extraction and building trades 
workers 
71 -0.19 11.5 30531 12.28 
 
5.64 0.24 
Routine  0.91 12.0 31708 5.53  38.94 -0.26 
Sales and services elementary 
occupations 
91 0.03 10.7 26293 6.00 
 
5.24 1.65 
Models, salespersons and 
demonstrators 
52 0.05 12.3 31327 5.80 
 
5.14 0.59 
Stationary-plant and related operators 81 0.32 11.7 31056 13.98  1.29 -0.14 
Labourers in mining, construction, 
manufacturing and transport 
93 0.45 11.1 27040 -1.37 
 
2.60 0.38 
Metal, machinery, related trades 
workers 
72 0.46 12.0 31894 16.30 
 
6.26 -2.13 
Machine operators and assemblers 82 0.49 11.4 28833 5.78  3.34 1.61 
Other craft and related trades workers 74 1.24 10.9 27845 4.20  2.29 -0.19 
Customer services clerks 42 1.41 13.1 34873 2.57  2.28 0.81 
Precision, handicraft, printing and 
related trades workers 
73 1.59 12.3 34770 13.97 
 
0.94 -0.45 
Office clerks 41 2.24 13.1 36991 13.14  9.56 -2.40 





1 The substantial increase in employment for general managers combined with the large drop in number of corporate managers is 
at least partly due to coding differences between ISCO-08 (for 2012) and ISCO-88 (for earlier waves). If we calculate the 
employment difference between 2002 and 2010 the employment share of general managers increased by 0.97, whilst the 
employment share of corporate managers dropped by -0.16. As already stated, none of our results change when we leave out 
2012.  
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contains the following categories: 1: Disagree strongly; 2: Disagree; 3: Neither
agree nor disagree; 4: Agree; and 5: Agree strongly.8 This question is the only
one tapping into social policy preferences available in all waves of the ESS,
and the question is frequently used in studies seeking to explain redistribution
preferences (Rehm, 2009; Burgoon et al., 2012; Burgoon, 2014; Kitschelt and
Rehm, 2014; Rueda, 2014; Wren and Rehm, 2014; Hausermann et al., forth-
coming). The mean of our ordinal measure of support for redistribution for
the full sample is 3.73. Support for redistribution went slightly up on average
from 3.65 (2002) to 3.81 (2012).
To better view the differences in redistribution preferences across occupa-
tions, we generate a binary measure for support for redistribution equal to 1
if an individual agrees or agrees strongly with support for redistribution (see
also Rehm, 2009; Wren and Rehm, 2014). This variable has an overall mean
of 0.68; its average values increased from 0.67 in 2002 to 0.70 in 2012. In Figure
5.1 we rank the occupations on their level of RTI, again distinguishing between
occupations with a negative RTI index score (non-routine, N) and a positive
RTI index level (routine, R). We can see that on average individuals in routine
occupations have higher levels of support for redistribution. In both groups
support for redistribution increased over time.
8 Refusals and don’t knows are recoded as missings (1.7 per cent of the sample).
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5.3.3 Sectoral exposure
In our theoretical section we hypothesised that income and sectoral exposure
can moderate the relationship between RTI and preferences for public insurance.
We already explained how we measure income. The ESS contains a sectoral
identifier whose definition unfortunately differs across waves. We generate
a standardised sectoral identifier based on the 1-digit Nomenclature statistique
des Activités économiques dans la Communauté Européenne (NACE) 1.1 level.9
We follow Wren and Rehm (2013) by defining the degree of exposure at
the sectoral level using our occupational indicator for RTI. We use the means
of the RTI index for this. We can see in Table 5.2 that manufacturing, financial
intermediation, and wholesale and retail trade are sectors containing on
average relatively large volumes of routine work, and can therefore considered
to be exposed to technological change. Interestingly, public administration
is also relatively exposed to RTI, which again illustrates the substantive differ-
ence between RTI and offshoring. We can see that exposure is low in agri-
culture, hotels and restaurants, but also in health and social work. This
corresponds to their large shares of manual and interpersonal work.
9 ESS 2002 is based on NACE Rev. 1.0, 2004-2008 on NACE Rev. 1.1, and 2010-2012 on NACE
Rev. 2.0. To link NACE Rev. 1.0 and 1.1 we only need to drop the tiny industry P: Activities
of households. NACE Rev. 1.1 and 2.0 can be (slightly imperfectly) linked, but only at the
1-digit level. We use the correspondence table from the UK National Statistics (2009: 2-3)
for this.
Table 5.2 Sectoral exposure 
Sector NACE Exposure 
Agriculture and fishing AtB -0.46 
Hotels and restaurants H -0.46 
Health and social work N -0.40 
Transport, storage, communication I -0.25 
Education M -0.22 
Other community, social and personal service activities O -0.22 
Real estate, renting, business activities K -0.21 
Construction F -0.18 
Mining C -0.15 
Electricity, gas, water supply E -0.04 
Public administration, defence, social security L -0.01 
Wholesale and retail trade G 0.01 
Financial intermediation J 0.06 




5.3.4 Other individual-level controls
We include a vector of common controls in the redistribution preferences
literature (e.g., Rehm, 2009; Burgoon, 2014; Rueda et al., 2014). We include
variables for years of education, age in years, the degree of religiosity (scaled
1-10), and we include dummies for gender, (former) trade union membership,
and whether an individual is unemployed. This last dummy can be seen as
a measure of realised risk; if an individual lost her or his job (Cusack et al.,
2006).
5.3.5 Country-level factors
At the country level, we follow the literature by including social spending
as a percentage of GDP (Burgoon et al., 2012; Rueda et al., 2014) and the unem-
ployment rate (Burgoon et al., 2012; Burgoon, 2014), both lagged one year.10
By including ex-ante levels of social spending we can account for possible
diminishing marginal returns to redistribution, yielding a negative association
between social spending and preferences for redistribution (Burgoon et al.,
2012). It could be that higher levels of social spending also affect the occupa-
tional distribution, for instance by leading to higher levels of public versus
private employment. We expect that individuals favour higher levels of re-
distribution as means of insurance when unemployment is soaring. The unem-
ployment rate might affect the occupational distribution when certain occupa-
tions are more severely affected by cyclical movements.
5.4 EMPIRICAL ESTIMATIONS
5.4.1 Model specification
We account for the fact that individuals are nested within countries by apply-
ing a multilevel model with random intercepts for countries, and we cluster
standard errors at the country level.11 Our dependent variable is categorical
and ordered. We could analyse its determinants by applying ordered probit
or ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation techniques. An ordered probit model
has the advantages that predicted probabilities are restricted to the range of
the dependent variable and it corrects for heteroskedasticity resulting from
the categorical nature of the dependent variable. Yet, interaction effects in
10 Data for social spending for Switzerland in 2009 (linked to 2010 in our dataset) are missing.
We impute this observation by linear interpolation; this does not affect our results.
11 As we will in our sensitivity tests, none of our results change when we use a crossed
random effects model for occupations and countries.
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nonlinear models cannot be directly interpreted (Ai and Norton, 2003; Greene,
2010). Moreover, in a more complicated multilevel setting, the models some-
times do not converge. A linear OLS model does not have these drawbacks,
and we already correct for heteroskedasticity by clustering our standard errors
at the country level. We estimate our equations using both techniques. Our
results and even coefficients are very comparable. All predicted probabilities
for our OLS tests fall neatly in the range of the dependent variable. Therefore,
we follow Burgoon (2014) and show the results of our OLS estimations of which
the interaction effects are easier to plot. We list the results for the multilevel
ordered probit models in Appendix 5.2.
In our regressions we demean sectoral exposure and ln income. The only
effect of this is that the RTI coefficient can be interpreted as the effect of RTI
on redistribution preferences when income and sectoral exposure are at their
mean, instead of when income and sectoral exposure are zero which is a
substantively meaningless case.
5.4.2 Main results
The results of our estimation of the effects of RTI on redistribution preferences
are presented in Table 5.3. We first briefly reflect on the coefficients of our
control variables. These estimates are all consistent with previous findings
in the literature. First, we find that poorer individuals favour higher levels
of redistribution than richer. This is in line with our expectations based on
the Meltzer-Richard model. The coefficient implies that a 1 per cent increase
in income is associated with a 0.002 decrease in expressed redistribution
preferences, or an individual with twice the income is predicted to have a 0.14
lower level of redistribution preferences, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, being
lower educated, older, female, unemployed, and being a trade union member
all increase the likelihood of approving that the government should reduce
income disparities (e.g., Rehm, 2009; Burgoon, 2014). The ordered probit models
yield fully comparable estimations of the individual-level variables. The OLS
models do not show signs of significant effects of social spending or the
unemployment rate. The ordered probit models, however, point to positive
associations for the unemployment rate. This is in line with the hypothesis
that individuals favour more nonmarket protection when unemployment rates
are higher.12
12 The difference between probit and OLS for the country-level variables potentially arises
from the fact that probit models tend to require a larger number of countries than linear
OLS models to derive reliable estimates. For our model which only includes random country
intercepts, the bias of estimated country effects is limited as long as 15-20 countries are
present (Stegmueller, 2013).
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We now move to our main variables of interest. In model 1 we test for
the direct effects of RTI on preferences for redistribution. Our findings indicate
that RTI is positively associated with redistribution preferences. This result
provides empirical support for our first hypothesis that individuals in routine
occupations favour more redistribution to insure against the increased risk
of job or income loss. As we will show in the sensitivity tests, the positive effect
of RTI on redistribution preferences remains robust in different specifications
and when other occupational risks are added. We will look into the size of
the coefficient compared to other occupational risks in this section as well.
Having found a positive effect of RTI on redistribution preferences, we now
enquire whether this relation is moderated by sectoral exposure. Following
the insurance logic our second hypothesis was that the positive linkage
between RTI and redistribution preferences increases for individuals working
in sectors more exposed to RTI. Thus, we expect a positive sign for our inter-
Table 5.3 RTI and redistribution preferences 
RTI 
 Interacted with 
sectoral exposure 




(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
RTI 
0.042***  0.050***  0.043***  0.050*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln income 
-0.202***  -0.197***  -0.195***  -0.191*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Sectoral exposure 
  -0.180***    -0.172*** 
  (0.000)    (0.000) 
RTI * sectoral 
exposure 
  0.144***    0.144*** 
  (0.000)    (0.000) 
RTI * ln income 
    0.046***  0.042*** 
    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Years of education 
-0.027***  -0.028***  -0.027***  -0.027*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Male 
-0.189***  -0.172***  -0.188***  -0.172*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 
0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002*** 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Trade union member 
0.160***  0.159***  0.160***  0.159*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Degree of religiosity 
-0.006  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006 
(0.155)  (0.133)  (0.159)  (0.137) 
Dummy 
unemployed 
0.096***  0.098***  0.100***  0.101*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Social spending in 
%GDPt-1 
0.007  0.007  0.007  0.006 
(0.280)  (0.329)  (0.295)  (0.342) 
Unemployment ratet-
1 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
(0.965)  (0.966)  (0.953)  (0.956) 
Constant 
3.933***  3.941***  3.928***  3.936*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Log likelihood -111158.0  -111072.2  -111121.9  -111041.1 
Intraclass correlation 0.082  0.083  0.083  0.083 
N 78050  78050  78050  78050 
Number of countries 23  23  23  23 
Note Multilevel OLS model with random country intercepts and standard errors clustered at the country level. Sectoral 
exposure and ln income are demeaned. P values in parentheses, *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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action between sectoral exposure and the RTI index. Again, our empirical
results support our theoretical expectations as can be concluded from model 2
in Table 5.3. We find positive associations between our dependent variable
and the interaction of the RTI index and sectoral exposure. Additional tests
where we also demean the RTI index (results not shown here) show that the
constituent element of sectoral exposure itself is negative, whilst the constituent
RTI index variable remains positive.13 This seems to suggest that sectoral
exposure is not an important driver of preferences for public insurance by
itself. This finding corresponds to Rehm (2009) that occupational factors matter
more for insurance motivations. Still, our results indicate that sectoral exposure
accentuates the effects of occupational hazards on individual preferences for
nonmarket protection.
Next, we address the role of income as a factor that can strengthen the
association between RTI and preferences for redistribution (hypothesis 3). As
we already stated, income itself is always negatively associated with prefer-
ences for redistribution. Yet, income can moderate the effects of RTI on prefer-
ences for redistribution, as richer individuals have relatively more to lose from
job loss due to automation. Our empirical results from model 3 in Table 5.3
support this line of reasoning as indicated by a positive effect of the interaction
effect of income and the RTI index on preferences for redistribution.
Having established that income and sectoral exposure strengthen the effects
of RTI on redistribution preferences separately, we now move to a simultaneous
estimation. In this way we test whether both interactions have explanatory
power, or whether they are picking up a similar moderating pattern. We do
this here by estimating both interactions in one equation as shown in model
4.14 The two interactions and their constitutive parts remain significant, and
the coefficients barely change. Thus, income and sectoral exposure have an
independent moderating effect on the relationship between RTI and redistribu-
tion preferences. From this we can conclude that higher levels of RTI particular-
ly translate into higher preferred levels of redistribution when individuals
are working in exposed sectors and when they are richer. This does not
necessarily mean that richer individuals have higher levels of redistribution
preferences, as the level of income itself is still negatively associated with
preferred levels of redistribution.
13 Demeaning the RTI index does not affect the constituent coefficient of sectoral exposure
much, as the RTI-index is normalised.
14 Another way of simultaneously analysing the moderating effects of income and sectoral
exposure on the relationship between RTI and redistribution preferences would be to
estimate a triple interaction between these variables. We do this in Appendix 5.3; results
confirm our findings presented here.
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Figure 5.2 Effects of RTI on redistribution preferences conditional on sectoral exposure and 
income 
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Note  Multilevel OLS model with random country intercepts and standard errors clustered at the country level. All 
continuous control variables are held at their mean and dummies at their median. The black line shows the coefficient 
of RTI on redistribution preferences (y axes) at different levels of sectoral exposure or ln income (x axes). The dotted 
lines are the 95 per cent confidence intervals. The grey histogram plots the distribution of observations across levels of 
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To ease the interpretation, we evaluate the effect of RTI on redistribution
preferences at different levels of sectoral exposure and income in Figure 5.2.15
All continuous control variables are held at their mean and the dummies at
their median value. We can see in Figure 2a that for individuals in sheltered
sectors (with a sectoral exposure below -0.35, or 18 per cent of the sample)
RTI is not a significant determinant of redistribution preferences. Above this
threshold, the RTI index at the occupational level becomes an increasingly
stronger determinant of preferences for redistribution.
We also see that the effects of RTI on redistribution preferences are mono-
tonically increasing in the level of income (Figure 2b). For individuals with
a very low income we find that RTI is associated with lower rather than higher
levels of redistribution preferences, but this only holds for a minor part of
our sample (5 per cent of the sample). For a slightly larger part of our sample
the association between RTI and redistribution preferences is insignificant (15
per cent of the sample). Above this income threshold RTI becomes a positive
and significant determinant of redistribution preferences. The size of the
coefficient of RTI increases when the level of individual income goes up.
5.4.3 Sensitivity tests
We conduct a battery of sensitivity tests to examine the robustness of our
results. In Table 5.4 we show the effects of these tests on the coefficients of
the RTI index and its interactions with sectoral exposure and income for OLS.16
In Appendix 5.2 we also display the results of these sensitivity tests for our
multilevel ordered probit models. We conclude from these tests that the effects
of RTI on redistribution preferences and the moderating effects of sectoral
exposure and income are robust.
15 We show the effects for model 4, holding the other interaction effect constant. The marginal
effects for models 2 and 3 with only one interaction effect at the time produce fully compar-
able results.
16 Signs and significance of the control variables are unaffected by these amendments (available
upon request).
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First we use alternative measures of technological change and the moderating
variables.17 We use the Oesch (2013: 156) coding to generate a dummy
variable for routine occupations (model 1). With this indicator the effects of
RTI on redistribution preferences become stronger. The same holds for the
moderating effects of sectoral exposure. We also use a different coding scheme
to examine sectoral exposure to technological change (model 2). Wren and
Rehm (2014) distinguish between four types of sectors on the basis of their
exposure to information and communications technology and tradability. We
follow their suggestions and generate a dummy equal to 1 for the sectors
characterised by high rates of information technology intensity (the traditional
sectors and technology-intensive services), and to 0 for other sectors (non-
technology intensive services and welfare and government services). Signs
and significance levels do not change. Furthermore, we employ alternative
definitions for real income. First, we standardise income across countries to
make sure that results are not driven by differences in average income across
countries (model 3). Also equivalising income using the square root of the
household size to correct for differences in household composition does not
affect our results (model 4).
Next, we include other occupational risks into our regression model. We
can see from Table 5.4 that this does not influence the significance of our
17 Plotting the interactions with these moderating variables yield results very comparable
to the ones shown in Figure 5.2 (available upon request).
Table 5.4 Robustness checks for our OLS results  
 
 






RTI * ln 
income 
 Original results 0.050*** -0.191*** -0.172*** 0.144*** 0.042*** 
(1) Dummy RTI from Oesch (2013) 0.081*** -0.212*** -0.313*** 0.352*** 0.050*** 
(2) Sectoral definitions from Wren and Rehm (2014) 0.045*** -0.190*** -0.101*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 
(3) Standardised ln income 0.050*** -0.141*** -0.173*** 0.140*** 0.034*** 
(4) Equivalised ln income 0.051*** -0.196*** -0.176*** 0.143*** 0.037*** 
(5) Skill specificity 0.047*** -0.189*** -0.199*** 0.122*** 0.043*** 
(6) Offshoring 0.061*** -0.188*** -0.118*** 0.120*** 0.037*** 
(7) Logic of task groups 0.072*** -0.175*** -0.131*** 0.070*** 0.035*** 
(8) Foreign ratio 0.055*** -0.187*** -0.184*** 0.146*** 0.043*** 
(9) Occupational unemployment rate 0.031*** -0.173*** -0.156*** 0.134*** 0.043*** 
(10) Left-right scale 0.046*** -0.168*** -0.153*** 0.119*** 0.040*** 
(11) All individuals 0.042*** -0.167*** -0.153*** 0.107*** 0.044*** 
(12) Only employed 0.050*** -0.205*** -0.188*** 0.146*** 0.042*** 
(13) Excluding Eastern Europe 0.052*** -0.189*** -0.211*** 0.157*** 0.045*** 
(14) Excluding 2012 0.049*** -0.195*** -0.170*** 0.137*** 0.041*** 
(15) Binary dependent variable 0.020*** -0.074*** -0.060*** 0.060*** 0.017*** 
(16) Redistribution 0.050*** -0.191*** -0.171*** 0.144*** 0.042*** 
(17) Gini market income 0.050*** -0.193*** -0.170*** 0.143*** 0.042*** 
(18) EPL index 0.049*** -0.191*** -0.173*** 0.149*** 0.042*** 
(19) UB replacement rate 0.050*** -0.194*** -0.173*** 0.144*** 0.042*** 
(20) Crossed effects 0.077*** -0.159*** -0.155*** 0.074*** 0.024*** 
Note  Multilevel OLS model with random country intercepts and standard errors clustered at the country level. Sectoral 
exposure and ln income are demeaned. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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coefficients of interest. A first alternative occupational risk is skill specificity
(Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Cusack et al., 2006). We use the measure of relative
skill specificity as also used by Rehm (2009).18 This is a time-invariant measure
available at the 2-digit ISCO-88 level. Second, we rely on Walter’s binary index
of offshoring (2010; 2014; Dancygier and Walter, forthcoming). This index is
defined at the 4-digit ISCO-88 level.19 We already argued that RTI substantively
differs from skill specificity and offshoring. This is also reflected in modest
correlations (0.15-0.21). We find that individuals whose occupations require
more specific skills favour more insurance (model 5; e.g., Iversen and Soskice,
2001; Cusack et al., 2006). Interestingly, individuals in offshorable occupations
decrease rather than increase their preferred level of redistribution (model
6). This finding is also reported by Walter (2014). Walter argues that exposure
to offshoring increases risk perceptions among low-skilled, whereas high-skilled
or the ‘globalisation winners’ lower their preferred levels of redistribution,
which can explain the negative coefficient of offshoring on redistribution
preferences.20
Furthermore, we include dummies for the technical and interpersonal task
logic from Kitschelt and Rehm (2014). Dummies are defined at the 4-digit ISCO
level. We find that these two groups have higher preferences for redistribution
compared to the baseline group with an organizational task logic (model 7),
as predicted by Kitschelt and Rehm. In fact, including these dummies almost
doubles the size of the RTI index coefficient. We do not show the results if we
include dummies for the logic of authority or the combined groups, as they
eat up much of the variation given that one dummy captures all routine
occupations (plus more, as shown in Appendix 5.1). If we were to include these
dummies, then all interaction effects remain comparable, but RTI itself becomes
insignificant.
In the literature more occupational risks have been discerned that sub-
stantively differ from RTI, but might still be seen as confounding factors.
Burgoon et al. (2012) identify migration as an occupational risk. We follow
their empirical strategy and include the number of foreign born as a percentage
of the population, which is available at the 2-digit ISCO-88 level from the OECD
migration database (OECD, 2008b). Data refer to around 2000. We find that
individuals within occupations with higher ratios of foreigners have higher
levels of redistribution preferences (model 8), as also found by Burgoon et al.
(2012). More importantly, the significance of our variables of interest is not
affected by including this occupational hazard.
18 The measure is taken from http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/SkillSpecificity.
htm. This website also contains information regarding its measurement.
19 We are grateful to Stefanie Walter for sharing her coding with us. We cannot use ESS wave
2012 as the ISCO-08 definitions cannot be recoded into ISCO-88 at the 4-digit ISCO level.
20 Following Walter (2014), the negative association between offshoring and preferences for
redistribution disappears when an interaction effect between offshoring and years of
education is included.
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Next, we include the occupational unemployment rate from Rehm (2009;
model 9).21 This is a stringent test, since our argument is that RTI leads to
an increased job or wage loss risk, and because of this, to higher levels of pre-
ferred nonmarket protection. We lag the occupational unemployment rates
by one year as information for 2012 is missing. Unfortunately, data are only
available at the 1-digit occupational level. The occupational unemployment
rate and the RTI index are positively correlated (0.22).22 As expected, including
the occupational unemployment rate decreases the size of the RTI index co-
efficient on redistribution preferences, though it remains significant at the 1 per
cent. The occupational unemployment rate positively affects the preferred level
of redistribution.
Our main analysis does not include the left-right inclination of individuals,
as we state that redistribution preferences, which we seek to explain, are a
key element of expressed ideology (Rueda et al., 2014). Nevertheless, left-right
self-placement might constitute an independent determinant of redistribution
preferences (see e.g., Margalit, 2011). Our estimates are robust to the inclusion
of left-right self-placement measured on a scale of 1-10 (model 10). Evidently,
individuals that consider themselves more leftist prefer higher levels of re-
distribution.
Furthermore, we test the robustness of our results to the sample definition.
First, we expand our sample by 67 per cent by including all individuals for
which information is available (model 11). We insert an additional dummy
for people not active in the labour market. Second, we repeat our estimations
for only employed individuals, which reduces our sample size by 6 per cent
(model 12). Both of these sample amendments do not affect our main results.
Furthermore, results might be driven by the country and time sample. Exclud-
ing the Eastern European countries (model 13) or leaving out 2012 which is
based on another occupational coding scheme (model 14) does not affect our
results either.23
By applying OLS and ordered probit estimation to a categorical dependent
variable, we implicitly make the proportional lines assumption that the effect
of the independent variables is constant for each answer category of our
dependent variable (see also Busemeyer and Garritzmann, 2014). This assump-
tion can be relaxed by transforming our categorical dependent variable into
a dummy equal to 1 when an individual prefers or strongly prefers redistribu-
tion (model 15). This does not affect the signs and significance of our variables
of interest for our multilevel OLS and probit estimations.
21 We thank Philipp Rehm for sharing his occupational information. Unfortunately, no high-
quality data are available at the two-digit level. Data for Luxembourg are missing.
22 The correlations between the occupational unemployment rate and the other occupational
risks we discuss are significantly weaker.
23 More generally, dropping countries, years, or occupations one by one does not affect signs
or significance levels.
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We also account for other factors at the country level. We again lag all
these factors by one year. Support for redistribution might decrease when
present levels of redistribution are high. Higher levels of redistribution might
lead to stronger disincentive effects (Thewissen, 2014), and individuals
potentially take this into account when forming their redistribution preferences.
Individuals might also use actual levels of redistribution as a benchmark when
answering the question about whether the government should reduce income
differences (Rueda et al., 2014). Furthermore, we include the ex-ante level of
market inequality (Burgoon et al., 2012). Individuals potentially favour more
redistribution when levels of inequality are higher. We include the absolute
level of redistribution and the level of market inequality from the Solt (2014)
database (models 16 and 17).24 Adding these factors does not affect our co-
efficients of interest. For OLS both country factors are insignificant, but for the
ordered probit model the preferred level of redistribution is negatively asso-
ciated with the existing level of redistribution, and positively with the level
of market inequality.
Two other country factors might be important as they could decrease the
level of redistribution individuals favour by providing insurance (Gingrich
and Ansell, 2012). We include the overall employment protection legislation
(EPL) index and the summary measure of OECD unemployment benefit replace-
ment rates (OECD, 2014f; 2014g). The EPL index is never significant, whilst the
ordered probit models provide support for our hypothesis that higher unem-
ployment benefit replacement rates decrease preferred levels of nonmarket
protection (models 18 and 19). More importantly, the country factors do not
affect our coefficients of interest.
Last, we test for robustness to our model specification. We model occupa-
tions as a separate level in addition to the country level to account for the
hierarchical nature of our data. Here, we use a crossed random effects model,
since occupations are not nested within countries but can be seen as a distinct
level. Our OLS results remain firm (model 20). The RTI coefficient increases
while the coefficients of the interaction terms decrease slightly. Unfortunately,
this specification does not converge for the ordered probit model.
5.4.4 Interpretation of the size of the coefficients
Having found a positive association between RTI and preferences for redistribu-
tion, we now interpret its size. We do this in a comparative fashion, by running
the regression with both interactions, where we include the two other occupa-
24 We calculate unweighted averages per country-year observation for our sample from the
Solt database. Unfortunately, within our multilevel framework we cannot take standard
errors of the levels of inequality and redistribution into account.
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tional risks discussed in the theoretical section, skill specificity and off-
shoring.25 We calculate the effects when one of these three occupational risks
increases by one standard deviation. In substantive terms, for the RTI index
this is roughly comparable to an occupational switch from models,
salespersons, and demonstrators to other crafts and related trades (0.11 to 1.08).
For the relative skill specificity this is approximately equivalent to an indi-
vidual switching from physical and engineering science associate professionals
to sales and services elementary occupations (4.3 to 7.7). Last, for offshoring,
it can be interpreted as an occupational switch from metal, machinery, and
related trades workers to general managers (0.50 to 0.95).
We evaluate the effects of RTI on redistribution preferences at three levels:
with ln income and sectoral exposure at their average value, one standard
deviation below, and one standard deviation above this. This approximately
implies that we evaluate the effects of the RTI index for an individual with
an annual real income of 15003 dollar working in transport, storage, and
communication (one standard deviation below), 31242 dollar in mining (aver-
age), and 65061 dollar in financial intermediation (one standard deviation
above).
From Table 5.5 we can conclude that a one standard deviation increase of the
RTI index at average ln income and sectoral exposure has a roughly 1.5 times
stronger effect than a comparable increase in skill specificity on the favoured
level of redistribution. An F test indicates that the effect of RTI on redistribution
preferences is stronger than the effect of skill specificity at the 1 per cent
significance level. The effect of the RTI index becomes a factor three larger than
skill specificity if ln income and sectoral exposure are one standard deviation
above their means. On the other hand, RTI is no longer a significant determin-
25 We also conducted an estimation where we included the foreign ratio and occupational
unemployment rate. The coefficient for the RTI index at average ln income and sectoral
exposure decreased slightly to .040. The effect of a one standard deviation increase in foreign
ratio on redistribution preferences is much lower, 0.022, whilst not surprisingly, the effect
for the occupational unemployment rates is larger: 0.084. The coefficient for the RTI index
when ln income and sectoral exposure are one standard deviation above is higher (0.10),
though an F test indicates that the difference in size is not statistically significant.



















Minus one standard deviation  0.010 -0.008 0.028 
(2) Average  0.056*** 0.043 0.070 
(3) Plus one standard deviation 0.103*** 0.080 0.125 
(4) Offshoring - -0.053*** -0.066 -0.039 
(5) Skill specificity - 0.034*** 0.024 0.044 
Note  Multilevel OLS model with random country intercepts and standard errors clustered at the country level. *p<0.1, 
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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ant of nonmarket protection preferences for low levels of ln income and
sectoral exposure. As found earlier, offshoring has a negative association with
redistribution preferences. Its (absolute) size is comparable to the size of the
RTI index coefficient at average values of income and sectoral exposure.
5.5 CONCLUSIONS
Current technological innovations in information technology involve a sub-
stantial employment risk for individuals holding routine occupations by
facilitating the ease of automation. We find that individuals in routine occupa-
tions respond to this risk by preferring higher levels of redistribution as a
means of nonmarket insurance. Even though technological change is widely
considered to be a key occupational driver with large distributive effects,
whether it influences the preferred level of redistribution has not been subject
of inquiry in the comparative political economy thus far. Indeed, our analysis
suggests that on average the routine task intensity of an occupation has a larger
positive effect on the preferred level of redistribution than other risks described
in the literature, in particular offshoring and skill specificity.
In this chapter we show that the degree of routine task intensity of an
occupation becomes a particularly influential determinant of redistribution
preferences when two moderating factors are present. First, if an individual
is employed in a sector exposed to technological change, and second, when
an individual has more to lose from automation, that is, when his or her
income is higher, the impact of routine task intensity on preferences for non-
market protection increases. By introducing sectoral exposure as a moderating
variable we combine an occupational and sectoral side of risk exposure.
Moreover, the role of personal income in shaping redistribution preferences
becomes fundamentally different. Even though richer individuals on average
might favour lower levels of redistribution, the routine task intensity of their
occupation becomes a more important determinant of their favoured level of
redistribution preferences. This view of income can be seen as more nuanced
than existing perspectives where income only has a direct effect, which might
be negative because of material self-interest (Meltzer and Richard, 1981), or
positive when insurance is a normal good (Moene and Wallerstein, 2001).
This study’s empirical work is built on survey data, rather than an ex-
periment where individuals are randomly assigned to occupations. One might
argue that individuals self-select into occupations, leading to possibly con-
founded causal interpretations of our results. This reasoning would imply that
risk-averse persons who already have higher preferences for provision of public
insurance choose occupations less exposed to risk. Second, it could be that
individuals in routine occupations increased their redistribution preferences,
lost their jobs because of automation, and moved to non-routine occupations
whilst keeping higher levels of preferred nonmarket protection. Unfortunately
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we cannot directly test for this as we do not have micro panel data at our
disposal. Yet, both of these arguments predict a negative association between
the degree of routine task intensity and the preferred level for redistribution,
militating against our statistically significant findings of a positive association.
It might be, however, that because of these counteracting effects we under-
estimate the effect of routine task intensity on preferences for redistribution.
In this chapter we allow the risk of automation to differ across occupations,
depending on their degree of routine task intensity. We devote less attention
to country-specific patterns, depending on for instance the amount of invest-
ment in research and development, or qualitative educational factors that
potentially shape how individuals cope with technological change. This would
be an interesting line of future inquiry. More generally, our analysis only
begins to explore how risks of technological change shape actual redistribution
and the welfare state. An extension of this study would be to consider whether
exposure to risk of automation affects voting behaviour, and party and policy
agendas, and ultimately, actual welfare state policies. Such a research agenda
could follow the quantitative lines as applied in this chapter, or it could involve
historical accounts of policies adopted by welfare states in response to risks
resulting from technological change.
In the meantime, our findings point toward the possibility of cross-class
coalitions between low-wage individuals in non-routine occupations and high-
wage individuals holding routine occupations in support of a redistributive
welfare state (Hausermann et al., 2014). This potentially has implications for
our understanding of insider-outsider politics and political mobilisation.
Whether these coalitions materialise should be subject to further research.
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APPENDIX 5.1 – DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KITSCHELT AND REHM AND THE RTI INDEX
In this appendix we more closely compare the Kitschelt and Rehm (2014)
dummies (KR dummies) based on Oesch (2006), which are said to capture
routine occupations, to the continuous RTI index from Goos et al. (2014). We
will argue here that the RTI index is substantively and empirically superior
to the KR dummies if one’s ambition is to examine the routine task intensity
of occupations. First, the RTI index is continuous and provides significantly
more variation across occupational groups. This holds even though the KR
dummies are defined at the more detailed 4-digit ISCO-88 occupational level.
Second, the KR dummies do not measure the degree of routine task intensity
but follow educational and income lines. Third, we have slightly more (8 per
cent) observations at our disposal for the RTI index.
KR distinguish between four a-groups which capture a vertical ‘logic of
authority’ dimension or the degree of discretionary space: professionals;
associate professionals; skilled routine; and unskilled routine. In addition, KR
generate a second ‘logic of tasks’ dimension with three groups (the t-groups)
depending on whether tasks are more or less clearly defined: organisational;
technical; or interpersonal task logics. This dimension does not have any
linkages with RTI. The four a and three t-groups are combined and merged
into four c-groups:
1. Skilled organisational: Professionals and associate professionals with an
organisational logic of task structure, who are against redistribution;
2. Skilled technical: Professionals and associate professionals with a technical
task structure, with more uncertainty and loose horizontal structures, who
are less opposed to redistribution;
3. Skilled interpersonal: Professionals and associate professionals with inter-
personal task structure, who have a considerable generosity to accept re-
distribution;
4. Routine: The skilled and unskilled routine workers in all three afore-
mentioned task structures are grouped. This group is hypothesised to be
in favour of redistribution.
Table A5.1 shows the mean values for all KR dummies for occupations at the
2-digit ISCO-88 level, where we sort occupations by their level of RTI. Only eight
occupations at the 2-digit level for the a-groups, and even only four occupa-
tions for the c-groups are not fully captured by a dummy (marked in bold).
Thus, the more detailed 4-digit level at which the KR dummies are defined
barely produce additional variation at a more aggregated level. In fact, the
variation is significantly decreased because of the dichotomous way of measur-
ing.
Second and more importantly, substantively the KR dummies are intended
to measure ‘unskilled routine’ (a4) or ‘routine’ groups (c4) as compared to
‘authoritarian’ (a1-3) or ‘skilled’ groups (c1-3) – not to demarcate routine from
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non-routine occupations. Kitschelt and Rehm (2014) stress that they are in-
terested in discretionary space rather than the intensity of routine tasks per
occupations. The ‘unskilled routine’ group a4 captures all occupations whose
ISCO-codes start with an 8 and 9 (plant and machine operators and assemblers,
and elementary occupations), almost all occupations with a 5 and 6 (service
workers and shop and market sales workers, and skilled agricultural and
fishery workers for which we do not have RTI data), and parts of occupations
starting with 4 and 7 (clerks, and craft and related trades workers). The
‘routine’ c4 group combines groups a3 and a4. It includes all occupations of
which the ISCO-88 code begins between 4-9, thus all occupations except legis-
lators, senior officials and managers, professionals, or technicians and associate
professionals. This group is very large, covering almost twice the number of
observations as the c1-c3 groups combined for our sample.
Group a4 and c4 do not measure the degree of routine task intensity of occupa-
tions contrasted to non-routine abstract or manual task intensive occupations,
but closely follow educational and income lines. We can see this in particular
for group c4, which indeed contains all occupations with a positive RTI index,
but also includes for instance occupations 51 (personal and protective services
workers) and in particular 83 (drivers and mobile plant operators). As we
argue and empirically show, it is not true that all low-skilled occupations are
routine (Michaels et al., 2014; Goos et al., 2014). Moreover, as all KR categories
are measured as dummies, they do not do justice to the fact that certain
occupations are significantly more or less routine than others. The KR dummies
Table A5.1 Comparing the continuous RTI index to the Kitschelt and Rehm dummy classifications 






































a1 a2 a3 a4  t1 t2 t3  c1 c2 c3 c4 
13 -1.52 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
83 -1.50 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.46  0.00 0.65 0.35  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
22 -1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.12 0.88  0.00 0.12 0.88 0.00 
21 -0.82 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
12 -0.75 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 0.00 0.00  1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
24 -0.73 0.82 0.19 0.00 0.00  0.53 0.00 0.47  0.53 0.00 0.47 0.00 
51 -0.60 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.67  0.00 0.00 1.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
34 -0.44 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  0.81 0.03 0.16  0.81 0.03 0.16 0.00 
31 -0.40 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
32 -0.33 0.00 0.90 0.11 0.00  0.00 0.09 0.91  0.00 0.09 0.80 0.11 
71 -0.19 0.00 0.00 0.89 0.11  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
91 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00  0.00 0.05 0.95  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
52 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.97  0.00 0.00 1.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
81 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
93 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
72 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
82 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
74 1.24 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
42 1.41 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.77  1.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
73 1.59 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
41 2.24 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.08  1.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
	
	 	
Technological change as a determinant of redistribution preferences 113
distinguish between large groups that largely following educational and income
lines – this might include an element of RTI, but it will capture most certainly
more, indeed, all (unobserved) differences between these groups.
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APPENDIX 5.2 – MULTILEVEL ORDERED PROBIT RESULTS
Here we show the regression results of our multilevel ordered probit models,
with random country intercepts and standard errors clustered at the country
level. The equivalent of Table 5.3 estimated using multilevel ordered probit
is shown in Table A5.2. The sign and size of coefficients for our variables of
interest are all very comparable. The only difference is that the unemployment
rate at country level becomes positive and significant.
We also run our sensitivity tests using multilevel ordered probit. The equi-
valent of Table 5.4 is shown in Table A5.3. Again, the signs and sizes of the
coefficients are very comparable. Also the added variables themselves yield
comparable estimates (results not shown). Unfortunately, we cannot show
results for a crossed effects model as this does not converge.
Table A5.2 RTI and redistribution preferences for multilevel ordered probit 
RTI 
 Interacted with 
sectoral exposure 




(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
RTI 
0.042***  0.048***  0.041***  0.047*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln income 
-0.209***  -0.206***  -0.205***  -0.201*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Sectoral exposure 
  -0.172***    -0.165*** 
  (0.000)    (0.000) 
RTI * sectoral exposure 
  0.135***    0.135*** 
  (0.000)    (0.000) 
RTI * ln income 
    0.042***  0.039*** 
    (0.000)  (0.000) 
Years of education 
-0.028***  -0.029***  -0.027***  -0.028*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Male 
-0.192***  -0.171***  -0.189***  -0.171*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age 
0.003***  0.002***  0.003***  0.002*** 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Trade union member 
0.147***  0.180***  0.143***  0.180*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Degree of religiosity 
-0.007*  0.000  -0.007  0.000 
(0.085)  (0.951)  (0.112)  (0.940) 
Dummy unemployed 
0.141***  0.135***  0.139***  0.138*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Social spending in %GDPt-1 
-0.006*  0.000  -0.009**  -0.000 
(0.054)  (0.987)  (0.025)  (0.991) 
Unemployment ratet-1 
0.016***  0.019***  0.018***  0.019*** 
(0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 









N 78050  78050  78050  78050 
Number of countries 23  23  23  23 
Note  Multilevel ordered probit model with random country intercepts and standard errors clustered at the country level. 
Sectoral exposure and ln income are demeaned. P values in parentheses, *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table A5.3 Robustness checks for the multilevel ordered probit models 






RTI * ln 
income 
 Original results (multilevel ordered probit) 0.047*** -0.201*** -0.165*** 0.135*** 0.039*** 
(1) Dummy RTI from Oesch (2013) 0.074*** -0.221*** -0.323*** 0.360*** 0.041** 
(2) Sectoral definitions from Wren and Rehm (2014) 0.043*** -0.206*** -0.098*** 0.043*** 0.038*** 
(3) Standardised ln income 0.049*** -0.148*** -0.173*** 0.139*** 0.032*** 
(4) Equivalised ln income 0.048*** -0.202*** -0.172*** 0.134*** 0.033*** 
(5) Skill specificity 0.046*** -0.197*** -0.201*** 0.117*** 0.040*** 
(6) Offshoring 0.059*** -0.203*** -0.130*** 0.116*** 0.031*** 
(7) Logic of task groups 0.072*** -0.183*** -0.121*** 0.059** 0.029*** 
(8) Foreign ratio 0.056*** -0.195*** -0.184*** 0.147*** 0.042*** 
(9) Occupational unemployment rate 0.032*** -0.186*** -0.165*** 0.128*** 0.038*** 
(10) Left-right scale 0.050*** -0.184*** -0.148*** 0.118*** 0.039*** 
(11) All individuals 0.040*** -0.167*** -0.151*** 0.106*** 0.043*** 
(12) Only employed 0.048*** -0.226*** -0.187*** 0.147*** 0.037*** 
(13) Excluding Eastern Europe 0.053*** -0.198*** -0.206*** 0.157*** 0.043*** 
(14) Excluding 2012 0.046*** -0.209*** -0.162*** 0.128*** 0.035*** 
(15) Binary dependent variable 0.055*** -0.232*** -0.159*** 0.176*** 0.039*** 
(16) Redistribution 0.051*** -0.203*** -0.168*** 0.141*** 0.039*** 
(17) Gini market income 0.049*** -0.202*** -0.166*** 0.140*** 0.038*** 
(18) EPL index 0.047*** -0.208*** -0.156*** 0.143*** 0.037*** 
(19) UB replacement rate 0.048*** -0.200*** -0.179*** 0.140*** 0.037*** 
Note  Multilevel ordered probit model with random country intercepts and standard errors clustered at the country level. 
Sectoral exposure and ln income are demeaned. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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APPENDIX 5.3 – A TRIPLE INTERACTION
Another way of testing the moderating effects of income and sectoral exposure
on the relationship between RTI and preferences for redistribution simul-
taneously is to run a triple interaction model. We run this model with OLS
estimation, as our ordered probit model does not converge. We include all
constitutive elements. Again, our results remain robust across model specifica-
tions and whether or not we include other occupational risks. For ease of
interpretation we evaluate the predicted level of redistribution preferences
for four groups: rich and exposed, rich and sheltered, poor and exposed, and
poor and sheltered. Rich and poor are defined as one standard deviation above
and below mean income. The same holds for sheltered and exposed sector.
We evaluate their redistribution preferences at the minimum and maximum
values of the RTI index.
Figure A5.1 supports our main hypotheses. We find that higher levels of
RTI are associated with higher levels of preferred redistribution, as indicated
by positive slopes. Second, we find that the poor always have higher predicted
levels of redistribution than the rich. Third, for the poor, preferred levels of
redistribution are reasonably stable across different levels of sectoral exposure
and RTI. The interesting part concerns the rich, who have relatively more to
lose from automation. The difference in predicted levels of redistribution
preferences between individuals in non-routine versus routine occupations
is substantial for the rich. This particularly holds for the exposed rich. Their
predicted preferred level of redistribution rises substantially when they move
from a non-routine to a routine occupation (from below 3.2 to around 3.7).
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We can also more formally test for the differences in effects of RTI on re-
distribution preferences (or the slopes) of these different groups, as we do in
Table A5.4. The p values, however, are not adjusted for the fact that we con-
duct post-hoc tests. A very conservative interpretation would be to multiply
these p values by the number of post-hoc tests (six). If we were to do so, we
can still safely conclude that effects of RTI on redistribution preferences differ
for rich exposed compared to every other group. We cannot conclude that
there is a significant difference in effects of RTI on redistribution preferences
for the poor exposed compared to the poor sheltered or compared to the rich
sheltered.
Figure A5.1 Predicted levels of redistribution preferences for a triple interaction 
	
           RTI index 
 






























Table A5.4 Post-hoc tests (unadjusted) 
Groups Coefficient 
Standard 
deviation z score p value 
Rich exposed vs. rich sheltered 0.093 0.013 7.18 0.000 
Poor exposed vs. poor sheltered 0.024 0.013 1.89 0.059 
Rich exposed vs. poor exposed 0.117 0.014 8.43 0.000 
Rich exposed vs. poor sheltered 0.034 0.012 2.83 0.005 
Rich sheltered vs. poor exposed 0.010 0.012 0.85 0.395 
Rich sheltered vs. poor sheltered 0.127 0.014 9.17 0.000 
Note  Multilevel OLS with random country intercepts and standard errors clustered at the country level 
	 	
6 Falling back on old habits?
A comparison of the social and unemployment
crisis reactive policy strategies in Germany, the UK
and Sweden1
ABSTRACT
Although long-term processes of welfare state development have been invest-
igated frequently, there is a surprising gap in knowledge on short-term re-
actions of states to sudden events. This article aims to fill this gap by examin-
ing the reactive policies, i.e. immediate policy responses to urgent social
matters, of governments to the current economic crisis. We focus on social
and unemployment policies of the three welfare regime ideal types of Esping-
Andersen’s typology, namely Germany, the UK and Sweden. We apply long-
term policy development theories, most notably the convergence and path
dependence theories, to understand the choices made in the different reactive
policy strategies of these countries. In addition, we scrutinise whether we find
similarities between the reactive policies and the converging structural welfare
state developments. We use comparable data from various European and
national data sources for the two years directly following the recent crisis,
namely 2008 and 2009. Our analysis shows that, at least for the three countries
under investigation, countries seem to have fallen back on ‘old habits’ by
adopting social and unemployment reactive policies that can be identified
based on their institutional legacies. This suggests that reactive policy strategies
can be explained by different dynamics than the more structural long-term
policy developments, and in our case we find evidence in support for the path
dependence theory.
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The years 2008 and 2009 were characterised by worldwide financial and
economic turmoil. The financial crisis quickly spread throughout the world
1 This chapter is published as Chung, H., Thewissen, S. (2011) Falling back on old habits?
A comparison of the social and unemployment crisis reactive policy strategies in Germany,
the UK and Sweden, Social Policy & Administration 45(4): 354-370 and in Greve, B. (ed) (2012)
The times they are changing? Crisis and the welfare state, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell: 23-39.
The chapter is reprinted with permission. The paper was runner up for the 2012 Social
Policy & Administration Early Stage Career Research Prize. We would like to thank Margo
Trappenburg and others who commented on the previous version of this article for their
help in improving it.
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and began to affect the real economies in the form of massive redundancies
and bankruptcies. This crisis caused a need for urgent state interventions. Many
governments provided credit supplies and guarantees for financial institutions
or even nationalised distressed banks. In addition, social and unemployment
policies were adopted as an attempt to stimulate the economy and to respond
to the sudden increase in redundancies. Germany for instance modified a
tripartite agreement on short-term unemployment, whilst the UK implemented
subsidies for employers to hire employees.
An interesting question that stems from this is how to understand the
reactive policies, i.e. the immediate responses of welfare states to urgent
societal matters, of countries to sudden economic shocks. These policies differ
in a number of aspects from structural policy-making processes such as grand
welfare reforms. Reactive policies are meant to provide quick relief to an
urgent crisis, the decision-making time is limited, and they only apply for a
limited amount of time or are stopped when the urgent need is met. Although
structural processes of welfare state development have been investigated
frequently, there is a surprising gap in knowledge on reactive policies (Vis,
2009; Castles, 2010).
This article aims to fill this gap by examining the reactive policies of three
countries best representing the different welfare state regime typologies,
namely Germany, the UK and Sweden. Our main question is how we can
explain the strategies countries follow in their social and unemployment
reactive policies. Due to the lack of theories that address the subject of short-
term reactions of the welfare state, we turn to structural policy development
theories, namely the convergence theories and path dependence theories. From
a convergence perspective we would expect similar policy solutions to the
crisis, due to similarities found in the nature of the problem and in the con-
straints of possible solutions. However, the rivalling path dependence theory
entails that specific national institutional legacies are the most decisive cause
in welfare state development. It could be expected that in times of abrupt
turmoil and when there is little time to react, countries are more likely to fall
back on their institutional legacies. By examining the reactive policies of the
three countries, we can see if the choices made by governments can be under-
stood with similar frameworks used for structural long-term policy develop-
ments. An emphasis is placed on social and unemployment policies, as the
discussion of convergence versus path dependence notably took place in this
policy field, and we focus on reactive policies that took place during 2008 and
2009.
This article is structured as follows. Section 6.2 explains the theoretical
framework of the crisis literature, and the convergence and path dependence
theories. We derive general expectations from these theories as a framework
to compare the reactive policy strategies. In Section 6.3, the methodology of
this article is explained. Section 6.4 consists of the empirical description of
the implemented responses of Germany, the UK and Sweden. Section 6.5
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compares and interprets the national strategies, after which we discuss our
conclusions in Section 6.6.
6.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
6.2.1 Reactive policy strategies of welfare states and the impact of crises
Reactive policies are the immediate responses of welfare states to urgent
societal matters. The comprehensive plan behind the implemented reactive
policies can be referred to as the reactive policy strategy. Specific crisis
situations, such as the current financial crisis, have been a topic of investiga-
tion. Yet, most studies focus on causes or consequences of the crisis (e.g. Datz,
2009; Eichhorst et al., 2010; Castles, 2010), providing short descriptions of what
governments have done (e.g. Clegg, 2010), or only focus on specific policy
areas such as family policies (e.g. Richardson, 2010). In the welfare state
literature, there are no studies yet that provide insights in understanding the
reactive policy strategies countries take in times of crises.
In agenda-setting theories the impact of crises on policy-making is ex-
amined more frequently. Here, crisis situations are understood as ‘windows
of opportunities’ (Kingdon, 1964) or ‘critical junctures’ (Capoccia and Kelemen,
2007). For instance, Boin et al. (2009) stress that crises can be politically
exploited by pushing forward certain policy answers by actors. Vis (2009) finds
evidence for this stance in welfare state research, by claiming that deteriorating
socio-economic situations are a necessary condition for unpopular welfare state
reforms. As we can see, the key focus of these studies is in understanding the
role of crises in changing the political dynamics of welfare reform. They teach
us that crises can be used to implement radical changes. However, they do
not provide us insight what kind of reactive policy strategies one can expect
during crises in different countries. For this reason, we turn to theories on
structural policy-making, namely the convergence and path dependence
theories. Even though these theories refer to structural reforms and long-term
policy-making, we use them as theoretical frameworks to reflect on when
examining reactive policy strategies. In addition, applying long-term policy
theories allows us to scrutinise whether we find similarities between the
reactive policies and the structural welfare state developments in our country
cases.
6.2.2 Path dependence theory and reactive policy strategies
In the path dependence theory, it is believed that the history or institutional
legacy of a country strongly influences the policies it will adopt in the future
(Pierson, 2000). Changes happen, but they are bounded or incremental, rather
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than being institutional overhauls (Starke, 2006: 105–6). A number of reasons
are put forward to argue why welfare states developments are unequivocally
path dependent. First, radical changes are difficult to accomplish and relatively
expensive. Many institutions contain veto-points and have high set-up costs
(Bonoli, 2001: 238), and politicians have a short time horizon in which they
need to show outcomes (Pierson, 2000: 258–62). Second, existing institutional
settings shape the expectations and behaviour of citizens, politicians, and
pressure groups. This could entail that radical welfare reforms are likely to
meet opposition from various interest groups. In addition, as the ‘varieties
of capitalism’ literature (Hall and Soskice, 2001) argues, different institutional
settings can also lead to comparative institutional advantages. These ad-
vantages act as powerful inducements to replicate existing institutions.
Central to the path dependence theory is that a number of welfare regimes
or trajectories can be discerned, based on their institutional legacies. One of
the most influential typologies of welfare states in this respect comes from
Esping-Andersen (1990). He discerns three ideal type welfare regimes, which
are the liberal, conservative and social democratic regime. Although this
typology has been criticised by scholars for various reasons, there seems to
be a consensus in the classification of the classic examples of the ideal types,
namely Germany, the USA (and to a lesser extent, the UK) and Sweden (Arts
and Gelissen, 2002).
The path dependence framework can be applied to reactive policies as
follows. First, since reactive policies are used to address urgent crises in a short
time frame, radical changes may be even more difficult to accomplish. Second,
as argued in the varieties of capitalism approach, it could be that certain
responses are expected by citizens and by pressure groups such as employer
and employee organisations. For instance, there could be a demand for policies
that enable society to do as much ‘business as usual’ as possible. Using these
arguments, we should expect that countries stay close to their institutional
legacies in times of crises, by using instruments that were in place or that have
been used before. We would then expect distinctive differences in reactive
policy strategies reflecting the countries’ institutional legacies, and we would
not expect policy innovation to take place.
Based on Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology, we can derive specific hypo-
theses of the national reactive policy strategies from a path dependence per-
spective. We expect Germany to have adopted a conservative strategy, with
a strong inclination to maintain traditional status relations. This implies that
its main focus would be to keep insiders in their jobs to preserve their in-
dustrial and firm-specific skills, combined with a low emphasis on activation.
The UK should follow a liberal laissez-faire crisis response strategy,
characterised by reliance on market forces with only residual engagement in
social policies. For Sweden we expect a social democratic strategy. This is
characterised by a combination of focus on activation, whilst securing income
by universal and generous social benefits.
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6.2.3 Convergence theory and crisis response policies
Contrary to the understanding of path dependence theorists, convergence
theory claims that all welfare states are converging into a common model.
Two important reasons are put forward why countries are slowly opting for
more similar policy solutions (Starke et al., 2008). First, internationalisation
and global competition weaken the freedom of action of national states. Due
to the increase in the dynamic nature of private economic forces, such as flows
of capital and labour across national borders, governments are no longer
capable of deviating much from other countries in their regulations and taxes.
Second, countries are facing similar problems and have comparable constraints
in their methods to deal with these problems. Low economic growth and
unfavourable demographic changes restrict states to pay for extensive social
policies (Pierson, 2002; Korpi and Palme, 2003). There is consistent evidence
that Western European countries have chosen similar strategies in response
to this permanent austerity in their structural policy development, which are
retrenchment and stimulation of employment. The sickness, work accident
and unemployment benefits have been lowered in most countries in terms
of both their proportion in spending, as well as in terms of replacement rates
(Korpi and Palme, 2003; Allan and Scruggs, 2004; Adelantado and Calderón,
2006). There has also been an increasing emphasis on activation and
employability (Dingeldey, 2007), including the development of various family
policies to stimulate the employment of women (Mandel and Semyonov, 2006;
Lewis et al., 2008). However, this process of convergence and retrenchment
seems to be a very gradual development, largely without radical reforms
(Pierson, 2002; Starke, 2006).
Using the logic of the convergence theory, there are several reasons why
we would expect countries to have chosen similar reactive policy strategies
to the crisis. First, our country cases are all members of the EU and their
financial sectors are strongly internationalised. Second, the financial and
economic crisis presented comparable problems of lower demands, bank-
ruptcies and threats of mass unemployment. Taking all this into account, we
could expect similar reactive policy strategies in all of the three countries under
investigation, regardless of their institutional heritages.
6.3 METHODS AND DATA SOURCES
Based on Esping-Andersen’s framework, we compare the three classic examples
of welfare regimes, which are Germany, the UK and Sweden. These three
countries differ maximally in their institutional legacies, yet they share a
number of important extraneous variables. First, all three countries have
experienced a sudden economic shock in terms of bankruptcies, decrease in
demands, leading to drops in GDP growth rates and increase in unemployment
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due to the crisis. This aspect is substantiated in the next section. Second, all
countries are EU member states, and all implement European Monetary Union
(EMU) policies, although Germany is the only one with the euro as its currency.
Third, all countries have financial sectors that are strongly internationalised.
These countries, however, differ in a number of important aspects, besides
their institutional legacy, which are the affiliation of the government and the
composition of their economies. During the crisis, Germany and Sweden were
governed by a centre right cabinet, whilst the centre left Labour Party was
in office in the UK. Unfortunately, there are no alternative countries that could
represent the ideal types of the regime typologies as well as the UK and
Sweden, which satisfied the other requirements. Second, our country cases
differ in their national economic composition, although this could also be
understood as part, or a consequence, of the institutional legacies in the devel-
opment of the welfare state. In other words, it is endogenous to the character-
istics of the welfare regimes. These points will be taken up later in our dis-
cussion section.
A second methodological consideration is the type of policies under investi-
gation. Although we also examine the general economic and financial policies
to provide background information on how the crisis has been managed in
each country, we concentrate on social and unemployment policies. We choose
these policies because we are interested in welfare state policies and because
the discussion of convergence versus divergence notably took place in this
policy field (Vis, 2009). In addition, we focus on state-level policies, although
we also refer to some of the important sectoral and company level policies.
The third consideration is the period under investigation. We focus on reactive
policies, which are short-term measures in reaction to the crisis. Therefore,
our focus is on the years 2008 and 2009. Concerning the choice of data, we
rely on comparable data from various European data sources, such as the
European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) and the European Commis-
sion’s (EC) joint employment reports, supplemented by various documents
from national sources.
6.4 THE CRISIS AND REACTIVE POLICIES
After years of relatively stable economic development, the crisis caused a
severe and sudden decline in GDP in all European states. The crisis struck in
a roughly similar fashion in Germany, the UK and Sweden. In 2007, the real
GDP growth rates in the three countries were approximately 2 per cent (see
Figure 6.1). This reversed to an average decline of approximately minus 5 to 6
per cent in 2009.
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The unemployment rate shows a similar course, as is evident from Figure 6.2.
The unemployment rate was rather different until the first quarter of 2006,
but it shows a converging pattern around the first and second quarter of 2008.
In the third quarter of 2008, we can see an increase of unemployment in all
countries, which continues until the third quarter of 2009. The exceptional case
is Germany, which has not shown a stark increase in unemployment rates.
This can be attributed to its reactive policies, which focused on keeping people
in their jobs. We explain this in detail in the next section. Despite the fact that
there are some deviations, it is clear that all countries faced the problem of
bankruptcies, sharp decrease in demand, and a threat of mass redundancies.
In the following sections, we examine what types of policies were implemented
to address these issues in the three countries under investigation.
Figure 6.1 Real GDP growth rates 
 
Note Figures for 2010 are forecast projections 
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Figure 6.2 Unemployment rate per quarter 
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6.4.1 Conservative considerations – the case of Germany
It has been noted that Germany departed from its conservative tradition before
the crisis started. During the Hartz reforms in 2003–04, unemployment and
social assistance benefits were lowered and activation became an essential
element in German employment policies (Seeleib-Kaiser and Fleckenstein,
2007). In addition, Germany has moved away from the male breadwinner
model through implementing family policies to stimulate the employment of
women (Lewis et al., 2008).
Despite a favourable starting position, Germany was severely affected by
the collapse in worldwide demand as a consequence of its reliance on exports
(EC, 2009). From September 2008 onwards, the centre right cabinet of CDU/CSU
(the Christian alliance) and FDP (the Liberals) turned to an active response
strategy. The most important policies were the ‘Package of Measures to Reduce
Tax Burdens, Stabilise Social Insurance Contributions and Invest in Families’,
of October 2008, and two economic stimulus packages. The first package,
‘Securing Jobs by Strengthening Growth’, stimulated the economy with a
government investment of C= 31 billion. Its main goal was to support the
viability of the financial sector, but it also consisted of Keynesian investments
in long-term public goods and support to the manufacturing industry. The
second stimulus package, the ‘Pact for Employment and Stability in Germany’,
of circa C= 50 billion, was used to relieve tax burdens, recuperate consumer
demands, and to stimulate investments (EC, 2009).
The main German strategy in social and unemployment measures was to
keep insiders in their jobs to preserve their skills by active state interventions.
A number of measures were adopted to achieve this strategy. First, an existing
tripartite agreement on short-term unemployment was extended and financially
modified (ILO, 2009). The agreement entailed that in case of temporary shortage
of orders, employers could lower labour costs by reducing working time and
wages of employees. This reduced wage was paid out by the government as
partial unemployment benefits so that workers did not see a remarkable
decrease in their wages. The measure enabled employers to maintain their
trained and skilled workers, whilst in return the employees’ employment was
safeguarded, occasionally supplemented with extra training. The short-time
work allowances consisted of replacement rates of 60 per cent for employees
without children, and 67 per cent for those with children. Before the crisis,
the short-time work allowances were paid out of social security contributions
of social partners, as part of the unemployment benefit scheme. Yet as a crisis
measure, it was decided that the allowances were paid out of general taxes.
In addition, the drawing period was temporarily extended from six to 24
months until 2009 (EIRO, 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; 2009d). Over 3 per cent of all
employees were participating in short-time work schemes in 2009 (OECD, 2010:
52). This extensive use of short-term allowance schemes is the main reason
why the overall unemployment rate in Germany did not rise as significantly
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as in other countries in Europe (see Figure 6.2), regardless of the overall
decrease in demands as shown in its GDP growth patterns. The measure
especially helped to preserve jobs in the male-dominated manufacturing
industry (Eichhorst et al., 2010; EIRO, 2010).
A second measure that provided relief to insiders was the extension of
the phased early retirement scheme for older employees (EC, 2009: 24). This
scheme aimed at facilitating a gradual transition of employees over 55 into
retirement, subsidised by the state, to generate new positions to be replaced.
When an employee over 55 cut his working time in half, the employers were
to pay 70 per cent of the employee’s reduced wage and contribute to the
pension schemes, whilst the Federal Government bore the additional expenses
(EIRO, 2009e). Third, Germany eased the burden of employers and employees
by significantly lowering both their unemployment insurance contributions
(from 6.5 to 2.8 per cent until 1 December 2010 and 3 per cent after that) and
health insurance contributions (from 15.5 to 14.9 per cent from July 2009
onwards) (German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology, 2008).
Germany also agreed on a number of complementary policies. In order
to stimulate activation, the second stimulus package also consisted of invest-
ment on training on-the-job and job-to-job placements. In addition, the tax
rate of the first income bracket was lowered from 15 to 14 per cent and the
personal allowance was increased to C= 7,834 from 2009, as an attempt to reduce
the unemployment trap. Lastly, it adopted a number of family policies as part
of the packages. For example, the universal child benefit and tax-free child
allowance were raised by 4.3 per cent (German Federal Ministry of Economics
and Technology, 2008) and parents received a non-recursive C= 100 child bonus
(EC, 2009: 24).
6.4.2 Liberal legislation – the case of the UK
Although the UK can still be characterised as a residual welfare state with a
relatively low degree of social protection by the state, more recently the state
has become increasingly involved in several aspects. First of all, there has been
an increase in active labour market policies to stimulate employability of its
workers (Dingeldey, 2007). In addition, the state has taken an active role by
both developing new family policies and increasing the amount of public
investment spent on these policies (Lewis et al., 2008).
The UK was one of the first European countries to be heavily hit by the
global crisis. Its strong ties with the financial sector in the USA made the UK
vulnerable to financial shocks (Hodson and Mabbett, 2009). In 2007, Barclays
Bank received two financial injections and mortgage lender Northern Rock
was nationalised in 2008. The financial sector was further supported by a
bailout package of £500 billion (C= 575 billion) of liquidity support, government
guarantees of bank issuances, and the purchase of (toxic) bank equities. In
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responding to the negative effects of the financial crisis on the real economy,
the Labour government implemented a number of additional policies. Most
of these measures, for an amount of roughly £20 billion (C= 23 billion), were
announced in the Pre-Budget Report 2008 (HM Treasury, 2008). Supplementing
measures were taken in the Budget Report 2009 (HM Treasury, 2009). Many
of these measures aimed to stimulate the economy, by means of Keynesian
investments in infrastructure, support to the manufacturing industry and the
severely afflicted housing market, and by temporary tax relief for businesses
or consumers. The most important measure was a temporary cut in the value
added tax (VAT) on consumption from 17.5 per cent to 15 per cent for 13
months (Clegg, 2010).
Although the British government was an active crisis manager in the
financial sector, it chose a highly laissez-faire strategy in social and unemploy-
ment crisis policies. It was quite unwilling to improve, even temporarily, its
already low supportive unemployment policies (Clegg, 2010: 5). Almost all
that the British government implemented as reactive measures were demand-
led labour market measures to stimulate activation. Most importantly, from
January 2009 onwards employers received a subsidy of £2,500 (C= 2,900) when
recruiting a person who has been unemployed for over six months (HM Treas-
ury, 2009). Next to this demand-driven stimulus, activation was encouraged
through increasing income tax allowances, except for high income groups (HM
Government, 2009). The administration also raised its funding for programmes
designed to get the unemployed back to work. A total amount of £3 billion
(C= 3.4 billion) was invested in 2009 in initiatives such as ‘Jobcentre Plus’, ‘Train
to Gain’, and ‘Local Employment Partnerships’. Additionally, it mediated for
apprenticeships tendered by private parties, and tried to enhance training
possibilities for unemployed people (HM Government, 2009; EIRO, 2009f).
Minimum engagements were observed in terms of passive labour market
programmes as well. There was a slight increase in the maximum statutory
redundancy pay for the middle and high income earners (HM Treasury, 2009:
13), a marginal non-recurring bonuses for pensioners of £60 (C= 69) and for
families with children £22 (C= 25), and a temporary increase of the child allow-
ance (HM Treasury, 2008: 6-7).
This laissez-faire approach by the government resulted in involvement from
the social partners. Social partners signed collective agreements concerning
the reduction of working hours and respective wages to save jobs (EIRO, 2009g).
In 2009, the median pay settlement dropped to 1 per cent (EIRO, 2009h). More-
over, occupational pensions have been cut in the hardest affected sectors (EIRO,
2009h).
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6.4.3 Social democratic strategies – the case of Sweden
Although even Sweden has implemented cutbacks in its welfare state in recent
times (Vis, 2009), it is still exemplified by its generous social policies combined
with supply-stimulus activation by public interventions and a large public
sector employment. As Sweden was faring well before the crisis started, the
centre-right four-party coalition was relatively late in its crisis reaction. The
initial point of interest was the viability of the financial sector and the real
economy (e.g. Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2008a). The Swedish Central Bank
supported the long-term credits with a loan facility of SEK 60 billion (C= 6.3
billion). Keynesian investments were implemented in education, infrastructure,
and research and development (e.g. Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2008b).
Moreover, the corporate tax rate was lowered from 28 per cent to 26.3 per
cent.
Sweden was also relatively active in adopting social and unemployment
reactive policies, compared to our other country cases. In total, the state has
adopted crisis policies of SEK 45 billion in 2009 and SEK 60 billion in 2010 (C= 4.7
billion and C= 6.3 billion; Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2009a). Its strategy
consisted of a combination of striving for full employment, whilst at the same
time providing income security and cushioning temporary unemployment
(Swedish Prime Minister’s Office, 2008: 1).
The centre-right coalition adopted many activation programmes (the ‘work-
first principle’). The Swedish government provided relief and employment
incentives for employers and employees by lowering payroll tax and unem-
ployment contributions (EIRO, 2008). Both of these contributions were reduced
even more for young employees, who were amongst the hardest hit during
the crisis in Sweden (Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2008b; EIRO, 2008). Another
incentive introduced by the Swedish government to increase employment was
the reduction in the employment tax by half for employers hiring long-term
unemployed persons. In the crisis package announced in December 2008, the
administration also focused on creating jobs and education possibilities. To
this end, the student grant for people over 25 was profoundly increased to
80 per cent of the total study allowance (EIRO, 2009i), and more was spent on
different employment programmes. One of these programmes, Lyft (‘boost’),
consisted of 40,000 temporary job positions in (semi-) public sectors (Swedish
Ministry of Finance, 2009b; EIRO, 2009j).
Alongside the activation incentives, the government tried to cushion
temporary unemployment by means of expanding its already rather generous
passive labour market programmes. The conditions to receive unemployment
benefits were relaxed by reducing the qualifying period, and the complete
abolishment of the requirement of a work history (Swedish Ministry of Finance,
2008b; EIRO, 2008). To ensure that these welfare programmes could be financed,
municipalities received increasing grants of SEK 5 billion per year (C= 520
million), and a supplementary SEK 7 billion (C= 730 million) in 2010 (Swedish
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Ministry of Finance, 2008b). Income security was also provided through
changes in tax benefits. The in-work tax credit was lowered, whilst the income
tax deduction was raised. The lower threshold for state income tax was also
raised to increase personal allowance. Combined, these measures entailed a
tax reduction of over SEK 1,000 per month (C= 105) for 97 per cent of full-time
employees (Swedish Ministry of Finance, 2008b). Additionally, taxes for pen-
sioners with marginal income-based pensions were lowered, which affected
up to 90 per cent of the country’s pensioners (Swedish Ministry of Finance,
2008b).
Although Sweden was active in stimulating employment whilst providing
income security for individuals, it did not directly intervene in the labour
market relations to protect jobs and salaries as seen in the German case. The
negotiations concerning jobs and terms of employment in Sweden are bipartite
and often sectoral (Van Ruysseveldt and Visser, 1996). In these negotiations
between social partners, historical agreements have been made in 2008 and
2009. Although comprehensive temporary layoffs were not officially provided
as an instrument for employers, social partners have agreed upon agreements
concerning temporary dismissals in many sectors to avoid massive re-
dundancies (EIRO, 2009l; 2009m; 2009n). In the manufacturing industry for
instance, an agreement was reached in 2009 that salaries and working hours
can be cut in case of decrease in orders, in exchange for no or less layoffs,
sometimes complemented with training possibilities for employees (EIRO,
2009k). Additionally, agreements have been made at the local level concerning
cuts in holiday allowances, bonuses, and wage freeze.
6.5 COMPARISON OF THE REACTIVE POLICY STRATEGIES
Our comparison of the reactive policies of Germany, the UK and Sweden shows
that there are remarkable differences in their reactive strategies, as is shown
in Table 6.1.
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The German reactive policies can be interpreted as being designed to keep
insiders in the labour market to preserve their skills, and provide companies
with skill maintenance, through active state interventions. This was done by
using short-time unemployment on a massive scale, subsidised by the state,
which ensured that insiders, skilled workers, stayed in their specific jobs. This
maintenance of jobs and firm- or sectoral-specific skills plays a crucial role
in corporatist countries, such as Germany, to keep their competitive advantages
in the global market (e.g. Hall and Soskice, 2001). Germany also implemented
a phased early retirement scheme for older employees, subsidised by the state.
This scheme was designed to make space for new people, without insiders
bearing any of the costs. Furthermore, the implemented tax cuts are typically
conservative, due to the fact that the cuts, mostly found in health insurance
and social benefit contributions, provided relief for employers and already
employed, who are the insiders in the labour market. The active crisis labour
market programmes were also made to benefit and maintain the insider
Table 6.1 Overview of national social and unemployment policies 
 Germany  United Kingdom  Sweden 










 State investments in mediating 
for jobs  
 
Training possibilities for 
unemployed, esp. young 
persons  
 
Bonus for employers when 
recruiting long-term 
unemployed  
 Places created for temporary work 
in (semi-) public sectors  
 
Student grant people over 25 
increased  
 
Employer tax for hiring long-term 












Extension of drawing period 
for short-time work 
allowances out of general 
taxes. State reimburses 
expenses of employers 
 
Tax rate first bracket lowered 
 
Allowances in personal 
income tax increased 
 




contributions lowered  
 Increase in maximum weekly 





Allowances in personal 
income tax increased, except 
for high incomes  
 
 Qualifying period reduced, 
demand of work history dropped 




First threshold income tax raised  
 
In-work tax credit lowered  
 
Income tax deduction raised  
 
Social security contributions 
lowered, especially for young 
people  
 
Payroll tax contributions lowered, 





Partial retirement scheme for 
older employees, subsidised 
by state  
 Marginal non-recursive 
pension bonus  
 Tax rate of pensioners lowered  
Family 
policies 
Increased child benefit, child 
allowance, child bonus  
 Marginal non-recursive child 




market, by providing training mostly for workers with employment. Due to
this, it has been noted that job losses during the crisis have been seen mostly
in the margin, thus the temporary workforce (Eichhorst et al., 2010). In addi-
tion, it has been noted that the recovery packages have mostly been aimed
towards male-dominated sectors, whilst no national plans were made to
prevent a decline in female employment (EIRO, 2010). Overall, Germany’s social
and unemployment reactive policy strategy shows conservative characteristics,
as its strategy has a profound inclination to maintain traditional status relations
in labour markets.
The social and unemployment reactive policy strategy of the UK can be
largely typified by passively relying on market forces, with a low degree of
government intervention and targeted residual social policies leading to low
decommodification. The unwillingness of the British government to improve
its low supportive unemployment policies led to involvement at the company
level to set up agreements concerning reduction of working hours and wages,
but it also ended in mass redundancies. The only passive labour market
programme implemented was a modest increase in the statutory redundancy
pay for medium and high earners, and marginal non-recurrent bonuses
targeted to pensioners and families with children. Almost all policies that the
UK government did implement can be characterised as demand stimulations,
such as a stimulus for employers for new hires and a stimulus for consumers
by the VAT decrease. This market system reliance and demand-driven policies,
along with its residual welfare state approach can be considered typically
liberal, reflecting its past legacies.
The Swedish reaction is exemplified by its strong emphasis on activation,
combined with the provision of income security. Sweden stimulated activation
in the labour market by cutting income and employment taxes, and by actively
creating places for temporary work in the (semi-) public sector to keep a skilled
workforce. In addition, it has expanded its already generous income protection
programmes for the general public and universal social policies. Whilst the
Swedish government was very active in providing income security and
stimulating activation, it did not so much directly protect jobs and salaries
of employees as the German government did. Therefore, cuts in jobs, working
hours and wages have occurred frequently through bipartite sectoral agree-
ments. This approach of Sweden of providing generous universal income
protection, and employment via the public sector, whilst focusing on activation
can be understood as the typical socio-democratic approach.
6.6 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
This article aims to fill the gap in the research on short-term policy responses,
by examining the reactive policy strategies of three welfare states, namely
Germany, UK and Sweden. Our article shows that even though the crisis
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presented sudden and severe problems to the economies of all our three
country cases, the reactive social and unemployment policy strategies of the
three countries are remarkably different. These differences in reactive policy
strategies can be understood largely by the different institutional legacies of
the three countries as argued by Esping-Andersen (1990). Germany’s strategy
shows conservative characteristics by maintaining the traditional status re-
lations, as well as focusing on keeping the key skilled male workforce in their
jobs. The UK, however, chose a liberal strategy, relying on market forces whilst
providing residual policies to targeted groups. Sweden on the other hand
adopted strong activation measures combined with generous passive labour
market schemes to provide universal income security, which is typically socio-
democratic in character. In addition, our study shows that the reactive policies
adopted by the national governments were essentially not new, but can be
seen as a succession or extension of existing ideas and paradigms from their
institutional legacies. Therefore, the degree of policy innovation was limited.
In their immediate reactions, our country cases seem to have fallen back on
their old habits by using the tools they know best.
As the adopted national reactive policy strategies can be largely explained
by the countries’ institutional legacy, it suggests that the path dependence
theory is applicable to reactive policies. This result is even stronger when we
consider the fact that the centre-right cabinet of Sweden used a social demo-
cratic strategy, whilst the Labour Party in the UK largely relied on liberal
rationales. Still, it is difficult to assess whether the policy responses would
be the same when other political affiliations would be in office. Although the
UK’s response was essentially based on a laissez-faire approach, it has inter-
vened in market forces, for instance by fiscally stimulating employers to hire
the long-term unemployed. Perhaps we can see here the leftist inclination,
but it could also be due to the fact that the UK is less of a classic liberal
example than for instance the USA (Arts and Gelissen, 2002).
In addition, our study suggests that reactive policy strategies are affected
by different dynamics than structural long-term policy developments. We do
not find evidence for a further process of convergence in reactive policy
strategies, whereas a gradual process of retrenchment and employability in
structural policy-making has been noted in long-term policy developments
of the welfare states under investigation (Dingeldey, 2007). This suggests that
countries fall back on their institutional legacy in the first ‘fire fighting’ phase
of social and unemployment crisis management. In addition, our study shows
that in the immediate phase, this crisis was not used to implement cutbacks
or reforms, as could be expected from agenda-setting theories. Whether this
crisis will be used to implement major reforms in a later state, and whether
the general process of retrenchment continues then, remains to be seen.
There are some limitations to this study. It should be noted here that
because of the strategic most-similar systems design case study with non-
representative cases, the generalisability of the study is relatively marginal.
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We have compared the archetypical European examples of the different
regimes, whereas other scholars have noted that other countries are more
difficult to classify using Esping-Andersen’s framework (Arts and Gelissen,
2002). It would be interesting to extend this study and look at the crisis
response policies of more countries, including more ambiguous cases.
A second downside of the most-similar systems design is the problem of
possible extraneous variables. The countries roughly share a number of im-
portant characteristics, including their geography, their membership of the
EU, and, to a certain extent, the consequences of the financial and economic
crisis. Other characteristics differ, including the political affiliation and the
economic composition of the three countries. For instance, Germany can be
characterised by its manufacturing industry and export-driven economy,
whereas the UK has a large global financial sector. Sweden is also an open
economy that relies heavily on foreign markets. The differences in economic
composition influenced the impact of the crisis on the national economies to
a certain extent (Eichhorst et al., 2010). However, we can see that industrial
differences do not seem to explain the dissimilarities we find in the reactive
social and unemployment policy strategies as well as the path dependence
theory of institutional legacies does. In addition, the industrial differences and
composition are in some ways integral parts of the legacies of these welfare
states, by reflecting their institutional advantages (Hall and Soskice, 2001).
In order to assess the influence of the political persuasion, more countries need
to be compared. If data are available, it would also be interesting to compare
previous crises responses, to see whether the conclusions made in our article
can actually be applicable for different crises at different periods of time.
7 Conclusions
In this final chapter I summarise the main findings of the previous chapters.
Subsequently, I reflect on how these findings contribute to the academic
literature and on their societal relevance in more general terms. Finally, I indi-
cate a number of directions for future research.
7.1 PUTTING THINGS TOGETHER
This dissertation consists of a collection of five chapters aiming to provide
insight into determinants and political and economic consequences of rising
levels of income inequality and social policy development in affluent countries.
Chapter 2 maps trends in intrasectoral inequality in 19 sectors across 8
OECD countries between 1985 and 2005 based on micro data from LIS. These
trends are contrasted with differences in exposure to international trade,
technological change, and labour market institutions. The chapter points to
the importance of taking note of sectoral trends for our understanding of
earnings inequality. On average, the levels of intrasectoral inequality within
countries vary as much as the levels of country-level inequality between
countries. Moreover, sectors differ widely in their level of exposure to inter-
national trade and technological change. Levels of intrasectoral inequality went
up in most sectors on average over time. A decomposition shows that intra-
sectoral inequality developments are significantly more important than earnings
differences between sectors for the level of inequality at the country level.
Cross-sectional pooled time-series analyses do not provide evidence for asso-
ciations between total international trade or technological change and intra-
sectoral earnings inequality. Nevertheless, there are signs of shrinkage of
employment in sectors exposed to international trade. The decrease of trade
union power at the country level is associated with higher levels of intra-
sectoral inequality.
Chapter 3 delves into the effects of imports from China in more detail.
Given its large volume of low-wage labour, the rapid rise of China on the
global economic stage might have inequality-enhancing effects in developed
countries. The empirical part of this chapter is based on wage and employment
shares across skill groups in 17 sectors for 18 countries between 1990 and 2007.
Particular attention is paid to the effects of competition with China in foreign
export markets, a channel that has been ignored thus far in comparative
136 Chapter 7
political economy studies. The analysis shows that employment declines in
sectors that are more exposed to imports from China. Chinese import com-
petition and competition in foreign export markets have a disadvantageous
impact on low-skilled workers, whilst high-skilled workers gain from com-
petition in foreign export markets. This results in higher levels of intrasectoral
earnings inequality for sectors more exposed to Chinese import competition.
Technological change has no effects on the overall employment size of sectors.
Yet, technological innovation contributes to negative employment and wage
effects for low-skilled workers whilst the high skilled benefit from it.
Subsequently, Chapter 4 differentiates between multiple channels through
which income inequality and redistribution might affect economic output levels
in advanced democracies. Inequality as such and the redistribution of taxes
and transfers might have opposing or reinforcing effects on economic growth.
Inequality might for instance affect growth when it lowers opportunities for
people to invest in human capital, or it might push people to put forth addi-
tional effort, as relative gains are higher. Redistribution could lower growth
by reducing the incentives for individuals to gain income, whilst it might also
lower any negative impacts of inequality on growth. Ideally, one would
distinguish between these two channels. At least, data should be used that
consistently distinguish between income distribution before and after govern-
ment intervention. The empirical analyses do not point to robust associations
between generic measures of income inequality and economic growth, nor
between redistribution and economic growth for 25 countries between 1975
and 2009. However, there are positive associations between the share of income
held by the top end of the distribution and economic growth, although the
coefficients are small.
Chapter 5 comprises an examination of the possible political effects of an
often-mentioned culprit suspected of increasing earnings inequality, techno-
logical change. Current advancements in information technology involve risks
for individuals holding routine intensive task occupations, as these occupations
can be automated relatively easily. The chapter finds evidence that supports
the implications of a simple theoretical framework in which risk-averse indi-
viduals prefer insurance against occupational hazards when markets cannot
provide such insurance. As social protection arrangements that offer such
insurance are redistributive, this will translate into higher redistribution
preferences for individuals more exposed to occupational risks. This analysis
is conducted for 21 occupations across 23 European countries between 2002
and 2012. The degree of routine task intensity of an occupation is a significant
determinant of the redistribution preferences of individuals. Moreover, the
preferences for redistribution resulting from risks of technological change are
accentuated by two factors: first, whether individuals are employed in sectors
that are more exposed to technological change, and second, whether an indi-
vidual’s income level is higher.
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Chapter 6 is a case study of social and unemployment policy development
in three countries, namely, Germany, the UK, and Sweden. It aims to add to
our understanding of short-term reactions of states to sudden events by analys-
ing the policy strategies adopted by these three countries in response to the
Great Recession in 2008 and 2009. These particular countries seem to have
fallen back on old habits by adopting social and unemployment reactive
policies that can be identified based on their institutional legacies, indicating
path dependence. This suggests that reactive policy strategies can be explained
by different dynamics than the more structural long-term policy developments
that show signs of convergence.
7.2 SOCIETAL AND SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE
Recently, international organisations and public policy makers have
emphasised the importance of improving our understanding of the causes and
consequences of the widespread trend towards rising earnings dispersion in
affluent countries (IMF, 2007; OECD, 2011a; Cingano, 2014). Examining the causes
and consequences of inequality is important from a societal perspective, as
a widening of the income differences might evoke social unrest, potentially
could affect total economic output, or can be deemed unfair from a normative
perspective. Also when rising inequality would be a consequence of changes
in labour market landscapes due to technological change or international trade
rather than a deliberate political choice, an examination of its causes, conse-
quences, or social policy developments is societally relevant. An improved
understanding of who gains or loses from what development, what the conse-
quences may be, and what social policy answers are available will add to our
understanding of what is taking place, what can be done about it, and whether
redistribution as income compensation for groups that are losing out would
make sense. Still, acting in itself by means of redistribution clearly is a political
choice.
The empirical findings in this dissertation are in line with theories predict-
ing inequality-enhancing effects of labour market institutions, technological
change, and international trade. The bargaining coverage rate of trade unions
is associated with a more equal distribution of earnings, but the influence of
trade unions in wage bargaining has decreased in most countries over time.
Furthermore, international trade, in particular Chinese import competition
and competition in foreign export markets, is negatively related to the employ-
ment size. Trade competition with China has distributive effects as the high
skilled benefit whilst wage shares and hours worked of low skilled employees
go down. Governments can choose to compensate the low skilled employees
when their disadvantageous labour market position is considered to be undesir-
able. Furthermore, the influence of trade unions in wage bargaining could be
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enforced by states as a means to equalise wages in line with the concept of
pre-distribution (Hacker, 2011).
No support is found for negative effects of rising levels of income inequality
on economic growth, though clearly, the empirical validity of this finding must
be assessed whilst taking into account the complexity of such endeavour. This
could imply that a growing dispersion in incomes does not have a clear
relation with the total size of the income pie. Of course, inequality can still
be considered as undesirable, or the opposite for that matter, on the basis of
normative judgement. Furthermore, this dissertation provides evidence for
political consequences of labour market trends associated with rising inequality.
Individuals in routine jobs who have a higher risk of job loss due to auto-
mation prefer higher levels of redistribution. Thus, skill-biased technological
change could potentially translate into higher levels of actual redistribution.
Academically, I aim to contribute to the field of comparative political
economy in specific ways that are discussed in more detail in the separate
chapters. Here I discuss what I consider the two most fundamental contribu-
tions. First, in multiple chapters I seek to move beyond generic country level
measures of the variables of interest by combining sectoral, occupational, and
country level data to sketch a more detailed picture. The analysis is based on
multiple measures of income and earnings inequality, and employment and
wage shares across skill groups. By doing so, I explicitly regard the significant
variation in inequality patterns across sectors, but also the sectoral and occupa-
tional differences in exposure to possible causes of earnings dispersion, in
particular technological change and international trade.
A second contribution to the field of comparative political economy is the
simultaneous and more extensive analysis of potential causes and political
consequences of rising wage inequality. In this doctoral thesis a prominent
role is played by technological change, which has received considerable atten-
tion in labour economics but much less so in comparative political economy.
Technological change is a difficult concept to grasp and measure, but the
analyses presented here indicate that it can have distributive effects and also
influence the redistribution preferences of individuals. This doctoral study
also broadens the scope of examining international trade, by analysing the
effects of total trade as well as trade competition with China in local and
foreign export markets. China’s surge in the global economy has not been
covered in detail in the comparative political economy literature on wage
inequality. Moreover, the competition in foreign export markets has been
neglected thus far in this strain of literature, whilst I find it to positively affect
the employment and wages of high-skilled employees whereas it has a dis-
advantageous impact on low-skilled workers. Compared to the labour eco-
nomics literature on wage inequality with sectoral designs this thesis devotes
a relatively large amount of attention to the role of labour market institutions.
In this way I hope to contribute to bridging the gap between labour economics
and comparative political economy.
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7.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS
A number of lines of future inquiry can be discerned, which are described
in greater detail in the different chapters. First, this doctoral thesis only begins
to explore sectoral and occupational elements concerning inequality and social
policy development. In particular, shifts of individuals between sectors and
occupations resulting from exposure to international trade or technological
change are not measured, as the analyses are based on time series rather than
micro panel data. Also for our understanding of economic and political conse-
quences a micro panel design would be beneficial. For instance, individuals
and their redistribution preferences moving away from exposed occupations
and sectors are now attributed to non-exposed occupations and sectors. As
micro panel data are starting to become available for a larger set of countries
and years, this would be an interesting avenue to further explore inequality
and its dynamics.
Second, in this doctoral thesis economic growth only enters the analysis
as a dependent variable in the examination of effects of inequality on growth.
Arguably, the real societal challenge is how to ensure that economic growth
delivers prosperity for the population at large. This issue of inclusive growth
or trickling down requires an analysis of living standards across the distribu-
tion over time, rather than only looking at an average measure of economic
progress such as real GDP per capita (Stiglitz et al., 2009; OECD, 2014h). An
analysis of inequality measures that only capture relative wage differences,
such as Gini indices, also do not reveal trends in absolute living standards
of different groups. Such a research agenda might depart from evaluations
of periods of inclusive growth across countries over time, which can be con-
trasted with trends in technological change, international trade, labour market
institutions, and social policies in place.
A third and arguably more ambitious research agenda would be to move
away from income as the yardstick to evaluate the distribution of living
standards and to consider how the resulting income distribution came to be
in the first place. Income is an outcome measure. It captures the amount of
money a person or household has managed to gather within a certain reference
period. Income does not necessarily reveal whether people were in the same
exogenously given position to begin with to attain this income, regardless of
the educational level of their parents, their race or gender, for instance. Studies
of inequality of opportunities try to differentiate between inequality of oppor-
tunity and inequality of effort (Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011; Niehues and Peichl,
2014). Conducting such a decomposition requires a definition of what factors
cannot be influenced individually as well as quality data that contain extensive
information on individual characteristics in addition to income. Yet, for our
understanding of the effects of inequality on economic growth, for instance,
such a decomposition might be valuable. It is possible that inequality of
opportunity hampers growth whilst inequality of effort can provide a boost
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by incentivising people. Also for the political issue whether individuals should
be compensated via redistribution because of rising inequality it seems im-
portant to know whether the distribution is by and large a consequence of
rising circumstantial differences or due to a difference in personal effort or
productivity.
A final recommendation for future research results from limitations of the
study presented here. Although in this thesis income inequality and social
policy development are viewed through a magnifying glass, this glass is
inevitably blurred. The most fundamental issues stem from the non-ex-
perimental character of the research conducted, which is arguably always a
problem for research in the field of comparative political economy. Clearly,
progress that can be made in order to better differentiate between causes and
consequences would be greatly advantageous to constructing effective policies.
In the meantime, this thesis points out directions for more detailed examin-
ations of income inequality and social policy development in affluent countries.
Samenvatting (Dutch summary)
UIT ELKAAR GEGROEID: DE POLITIEKE ECONOMIE VAN INKOMENSONGELIJKHEID
EN DE ONTWIKKELING VAN SOCIAALECONOMISCH BELEID IN WELVARENDE LANDEN
Tot het uitbreken van de financiële crisis in 2007 is gedurende de laatste
decennia het besteedbaar inkomen per hoofd van de bevolking in ontwikkelde
landen toegenomen. Van deze inkomensgroei heeft echter niet iedereen in
dezelfde mate geprofiteerd. In de meeste ontwikkelde landen is de inkomens-
ongelijkheid gestegen. Voor een significant deel was dit het gevolg van geste-
gen loonongelijkheid, met name tussen laag- en hoogopgeleide werknemers.
In dit proefschrift probeer ik inzicht te verschaffen in determinanten en
politieke en economische gevolgen van toegenomen inkomensongelijkheid
en ontwikkelingen in sociaaleconomisch beleid in internationaal-vergelijkend
perspectief. Dit proefschrift bestaat naast een inleiding en conclusie uit een
verzameling van vijf zelfstandig te lezen hoofdstukken. Vier van deze hoofd-
stukken zijn in coproductie tot stand gekomen. In de hoofdstukken over
oorzaken en gevolgen van ongelijkheid beperk ik me tot informatie over
inkomen en werkgelegenheid. De empirische analyses in deze hoofdstukken
zijn kwantitatief en omvatten lidstaten van de Organisatie voor Economische
Samenwerking en Ontwikkeling (OESO) tussen grofweg 1970 en 2012. In het
bijzonder wordt er gebruik gemaakt van data op beroeps- en sectoraal niveau.
Het laatste hoofdstuk gaat over de implementatie van sociaaleconomische
crisismaatregelen als directe reactie op de financiële crisis in 2008 en 2009.
In dit hoofdstuk wordt onderzocht of er sprake is van convergentie of padaf-
hankelijkheid in crisisbeleid. Hiertoe worden de genomen crisismaatregelen
in Zweden, Duitsland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk met elkaar vergeleken. In
de politicologische literatuur worden de genoemde landen gezien als school-
voorbeeld van een sociaaldemocratische, een conservatieve, respectievelijk een
liberale verzorgingsstaat. De landen werden alle drie sterk geraakt door de
crisis.
Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 gaan over determinanten van ongelijkheid. In de politieke
economie en arbeidseconomie worden vooral veranderingen in arbeidsmarkt-
instituties, internationale handel en technologische ontwikkeling genoemd als
oorzaken van toegenomen loonongelijkheid. Ten eerste is gedurende de laatste
decennia het belang van bepaalde arbeidsmarktinstituties met een nivellerend
karakter, zoals de invloed van vakbonden in loonbepaling, afgenomen. Ten
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tweede is in deze periode de handel met lagelonenlanden sterk gestegen.
Blootstelling aan internationale handel kan leiden tot verplaatsing van produc-
tie en werkgelegenheid naar het buitenland. Aangezien toegenomen import
uit lagelonenlanden in het bijzonder effecten kan hebben op lonen en werkge-
legenheid van laaggeschoolde werknemers in ontwikkelde landen, kan dit
hebben bijgedragen aan een stijging in de loonongelijkheid. Ten derde maken
recente ontwikkelingen in technologie automatisering van routinematig werk
relatief goedkoper. Dit kan negatieve effecten hebben voor individuen in
beroepen met een meer routinematig karakter. Deze beroepen bevinden zich
met name in het midden- en lagere segment van de loonverdeling. De arbeids-
marktpositie van individuen met een meer abstract beroep met gemiddeld
hogere lonen wordt juist door deze technologische ontwikkelingen versterkt.
De empirische analyse in hoofdstuk 2 bestaat uit een vergelijking van
inkomensongelijkheidsniveaus binnen sectoren in acht landen gebaseerd op
LIS-microdata uit de periode 1985-2005. Uit een decompositie van ongelijkheid
op nationaal niveau komt naar voren dat ongelijkheid binnen sectoren – de
intrasectorale ongelijkheid – een veel grotere invloed heeft op het niveau en
de toename van ongelijkheid op nationaal niveau dan loonverschillen tussen
sectoren. In de meeste sectoren nam de intrasectorale ongelijkheid in de loop
van de tijd toe. Sectorale verschillen in blootstelling aan internationale handel
en technologische vooruitgang bieden geen significante verklaring voor deze
wijdverspreide stijging in intrasectorale ongelijkheid. De afname in dekkings-
graad van collectieve loononderhandelingen toont wel een significant verband
met intrasectorale ongelijkheid.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt nader ingegaan op effecten van import uit China
op de loonongelijkheid in ontwikkelde landen. China heeft een groot volume
aan laagbetaalde werknemers. Niet alleen wordt er aandacht besteed aan de
mate van blootstelling aan Chinese import in verschillende sectoren in ontwik-
kelde landen, maar ook wordt getracht in kaart te brengen in hoeverre handels-
competitie met China in buitenlandse exportmarkten is toegenomen. Bestaande
studies in de politieke economie nemen handelscompetitie in buitenlandse
exportmarkten niet mee in hun analyses. Lonen en werkgelegenheidsmogelijk-
heden van laaggeschoolde werknemers in ontwikkelde landen kunnen immers
ook onder druk komen te staan wanneer dit land minder kan exporteren naar
andere landen, omdat het voor deze andere landen aantrekkelijker wordt om
Chinese goederen te importeren.
Voor het empirische gedeelte van hoofdstuk 3 wordt gebruik gemaakt van
informatie over het aandeel van arbeidsuren en lonen van laag- en hoog-
geschoolde werknemers op sectoraal niveau in 18 landen tussen 1990 en 2007.
Blootstelling aan Chinese import en competitie met China in buitenlandse
exportmarkten hebben negatieve effecten op de werkgelegenheid en lonen
van laaggeschoolde werknemers. Hooggeschoolden profiteren daarentegen
van concurrentie in buitenlandse exportmarkten. Dit komt overeen met eerder
onderzoek voor Groot-Brittannië dat laat zien dat toegenomen handelsconcur-
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rentie leidt tot meer innovatie en productiviteit in exporterende industrieën
waar hooggeschoolde werknemers van profiteren. Er is bewijs voor een nega-
tief verband tussen technologische vooruitgang en de arbeidsmarktpositie van
laaggeschoolde werknemers, terwijl technologische vooruitgang positief lijkt
uit te werken voor hooggeschoolde werknemers. Zoals eerder onderzoek voor
de VS heeft uitgewezen, heeft import uit China negatieve effecten op de sectora-
le werkgelegenheid als percentage van de totale werkgelegenheid op nationaal
niveau. Technologische vooruitgang heeft echter alleen effecten op de werkgele-
genheidsverdeling tussen laag- en hooggeschoolden.
Na in hoofdstuk 2 en 3 ingegaan te zijn op de oorzaken, richten hoofdstuk-
ken 4 en 5 zich op de mogelijke gevolgen van inkomensongelijkheid. Hoofd-
stuk 4 concentreert zich daarbij op economische groei. Het is mogelijk dat
inkomensverschillen in de algehele populatie andere effecten hebben op de
specifieke toename in loonaandelen in de top van de loonverdeling. Inkomens-
verschillen in de algehele populatie kunnen bijvoorbeeld scholingskansen
negatief beïnvloeden, of juist economische groei stimuleren wanneer mensen
worden geprikkeld door de relatief grotere loonverschillen. Grotere loonaan-
delen aan de top kunnen gunstig zijn voor private investeringen, of juist de
groei belemmeren wanneer deze aandelen worden aangewend om te lobbyen
om voordelen via de politiek te bewerkstelligen. De analyse van effecten van
ongelijkheid op economische groei wordt verder bemoeilijkt door het feit dat
herverdeling ook en wellicht tegengestelde effecten kan hebben op economische
groei. In de economische wetenschap is de hypothese dat herverdeling loon-
prikkels en daarmee groei negatief beïnvloedt gezaghebbend.
Het is methodologisch ingewikkeld om een strikt onderscheid te maken
tussen effecten van inkomensongelijkheid en herverdeling op economische
groei. In ieder geval is het van belang om gebruik te maken van data waarin
een onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen ongelijkheid voor of na herverdelende
belastingen en overdrachten. Wanneer gegevens van 25 landen tussen 1975
en 2009 worden geanalyseerd, worden met betrekking tot ongelijkheids- en
herverdelingsmaatstaven die de gehele bevolking omvatten geen significante
verbanden met economische groei gevonden. Wel is er een positieve relatie
tussen het loonaandeel van de topinkomens en de economische groei, maar
de coëfficiënten zijn klein.
Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft een onderzoek naar mogelijke politieke consequenties
van inkomensongelijkheid. Meer specifiek wordt er een analyse uitgevoerd
of individuen die meer blootgesteld zijn aan technologische vooruitgang –
zoals reeds besproken een veelgenoemde oorzaak van ongelijkheid – meer
herverdeling prefereren als publieke verzekering tegen het toegenomen risico
op baanverlies. Publieke verzekeringen tegen bijvoorbeeld werkloosheid hebben
herverdelende effecten. Huidige technologische ontwikkelingen maken automa-
tisering van routinematig werk relatief eenvoudiger. Op basis van microdata
in 23 landen tussen 2002 en 2012 blijken individuen in routinematige beroepen
meer herverdeling te prefereren. Deze relatie wordt sterker voor individuen
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die werkzaam zijn in sectoren die zijn blootgesteld aan technologische vooruit-
gang, en voor mensen met een hoger inkomen aangezien zij meer te verliezen
hebben in geval van baanverlies.
Tot slot omvat hoofdstuk 6 een casestudy van sociaaleconomisch crisis-
beleid in Duitsland, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Zweden als reactie op de
financiële crisis in 2008 en 2009. Deze landen worden gekenmerkt door een
verschillende institutionele geschiedenis. Zweden wordt gezien als een typische
sociaaldemocratische verzorgingsstaat, terwijl Duitsland en het Verenigd
Koninkrijk worden beschouwd als vertegenwoordigers van respectievelijk
conservatieve en liberale verzorgingsstaten. Vaak wordt gesteld dat op de lange
termijn deze institutionele verschillen lijken te verkleinen aangezien het sociaal-
economisch beleid tekenen van convergentie vertoont. Als directe reactie op
de financiële crisis op de korte termijn daarentegen lijken de landen padafhan-
kelijk te reageren. De crisisbeleidsstrategieën van de landen kunnen namelijk
verklaard worden door verschillen in de institutionele geschiedenis. Dit sugge-
reert dat beleidsstrategieën op de korte termijn verklaard kunnen worden door
andere dynamieken dan beleidsontwikkelingen op de lange termijn.
Uit dit proefschrift komt het belang naar voren om op meer gedetailleerd
sectoraal- en beroepsniveau dan in plaats van alleen overkoepelend nationaal
niveau te kijken naar ontwikkelingen in inkomensongelijkheid. Er is substan-
tiële variatie in niveaus van ongelijkheid, loonaandelen en werkgelegenheid
tussen sectoren binnen landen. Aldus kan een meer gedetailleerd beeld verkre-
gen worden van trends in ongelijkheid. Bovendien verschilt binnen landen
de blootstelling aan mogelijke oorzaken van inkomensongelijkheid sterk tussen
sectoren en beroepen. Dit kan worden gebruikt om meer inzicht te krijgen
in mogelijke oorzaken – en daarmee indien gewenst mogelijke beleidsoplossin-
gen – van ongelijkheid.
Een tweede bijdrage aan de politieke economie omvat de meer uitgebreide
analyse van oorzaken en politieke gevolgen van inkomensongelijkheid. Binnen
de politieke economie is de impact van technologische vooruitgang nog weinig
onderzocht, terwijl de huidige technologische innovaties ongelijkheidsverster-
kende effecten hebben en tevens de herverdelingspreferenties van individuen
beïnvloeden. Bovendien wordt in dit proefschrift aandacht besteed aan inter-
nationale handel, importcompetitie specifiek uit China en handelscompetitie
met China in buitenlandse exportmarkten. Deze laatste twee factoren zijn
eveneens nog weinig onderzocht maar blijken positieve effecten voor hoogop-
geleide werknemers, maar negatieve effecten voor laagopgeleide werknemers
in ontwikkelde landen te hebben.
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